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Chapter 7

Rethinking Guomintang National Minority Policy and the Case of Inner Mongolia

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I. Introduction

On the Chinese mainland, historians generally depict the Guomintang's minority policy in starkly negative terms. They contend that Chiang Kai-shek's Central Government denied the very existence of minority nationalities and attempted to forcefully assimilate all minorities into a single, Han-dominated *Zhonghua minzu*, or "Chinese race/nation." This "Fascist" approach is frequently contrasted with Sun Yat-sen's policy of minority self-determination and self-rule formulated during the last years of his life under Comintern influence. The official textbook of Beijing's Central Party School, for example, describes Guomintang national minority policy as one of "discrimination, oppression and assimilation."ⁱ

Historians writing outside China have largely perpetuated this uniformly negative characterization. Lacking an independent and systematic analysis of the national question in China, Western scholars have tended to uncritically adopt the attitude of their mainland secondary sources. For example, Linda Benson's summary of Guomintang policy closely dovetails the description of the Central Party School.ⁱⁱ Edwin Leung, a Western-trained historian, argues that the "real function" of the Commission on Mongolian and Tibetan

Affairs (*Mengzang weiyuanhui*, CMTA), the Nationalist Government's principal frontier policymaking body, was to "carry out the official solution of the minority problem, namely, a complete assimilation of the non-Han peoples in the Chinese state."ⁱⁱⁱ Similarly, Colin Mackerras and others argue that Chiang Kai-shek was strongly opposed to any form of autonomy for the frontier minorities, regarding national unity as paramount in China's struggle for modernity and equality with the rest of the world's nation-states.^{iv}

In contrast, this article calls for a thorough revision of this facile and polemic depiction. In characterizing Guomindang national minority policy, Chinese and Western scholars alike make frequent reference to the Party's famous 1943 political tract *China's Destiny* (*Zhongguo mingyun*), which contended that all "Chinese" citizens, including the Manchus, Mongols, Tibetans, Hui and other frontier minorities, were interrelated "lineage branches" (*zongzhi*) of a single, consanguineous *Zhonghua minzu*.^v The book, which was published in Chiang Kai-shek's name but actually ghost written by conservative Guomindang historian Tao Xisheng, represented a significant hardening of party rhetoric under the growing influence of a group of cultural conservatives who controlled the educational and propaganda apparatuses. Yet, this article argues that the cultural conservatives exerted only minimal influence on the actual formulation and implementation of Guomindang frontier policy. It was the Qing court's highly pragmatic "loose rein" (*jimi*) policy rather than the racist discourse of national homogeneity championed by the cultural conservatives that served as the guiding principle with which Chiang and the CMTA bureaucrats dealt with the question of the frontier minorities.

This article argues that the Guomindang extended the frontier minorities a high degree of autonomy in exchange for expressions of loyalty towards Nanjing. The Nationalists, much like their Communist rivals, viewed the frontier and its people as potential allies in their struggle for political power and independence from foreign imperialism and domestic feudalism. In securing the allegiance of the minorities, the Guomindang hoped to not only bolster its nationalist credentials but also prevent the frontier from being used as a base for imperialist intrigue, warlord militarism and most importantly Communist infiltration.

II. Chinese Encroachment on the Inner Mongolian Frontier

With its creation in March 1928, the Commission on Mongolian and Tibetan Affairs was given broad authority to draft legislation and implement Central Government policy towards the frontier regions.^{vi} Based on the administrative precedent of the Qing Court of Colonial Affairs (*Lifanyuan*), the CMTA inherited both the language and policies of the Qing state towards the frontier. Initially, Qing frontier policy was guided by the dual principles of “combining the use of force with imperial grace” (*enwei bingshi*) and “ruling by customs” (*yisu erzhi*). Yet, during the late 1700s, the Qing court began adopting more conciliatory policies towards the Mongolian, Tibetan and Xinjiang frontiers as its political power started to wane, leading it to emphasize the “grace” (*en*) side of the *enwei bingshi* equation more than the “force” (*wei*) side.^{vii} Qing policy made use of the traditional ruling elite in Mongolia, Tibet and Xinjiang in governing the frontier in accordance with local customs. In exchange for the high degree of autonomy, frontier princes and lamas were required to pledge their loyalty towards the Qing Court through the largely symbolic tribute system. It was the “loose rein” or “winning over by all means” (*longluo*) policies that appealed most to CMTA administrators as they began to formulate their own frontier policy that aimed, above all else, to hold the fragile Chinese Republic together against the corrupting forces of domestic warlordism and foreign imperialism.^{viii}

Faced with the reality of the Guomindang’s political weakness and Sun Yat-sen’s own pledge to “prop-up and guide” (*fuzhi*) the frontier minorities, the CMTA moved quickly to address the concerns of the Mongolian princes. In late November 1928, CMTA standing committee member Zhang Ji recommended to Party chairman Chiang Kai-shek that the Guomindang expressed its sympathy toward the plight of the Mongolian princes and tentative support for the establishment of the Autonomous Mongolian Banner Council (*Mengqi zizhi weiyuanhui*).^{ix} The CMTA also employed Unenbayin (Wu Heling), one of the Mongolian delegation leaders, as an adviser and asked him to draw up a detailed plan for Inner Mongolian autonomy.

Han civil and military officials in the frontier provinces did not however share the Central Government’s paternalistic view of the situation, viewing Mongolian autonomy instead as a direct threat to their own authority over the frontier. This concern was the principal focus of a letter of protest sent by a group of Jehol provincial officials to the Executive Yuan in late 1928. They expressed astonishment over the proposals drafted by Unenbayin, arguing, “there no longer exists an Inner Mongolia beyond the scope of Suiyuan, Jehol, and Chahar provinces.”^x

Attempting to defuse the growing tension between the Mongol princes and Han frontiersmen, the Guomintang Government convened a special “Mongolian Conference” (*Menggu huiyi*) in Nanjing in summer 1930. The meeting sparked heated debate, but ultimately failed to forge a consensus on the future of the banner system, the colonization of Mongol pastureland and other contentious issues.^{xi} Despite strong CMTA support for Inner Mongolian autonomy, Chiang Kai-shek’s fragile regime was not in a position politically to override the strong resistance from its powerful allies in the frontier provinces. The success of the Guomintang’s Northern Expedition and the new Nationalist Government was based on an uneasy coalition of regional militarists. Fearful of provoking a revolt among northern warlords Yan Xishan, Feng Yuxiang and Zhang Xueliang, the Guomintang proposed a compromise solution to the Mongolian problem. The “Organizational Law of Mongolian Leagues, Banners and Tribes” (*Menggu meng-bu-qi xuzhifa*), which was passed by the Legislative Yuan in October 1931, called for the preservation of the Mongolian banner system in all those regions occupied by Mongolian people *and not currently under Chinese county administration*, and placed the Mongolian banners directly under the jurisdiction of the Executive Yuan in Nanjing. While the Central Government would assume control of military, diplomatic and other issues of national concern, the banners would be granted autonomy to govern their people according to local tradition and custom. On the contentious issue of banner relations with Han county and provincial administrations, the resolution called for both sides to consult one another on all issues of mutual concern, including the central problem of Chinese colonization of Mongol pastureland.^{xii}

III. Frontier Warlordism and the Opening of the Northern Frontier

During the early Republican period, the Mongolian frontier became an important proving ground for the autonomous authority of Chinese warlords. With the growing authority of the Nanjing Central Government over the central plains region, Chinese militarists looked increasingly toward the frontier in their effort to create a zone free from Central Government control. The harsh yet unexploited natural environment of the frontier provided an excellent base for the recruitment of soldiers and exploitation of natural resources necessary to keep Nanjing at bay. A symbiotic relationship developed between the Han frontiersmen and the regional militarists as both attempted to

safeguard their political and economic self-interests from the Nationalist Government. In the Northeast, Zhang Xueliang inherited the Fengtian army and the resource-rich Manchurian frontier from his father Zhang Zuolin. Despite declaring alliance to Chiang Kai-shek's Nationalist Government in 1930, Zhang retained complete control over Manchuria and eastern Inner Mongolia. Initially, Feng Yuxiang's two hundred thousand strong forces controlled both Suiyuan and Chahar provinces from his Kalgan headquarters. The defeat of Feng's army in 1931 only paved the way for the extension of Yan Xishan's authority into Inner Mongolia from his power-base in Shanxi province. Yan's appointment by Nanjing as the "Pacification Commissioner of Taiyuan and Suiyuan" (*Taiyuan Sui jing zhuren*) in December 1932 ensured that two of his loyal subordinates, Fu Zuoyi and Song Zeguang, were named chairmen of Suiyuan and Chahar provinces, solidifying his authority over China's northwest frontier.

In stark contrast to the paternalist rhetoric of the CMTA, these warlord regimes stressed the importance of developing the Mongolian frontier and civilizing its backward nomads. In their publications, the "virgin" Mongol land was frequently referred to as a "gold vault" (*jinjiao*) or "treasure trove" (*baoku*), with frontier administrators stressing the importance of "opening up wasteland" (*kaiken*), "excavating mines" (*kaikuang*) and "clearing forests" (*kailin*). Frontier administrators writing in the journal *Mongolian Banner Bi-weekly* (*Mengqi xunkan*), which was published by the General Affairs Office of Zhang Xueliang's Manchurian regime, argued that "military colonization" (*tunken*) was the most effective method for systematically exploiting the frontier's untapped riches while safeguarding against foreign invasion. Calling the task of "cutting down the thicket and opening up the wilderness" one of humanity's most noble and important pursuits, Zuo Zuohua pleaded with Han soldiers to build their houses among the "barren desert and wild grasses" of Mongolia in order to seek their personal fortunes while enriching the glory of the Chinese nation.^{xiii}

IV. The Bailingmiao Autonomous Movement and Resistance from the Han Frontiersmen

It was warlord Yan Xishan's renewed efforts to colonize the remaining grassland of Suiyuan that sparked the first pan-Inner Mongolian resistance movement since the early years of the Republic. The division of Inner Mongolia into forty-nine separate banner administrations and five Chinese provinces made collective resistance

difficult. Yet, with his youthful vigor, charismatic personality and sharp intellect, the thirty-one year-old leader of the West Sunid Banner, Prince Demchukdongrob (De Wang) was able to galvanize this growing anti-Chinese sentiment into a cohesive, and highly public, movement for Inner Mongolian autonomy.^{xiv}

During the winter of 1932, De Wang led a delegation of Mongol princes from the Silinghol and Ulauchab leagues to Nanjing. They warned Chiang Kai-shek and other Guomindang officials about the growing Japanese threat and protested against Yan Xishan's efforts to colonize Mongolian grassland. The Central Government, used to dealing with Unenbayin and other Mongol representative living in the capital, largely ignored De Wang. Frustrated and feeling slighted, De Wang returned to Inner Mongolia where he convened a congress of Inner Mongolian banner delegates at the Bailingmiao temple located deep within the Yinshan highlands in northern Suiyuan province. When the congress opened on 26 July 1933, opinion was divided; yet De Wang persuaded Silinghol League chieftain Prince Yun and Ulauchab League chieftain Prince So to formally petition Nanjing for a "high degree of autonomy" (*gaodu zizhi*). The masterfully written petition, drafted by De Wang and cabled to the Central Government on 27 July, tapped into the anxious national mood following the Japanese annexation of Jehol province and the humiliating Tanku Truce of 31 May. The petition began by admitting that Sun Yat-sen's *Outline for National Reconstruction* called for the Central Government to "foster and guide" (*fuzhi*) the frontier minorities through a period of political tutelage in preparation for a future state of "self-determination and self-rule" (*zizhi zijue*), yet went on to claim that extraordinary times call for extraordinary measures. The imminent threat of foreign invasion required the foreshortening of political tutelage and the immediate creation of a single, unified Inner Mongolian Autonomous Government.^{xv}

Following the publication of the petition in the domestic and foreign media, De Wang's Bailingmiao movement garnered national attention and won the support of Unenbayin, Bai Yundi, and other Mongols closely associated with the Guomindang. The Government bureaucracy was slow to react however. After waiting several months for a reply to the petition, De Wang decided to convene a second Bailingmiao Congress in October. Taking matters into their own hands, the nearly 150 delegates voted to form the "Inner Mongolian Autonomous Government" (*Neimenggu zizhi zhengfu*, IMAG) without waiting for Nanjing's approval. The Political Outline of IMAG claimed

authority over all Mongols living within the *original territory* of the Inner Mongolian leagues, banners and tribes, and the right, with the exception of military and diplomatic affairs, to regulate all affairs within its territory.^{xvi} De Wang cabled Nanjing announcing the creation of IMAG and calling for an immediate halt to the establishment of county administrations and Chinese colonization. The new government requested Nanjing's active assistance in building an autonomous Inner Mongolia free from Han exploitation and foreign encroachment.^{xvii}

As one would expect, De Wang's autonomous movement produced a strong reaction among the Han frontiersmen. Following the first meeting at Bailingmiao, Yan Xishan and Fu Zuoyi used force and coercion to block the future participation of Suiyuan and Chahar Mongols. Fu Zuoyi's strong-arm tactics prevented many Ikhachao and Ulauchab league Mongols from attending the second Congress.^{xviii} He also dispatched Mongol spies to infiltrate De Wang's movement and sent regular cables back to Nanjing over the next couple of months stressing De Wang's evil intentions and lack of support among the Mongolian masses.^{xix}

While De Wang was appealing to the Central Government for assistance, leading Suiyuan provincial officials were sending their own petitions to Nanjing expressing their strong opposition to Mongol autonomy. They contended that the Bailingmiao movement was motivated solely by the selfish desire of the feudal princes to expand their personal authority and had little or no support among the Mongolian people. An October 1933 petition argued that the Mongols lacked the basic economic, political and education requirements for self-rule and needed a lengthy period of Han tutelage prior to reaching the stage of autonomous political activity. They also stressed that, according to Sun Yat-sen's Three People's Principles, only the county (*xian*) could serve as the basic unit of self-rule in China; as a result, any future form of autonomy in Inner Mongolia must be located at the level of individual banners and counties rather than the entire Inner Mongolian region as De Wang suggested.^{xx}

Fearing that the Central Government might choose to back the Mongols against their wishes, the Suiyuan officials sent a second petition outlining the bottom-line conditions for any form of Mongolian self-rule: first, self-rule on the Mongolian frontier must occur at the banner level and all self-governing banners must be placed under the jurisdiction of their respective provinces and undergo a fixed period of political tutelage in preparation for their ultimate binding together with the provinces; second, the boundary between the provinces and the

autonomous banners should be fixed along the lines of cultivated/uncultivated land rather than the original territory of the banners; third, special legal provisions should be made to protect the rights of the nearly 170,000 Han currently living within the territory of the Suiyuan banners; four, self-rule should not be permitted in the Tümed Special Banner or the eight western banners of the Chahar tribes since this territory had long been “colonized by the people” (*minken*) rather than “colonized by officials” (*guanken*), and was now overwhelmingly (98 percent in some areas) Han; and finally, the Mongols must provide their own tax base to fund their experiment in self-rule—the Han people living in Suiyuan have absolutely no tax responsibility towards the Mongols.^{xxi} If the Central Government was going to grant De Wang’s request for Mongolian autonomy, the Han frontiersmen were going to fight to ensure that their own self-interests were not damaged.

V. Nanjing’s Ambiguous Response to the Bailingmiao Autonomous Movement

The Guomindang’s initial response to the Bailingmiao movement was divided. The CMTA, the first government organ to react, proposed a dual solution to the problem: first, as a temporary solution, it called on Fu Zuoyi to dispatch officials to dissuade Mongolian princes from attending the Second Bailingmiao Congress; second, towards a long term solution, the CMTA asked Unenbayin to draft another report, this time with the assistance of two Han CMTA officials, examining whether or not Inner Mongolian autonomy was warranted.^{xxii} When completed, Unenbayin’s report argued that the right of Mongolian self-rule was contained within the Guomindang’s party programme and thus should be permitted as long as it did not interfere with national unity, foreign policy and national defense, and proceeded under direct central government supervision. The report called for the immediate creation of a “Preparatory Committee for Mongolian Autonomy” which would lead to the eventual creation of a unified and autonomous Inner Mongolian government.^{xxiii}

The CMTA’s proposal failed to meet with the approval of top Guomindang and Central Government officials. The Nanjing leadership clearly valued its relationship with Yan Xishan more than it did its relationship with the handful of discontented Mongolian princes. Despite Nanjing’s victory over the anti-Chiang Northern Coalition in the civil war of 1930, its control over the frontier provinces remained

weak. The Central Government continued to face the direct threat of rebellion from the powerful southern militarists of Guangdong and Guangxi, who formalized their autonomy from Nanjing at the end of 1931 with the creation of the Southwest Political Council (SWPC) and the Southwest Headquarters of the Guomindang Central Executive Committee. In the precarious balance of power between Nanjing and the SWPC, the support of Yan Xishan's northern regime was crucial. Yan's defection to the SWPC could very well topple Chiang's government.^{xxiv} Therefore, it is not surprising that Nanjing's initial response to De Wang's autonomous movement closely dovetailed the opinion and policy suggestions of Yan Xishan's frontier officials.

On 7 October 1933, Wang Jingwei, chairman of the Executive Yuan, forwarded Fu Zuoyi's policy suggestions on the Inner Mongolian crisis to CMTA chairman Shi Qingyang, recommending that the Central Government adopt a traditional "threaten or console" (*wei / en*) approach to "snuff out (*zhupo*) De Wang's deceitful scheme." Echoing the opinion of Fu Zuoyi's attached cable, Wang Jingwei contended that most Mongolian princes opposed De Wang's movement and the Central Government should stop at nothing to win these individuals over in order to isolate and then exterminate De Wang's movement.^{xxv} Three days later the Executive Yuan approved the "Draft Revision of Mongolian Administration,"^{xxvi} which aimed at placating De Wang's request for autonomy while bringing the Mongols under more firm provincial control. The plan called for the creation of several "Mongolian Local Autonomous Councils" (MLAPC) to deal directly with banner affairs. These councils would be responsible for preparing the Mongols for a future state of unified self-rule; yet, in the meantime, they were to be placed *directly under the jurisdiction and guidance of provincial officials*. Banner and provincial officials were to staff these councils with a top provincial official rather than a banner prince serving as chairman. In order to convey the Central Government's new plan to De Wang and the Mongols, the Executive Yuan dispatched a delegation of top government and party officials, led by Minister of the Interior General Huang Shaoxing and CMTA vice-chairman Zhao Beiling, to Bailingmiao.^{xxvii}

To ensure their safety and set the tone for talks with the Mongols, General Huang's mission arrived in Bailingmiao on 10 November 1933 under military escort from the Seventeenth Army group. The general met with top IMAG officials and presented the Executive Yuan's plan to De Wang. General Huang also issued a public proclamation to the Mongol people written by Wang Jingwei on behalf of the Central Government. "Presently," it declared, "the Inner Mongolian people

wish to carry out self-rule, but the Central Government ungrudgingly cannot allow this, instead it desires to foster and guide (*fuzhi judao*) [the Mongolian people] so that they might fully mature.” Wang warned against “the skipping over of normal stages” and called for an extensive but fixed period of Central Government tutelage aimed at raising the level of education, culture and economic livelihood of the Mongolian people. It also warned against any obstruction to the system of provincial rule while referring to the local autonomous councils as a “preliminary trial in self-rule.”^{xxviii} Realizing that Central Government support was crucial to any future state of genuine Mongolian autonomy, De Wang expressed his willingness to consider the Central Government’s proposal and called on General Huang to negotiate the details of the plan in Bailingmiao.

During the talks, Huang Shaoxing agreed to present De Wang’s eleven-point counter proposal to the Central Government if he would agree to the creation of two separate autonomous political councils (one comprising the Silinghol and Chahar tribes of Chahar Province and the other the Ulauchab and Ikhchao leagues of Suiyuan Province) which, the General agreed, would be *placed under Executive Yuan jurisdiction* while working closely with the authorities of the two frontier provinces. De Wang reluctantly agreed and on 19 November General Huang departed Bailingmiao promising to personally deliver De Wang’s new proposal to Premier Wang Jingwei.^{xxix} General Huang did not, however, return directly to the capital. Realizing that any compromise required the endorsement of Yan Xishan, General Huang traveled secretly to Taiyuan to meet with Yan.

As General Huang was arriving in Taiyuan, events were unfolding in southern China that would ensure, for the time being at least, that Yan Xishan and not De Wang or the Central Government would be the final arbitrator on the shape of Inner Mongolian autonomy. On 20 November 1933, a coalition of Fujian-based, anti-Nanjing rebels—led by immensely popular Chen Mingshu and his Nineteenth Route Army, the “national heroes” of the January 1932 Japanese attack on Shanghai—declared Fujian Province independent from the Central Government. The rebels claimed that Chiang Kai-shek’s regime was slowly destroying the nation and called on other provinces to break with Nanjing. The Fujian rebellion momentarily shook the balance of power in China, setting off a race for allies that, according to Lloyd Eastman, “forced all elements in the Chinese political world to shift, or threaten to shift, their positions in order to maintain themselves in the new political equilibrium.”^{xxx} Initially, it appeared that the powerful

SWPC would support their neighbours in Fujian, while the position of Yan Xishan's Northwest regime was less clear. Yan made an initial pronouncement of support for Nanjing, but also dispatched representatives to meet with the Fujian rebels. He also approached other northern warlords—such as Feng Yuxiang and Han Fuqu—about a possible anti-Chiang coalition.

With the Mongolian autonomous movement a large thorn in the side of his regime, General Huang moved quickly to solve the problem and maintain Yan's neutrality in the Fujian revolt. In their Taiyuan talks, the two men agreed on a secret, alternative plan calling for a largely symbolic, and virtually meaningless, form of Inner Mongolian autonomy, which in reality placed the Mongolian banners firmly under the control of Yan Xishan's frontier officials.^{xxxii} On the surface the Taiyuan plan looked similar to De Wang's compromise proposal. The first article, for example, called for the creation of two autonomous Inner Mongolian political councils under the authority of the Executive Yuan; yet, each of the following provisions gave sweeping economic and political authority to provincial officials to regulate the affairs of the two councils.^{xxxiii} When he returned to the capital in December, General Huang presented the secret Taiyuan proposal to the Executive Yuan, claiming that the plan was De Wang's own. Following a round of discussions by the Central Political Bureau of the Guomindang, the Central Government officially endorsed the "Eleven Methods for Inner Mongolian Autonomy" on 17 January 1934.^{xxxiii}

VI. Nanjing's Sudden Reversal and Chiang Kai-shek's Frontier Policy

In an incredible turn of events, Premier Wang Jingwei held a closed-door "tea meeting" with top Mongolian officials in Nanjing only eleven days after the passage of the Taiyuan plan. In attendance were over one hundred Mongolian leaders and top Guomindang officials like Dai Jitao, Zhang Ji, Huang Shaoxiong and Zhao Beilian. Led by Unenbayin, the Mongols aggressively pressed Wang Jingwei for a reversal of the government's 17 January 1934 decision, and a greatly expanded and genuine form of Mongolian autonomy. After the meeting, Wang Jingwei asked Unenbayin to draft an alternative plan more acceptable to the Mongols, and in an unprecedented reversal, the Guomindang's Central Political Bureau approved Wu Heting's eight-point plan for the creation of a single, unified "Mongolian Local Autonomous Political Council" (*Menggu difang zizhi zhengwu weiyuanhui*, MLAPC) on 28 February 1934. Several weeks later, the

Executive Yuan issued an order calling for the implementation of this plan which closely resembled De Wang's original eleven-point proposal handed to General Huang back in November.^{xxxiv}

What caused the Central Government's sudden and unprecedented reversal, and led it to finally accept a genuine form of Mongolian autonomy? The reasons appeared to have been at least threefold. First, the collapse of the Fujian rebellion in late January removed the immediate threat of a Yan Xishan revolt against the Central Government. As Yan Xishan and other provincial militarists contemplated whether to join the Fujian rebels, Chiang's army launched a massive military offensive, and amidst heavy rebel defections, easily crushed the rebellion.^{xxxv} The event marked the last direct threat to the authority of the Guomindang Central Government. The speed and ease with which Chiang's increasingly powerful military suppressed the rebellion caused Yan Xishan and other regional militarists to choose self-preservation within a loosely centralized Nationalist Government over outright resistance.

Second, De Wang's representatives in Nanjing brought enormous pressure to bear on the Nanjing Government. After General Huang's departure from Bailingmiao, De Wang dispatched a delegation of Mongolian dignitaries, led by the politically savvy Unenbayin, to keep the pressure on the Central Government. In Nanjing, Unenbayin rallied the expatriate Mongolian community in a series of high-profile demonstrations in support of Mongolian autonomy. Through a series of carefully orchestrated press conferences and symbolic outings to Sun Yat-sen's tomb and other places of historical significance, the Mongols manipulated public opinion to highlight the legitimacy of their struggle in accordance with Sun Yat-sen's Three People's Principles. In nearly daily reports, the Nanjing and Shanghai newspapers sympathetically chronicled the activities of the Mongolian representatives. After General Huang's secret meetings with Yan Xishan were made public, the Mongols presented a detailed and passionate petition to National Government chairman Lin Sen, claiming that the General had negotiated in bad faith at Bailingmiao and failed to present, as promised, their proposal to the Executive Yuan. Around the same time, the chieftain and vice-chieftain of the Ikhchao leagues cabled the Central Government claiming that Fu Zuoyi had coerced them into declaring their opposition to the Bailingmiao Congresses.^{xxxvi}

Yet, the ultimate reasons behind Nanjing's sudden reversal appear to have been Chiang Kai-shek's decision to personally throw his support behind De Wang's autonomous government. As events were

unfolding during the second half of 1933, Chiang was absent from Nanjing and uninvolved in the Executive Yuan's daily handling of the Mongolian situation. Chiang was busy personally directing the fifth and final encirclement campaign against the CCP's Jiangxi Soviet from his military field headquarters in Nanchang. Sensing that the last hope for Mongolian autonomy rested with the Guomindang leader, De Wang sent one of his most trusted subordinates to directly seek Chiang's support.^{xxxvii} When De Wang's envoy arrived in the south, the Inner Mongolian autonomous movement had reached a position of national prominence. What Chiang feared most was a shifting in public attention away from the government's struggle to destroy the Communist bandits and to consolidate its control over the provinces. Even more potentially dangerous, the Mongolian cause threatened to redirect public attention towards the growing threat of Japanese encroachment in Northern China. In contrast to the Han frontiersmen, Chiang viewed the establishment of a pro-Nanjing regime in Inner Mongolia as a useful buffer zone against Japanese imperialism and counter-balance to Yan Xishan's provincial regime.

During an important speech on "China's Frontier Problem" delivered at his Nanchang headquarters on 7 March 1934, Chiang expressed his public support for Mongolian autonomy. He began with an assertion that the so-called "frontier question" (*bianjiang wenti*) was actually a "question of diplomacy" (*waijiao wenti*). If a country's power is sufficient, it can rely on brute force to solve the frontier problem and secure its borders against foreign encroachment; if, however, a country is weak and faced with both internal and external enemies, like China, it must develop a careful, and well crafted, strategy for dealing with the frontier problem. At its current stage, Chiang argued, a "conciliatory" (*rouxing*) and "loose rein" policy was the most effective method for dealing with the frontier question. Since the Chinese state currently lacked the strength to directly control the frontier, it was better to create a balance of power aimed at maintaining long term stability, whilst strengthening itself domestically and preparing for the day when it would be able to consolidate its frontier. "If we let them go and rule themselves," Chiang stressed, "the border peoples will enjoy freedom, while at the same time there still exists a good deal of room among their traditional customs for enticement and a "loose rein" approach. They put up a bold front like a paper tiger, yet each of their national sentiments are isolated and they certainly do not have the capacity for unity."^{xxxviii} If the Central Government were to deny the requests of the Inner Mongols and other frontier peoples for self-rule, they would turn to the imperialists for help and invite further

foreign interference in China's internal affairs. Thus, Chiang concluded, only a tolerant and magnanimous policy of self-rule could solve China's frontier problem. As this important, yet previously overlooked, speech demonstrated, Chiang's pragmatic approach to the national question was rooted in proven historical precedents of the Qing emperors rather than the racist and idealist rhetoric of the cultural nationalists.

In the end, however, even Chiang's public support was not enough to overcome the spirited opposition of Han frontiersmen to Inner Mongolian autonomy. Throughout the negotiation process, the issue of tax autonomy proved nearly as contentious as the land question. Both the Mongols and provincial warlords realized an autonomous Mongolian government was toothless without the ability to collect its own revenue. In his final negotiations with Guomintang officials, Unenbayin won a modest monthly subsidy from the Central Government to cover the administrative cost of MLAPC and a promise that the Inner Mongolian government could collect its own taxes from within banner territory. When the monies promised by Nanjing failed to arrive in a timely or complete fashion, De Wang decided to test the wording and spirit of the new agreement by taxing Yan Xishan's extremely profitable opium caravans as they passed through Mongolian territory. As one would expect, this sparked an intense stand off between MLAPC and the Suiyuan and Shanxi provincial authorities who quickly dispatched heavily-armed troops to secure the opium route. In an effort to force MLAPC into submission, Fu Zuoyi's Suiyuan government also imposed a grain embargo on the Mongolian banner. De Wang's repeated protests to Nanjing elicited no response.^{xxxix}

In early summer, De Wang dispatched one of his top officials, Chen Shaowu, to Lushan to request assistance directly from Chiang Kai-shek while beginning to feel out the Japanese for possible support. Chen Shaowu complained to Chiang about provincial interference in MLAPC's affairs and warned him about Japanese attempts to court Mongolian officials. Chiang agreed to provide MLAPC with an increased monthly stipend of 300,000 *yuan*, a construction grant of 120,000 *yuan*, and the necessary weapons and equipment to strengthen its fledgling administration. Yet, once again, the money and equipment failed to arrive, with most of it being confiscated by the provincial authorities before it reached Bailingmiao. In one last ditch effort to secure Chiang's help, Prince Yun and De Wang traveled to Kueihua in September 1934 to meet with Chiang during his tour of the northwest frontier. De Wang pressed Chiang for the promised funding and

weapons to protect themselves and the nation against the growing threat of Japanese invasion. Yet, this time, Chiang showed very little interest in the Mongolian plight.^{xl} It appears that sometime during the summer of 1934, the Guomindang leader wrote off De Wang and his Mongols, choosing instead to focus all necessary resources on his efforts to exterminate the Chinese Communists. Frustrated, De Wang began open negotiations with the Japanese, eventually flying to Changchun to sign a formal agreement of cooperation between MLAPC and the puppet state of Manchukuo. As Owen Lattimore pointed out, De Wang did not “go over” to Japan as Chiang and others claimed, but rather he was “tied hand and foot and thrown to the Japanese.”^{xli}

VII. Concluding Remarks

The Inner Mongolian Autonomous Movement highlights the often tense, triangular relationship between the ethnic minorities, the political center and the frontier warlords in early twentieth-century China. Chinese historians have long highlighted the fragmented and decentralized nature of political power in Republican China, arguing that the Nationalist Government represented only a loose coalition of highly autonomous regional warlords. China’s vast and remote frontier region served as an ideal base of operations for Yan Xishan, Fu Zuoyi, Liu Wenhui and other Han militarists, where they safely expanded their personal wealth and power beyond the reach of the political establishment in central China. The frontier warlords consistently blocked the Central Government’s frontier policy, fearing that any form of genuine minority autonomy would weaken their power base while enhancing the prestige and authority of the Central Government. In the end, we find that while the Guomindang was willing to grant the frontier minorities autonomy, it lacked the political capital and material resources necessary to implement its policies over the strident objections of its allies in the frontier provinces.

These contrasting approaches to the frontier problem were rooted in two fundamentally different mentalities. The Han frontiersmen looked at the border regions from the vantage point of a pioneer. To the frontier pioneer, Inner Mongolia and other remote regions offered uncultivated wasteland ripe for exploitation. The economic dislocation and political chaos of the Republican period pushed and pulled scores of Han people—merchants seeking high profits, poor farmers in search of “virgin” farmland, opium smugglers, bandits, adventurers and social misfits—onto the frontier, where each hoped to strike it rich before

returning to their home village a local hero. In pursuit of their fortune, the Han frontiersmen developed open contempt for the nomadic inhabitants of the frontier. Their backward customs and non-sedentary lifestyle hindered modern development and, without their forceful assimilation, the vast natural resources of the frontier could not be properly tapped. Military leaders, like Yan Xishan and Fu Zuoyi, came to represent the interests of these frontiersmen, using military force to protect their resources against Central Government encroachment while resisting the centralization of political authority in China.

Kuomintang policymakers, on the other hand, looked at the frontier from the angle of the Chinese mandarin. Stability and peace along the frontier were crucial for the maintenance of Central Government authority. For centuries, Chinese dynasties had been toppled by rebellions which originated and festered along the frontier before threatening the Chinese heartland. Much like their Qing predecessors, the Kuomintang State understood the merit of the traditional saying that “turmoil on the frontier brings rebellion to the interior.”^{xlii} The state’s ability to maintain peace along the frontier was the ultimate signifier of its strength, authority and majesty. The goal of the mandarin was to secure the “tribute” or symbolic recognition from the “Outer Feudatories” or “External Vassals” (*waiifan*). During times of military weakness, like the late Qing and Republican periods, a *laissez-faire* or “loose rein” (*jimi*) policy was the best method for incorporating the “barbarians” into the state while maintaining stability along the frontier. In exchange for their allegiance and symbolic inclusion in the Zhonghua Republic, the Kuomintang State was willing to grant the frontier regions near complete autonomy in the hope that the frontier would not be transformed into a base for communist and foreign intrigue. In the clash of these two mentalities in early 20th century China, the gun however proved much more powerful than the gown.

Notes

i. Jiang Ping et al., *Zhongguo minzu wenti de lilun yu shixian* (Theory and practice of China’s national question) (Beijing: Zhonggong zhongyang dangxiao chubanshe, 1994), 110.

ii. Linda Benson, *The Ili Rebellion: The Moslem Challenge to Chinese Authority in Xinjiang, 1944-1949* (Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe, 1990), 11.

iii. Edwin Pak-Wah Leung, "Regional Autonomy versus Central Authority: The Inner Mongolian Autonomous Movement and the Chinese Response, 1925-1947," *Journal of Oriental Studies* 25, no.1 (1986): 53.

iv. Colin Mackerras, *China's Minorities: Integration and Modernization in the Twentieth Century* (London: Oxford University Press, 1994), 59 and Colin Mackerras, *China's Minority Cultures: Identities and Integration Since 1912* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1995), 9; For another recent example see Edward J.M. Rhoads, *Manchus & Han: Ethnic Relations and Political Power in Late Qing and Early Republican China, 1861-1928* (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 2000), 275-76.

v. Chiang Kai-shek, *Zhongguo zhi mingyun (China's Destiny)*, 2d rev. ed. (Chongqing: Zhengyang shuju, 1943), or as translated in Chiang Kai-shek, *China's Destiny and Chinese Economic Theory*, ed. Philip Jaffe (New York: Roy Publishers, 1947). On Tao Xisheng's authorship see Arlif Dirlík, "T'ao His-sheng: The Social Limits of Change," in *The Limits of Change: Essays on Conservative Alternatives in Republican China*, ed. Charlotte Furth (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1976), 305.

vi. "Guomin zhengfu Mengzang weiyuanhui zuzhifa" (Organizational law of the Commission on Mongolian and Tibetan Affairs), 21 March 1928, in *Zhonghua Minguo shi dang'an ziliao huibian* (Collection of archival documents on Republican History), comp. *Zhongguo dier lishi dang'anguan* (Nanjing: Jiangsu guji shudian, 1994-), [5.1.5: 1-2] (hereafter cited as *ZMSD*); "Xiuzheng Mengzang weiyuanhui zuzhifa" (Revised Organizational law of the Commission on Mongolian and Tibetan Affairs), 25 July 1932, in *ZMSD*, [5.1.5: 2-4]; Also see Zhang Xingtang, *Bianjiang zhengzhi* (Frontier administration) (Taipei [Taipei]: Mengzang weiyuanhui, 1962), 125-26.

vii. On the Lifanyuan and Qing frontier policy see Ma Ruheng and Zhao Yuntian, "Qingdai bianjiang minzu zhengce jianlun" (Brief discussion of Qing dynasty frontier nationality policy), *Qingshi yanjiu* [English translation of *journal title?*] 2 (1991): 1-14; Ma Ruheng and Ma Dazheng, *Qingdai de bianjiang zhengce* (Qing dynasty frontier policy) (Beijing: Zhongguo shehui kexue chubanshe, 1994).

viii. A survey of the numerous administrative plans and regulations drafted by CMTA reveal a striking similarity in both language and policy with the Qing's Lifanyuan. Take, for example, the series of laws created to codify, regulate and administer the systematic visits of minority princes, headmen and religious personnel to the capital, or the regulations governing the bestowing of state titles and awards on loyal frontier princes and officials or the countless laws meant to ensure state supervision of the banners, Lamaist temples and other frontier institutions. See, for example, "Meng Zang Xinjiang huibu laijing zhenjin renyuan zhaodai guize" (Regulations for receiving personnel on extended official visits to the capital from Mongolia, Tibet, and Xinjiang), 8 January 1934, in *ZMSD*, [5.1.5: 4-9]; "Meng Zang Huijiang ge difang changguan

ji ge zongjiao lingdao renyuan laijing guanjian lijie dan” (List of protocol for extended official visits to the capital by senior officials and religious personnel from Mongolia, Tibet and Xinjiang), 8 January 1934, in *ZMSD*, [5.1.5: 11](#); “Meng Zang Huijiang ge difang changguan ji ge zongjiao lingdao renyuan laijing zhanguan shanglai banfa” (Regulations for the bestowing of rewards to senior officials and religious personage from Mongolia, Tibet and Xinjiang visiting the Capital on an official visits), 14 January 1935, in *ZMSD*, [5.1.5: 12](#); “Guanli lama simiao tiaolie” (Regulations governing the management of lamaist temples), 9 December 1935, in *ZMSD*, [5.1.5: 13](#); “Lama jiangzheng banfa” (Methods for rewarding and punishing lamas), 10 January 1936, in *ZMSD*, [5.1.5: 13-18](#); “Meng Zang bianqu renyuan renyong tiaolie” (Regulations for the appointment of personnel in the Mongolian and Tibetan border region), 1 April 1937, in *ZMSD*, [5.1.5: 33-35](#).

ix. [Zhang Ji], “Zhang Ji wei Enheemuer deng shengqing sheli Mengqi zizhi weiyuanhui deng zhi Jiang Jieshi deng han” (Letter from Zhang Ji to Chiang Kai-shek and others about the request by Zhang Zhaoting and others for the establishment of a Autonomous Mongolian Banner Council), 16 November 1928, in *ZMSD*, [5.1.5: 39-40](#).

x. [Wei Xiaotao], “Guomin zhengfu wenguan chuwei Wei Xiaotao yaoqiu chenming Mengbian qingxing shi Xingzhengyuan gonghan” (Public petition of national government civil official Wei Xiaotao to the Executive Yuan seeking clarification on the condition of the Mongolian frontier), 14 November 1928, in *ZMSD*, [5.1.5: 36-9](#).

xi. See the documents and explanations included in the entry on the “Menggu dahui bihui” (Closing Ceremony of the Mongolian Conference), 12 June 1930, in *Zhonghua Minguo shi shijiyao (chugao)* (Chronology of historical events on the Republic of China (draft)), comp. Zhonghua Minguo shiliao yanjiu zhengxin (Taipei [Taipei]: Zhonghua minguo shiliao yanjiu chuban, 1974-), Year 1930, vol. 1, 754-58; Hao Weimin, *Neimenggu gemingshi* (Revolutionary history of Inner Mongolia) (Hohhot: Neimenggu daxue chubanshe, 1997), 170.

xii. “Guomin zhengfu gongbu Mengguo meng-bu-qi zuzhifa” (The national government announces the Organizational Law for Mongolian Leagues, Banners and Tribes), 21 October 1931, in [ZMSD, 5.1.5: 45-48](#).

xiii. Zuo Zuohua, “Tunken qianshuo” (A cursory discussion of military colonization), *Mengqi xunkan* ([English translation of journal title?](#)) 1, no. 4 (May 1929): 7.

xiv. In my reconstruction of the Bailingmiao autonomous movement, I have drawn on recently reprint Nanjing government documents from the Second Historical Archive and the following secondary sources: Tan Tiwu, *Neimeng zhi jinxi* (Inner Mongolia past and present) (Shanghai: Shangwu yinshuguan, 1934): 117-92; Chen Jianfu, *Neimeng zizhi shiliao jiyao* (Compilation of important historical documents on Inner Mongolian autonomy) (Nanjing:

Nanjing fati shudian chuban, 1934); Huang Fengsheng, *Neimeng mengqi zizhi yundong ji* (Record of actual events from the Inner Mongolian league and banner autonomous movement) (Shanghai: Zhonghua shuju, 1935); Lu Minghui, *Menggu “zizhi yundong” shiwei* (The complete story of the Mongolian “autonomous movement”) (Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 1980); Hao, *Neimenggu gemingshi*, 159-85; While little has been written in English about the movement, two essays by Owen Lattimore provide a valuable, non-Chinese first-person point-of-view. See Owen Lattimore, “The Eclipse of Inner Mongolian Nationalism,” July 1936, in *Studies in Frontier History: Collected Papers, 1928-1958* (London: Oxford University Press, 1962), 427-39; and Owen Lattimore, “The Historical Setting of Inner Mongolian Nationalism,” 1936, in *Studies in Frontier History*, 440-55. The analysis of Sechin Jagchid, who at the time was a young following of De Wang, is also particularly valuable. See, in particular, Sechin Jagchid, “The Failure of a Self-determination Movement: The Inner Mongolian Case,” in *Soviet Asian Ethnic Frontiers*, ed. William McCagg and Brian Silver (New York: Pergamon Press, 1979), 229-45; Sechin Jagchid, *Menggu zhi jinxi* (Mongolia yesterday and today) (Taipei [Taipei]: Zhonghua wenhua chubanshi weiyuanhui, 1954), vol. 2, 251-66.

xv. [De Wang], “De Wang deng wei tuixing Menggu gaodu zizhi zhenxiang zhi zhongyang dangbu shixing weiyuanhui deng dian” (The cable of De Wang and others to the Guomindang Central Executive Committee and others concerning the actual facts of promoting a high degree of Mongolian autonomy), 14 July 1933, in *ZMSD*, [5.1.5: 89-91](#).

xvi. “Zizhi zhengfu zuzhi dagang” (Outline for the organization of an autonomous government), October 1933, in Chen, *Neimeng zizhi shiliao jiyao*, 9-14. This document can also be found in Lu, *Menggu “zizhi yundong” shiwei*, 36-38.

xvii. [De Wang], “De Wang wei zuzhi neimeng zizhi zhengfu shixing zizhi zhi zhongyang shixing weiyuanhui tongdian” (Circular telegram from De Wang to the Guomindang Central Executive Committee concerning the organization of the Inner Mongolian Autonomous Government for carrying out of autonomy), 28 October 1933, in *ZMSD*, [5.1.5](#): 108-10.

xviii. See Lu, *Menggu “zizhi yundong” shiwei*, 39-42; [Ni Wang], “Ni-mu-e-te-suo-er baogao De Wang zai Bailingmiao kaihui canjia renyuan shiqing shi Mengzang weiyuanhui dian” (Mongolian Prince Ni’s cable to CMTA about the true circumstances behind those who are participating in De Wang’s Bailingmiao meeting), 24 September 1933, in *ZMSD*, [5.1.5](#): 95; [Zhuo Wang], “Zhuo-te-ba-zha-pu deng wei buyuan zhuisui De Wang zizhi zhi Mengzang weiyuanhui dian” (Mongolian prince Zhuo and others’ cable to CMTA expressing their unwillingness to follow De Wang’s autonomous movement), 26 September 1933, in *ZMSD*, [5.1.5](#): 96; [Fu Zuoyi], “Fu Zuoyi guanyu De Wang zizhi huiyi qingxing ji zizhi dagang zhi Mengzang weiyuanhui dian” (Fu Zuoyi’s cable to CMTA about the conditions of De Wang’s autonomous meeting and its autonomous outline), 11 October 1933, in *ZMSD*, [5.1.5](#): 103-4;

[Fu Zuoyi], “Fu Zuoyi wei baogao Sha mengzhang dui De Wang zizhi taidu zhi Mengzhang weiyuanhui dian” (Fu Zuoyi’s cable to CMTA reporting that league chieftain Sha attitudes towards De Wang’s autonomous movement), 14 October 1933, in *ZMSD*, [5.1.5](#): 105.

xix. [Fu Zuoyi], “Fu Zuoyi guanyu xinmeng faqi zizhi qiyan yi xuanhua qingxing zhi Mengzhang weiyuanhui dian” (Fu Zuoyi’s cable to CMTA about the reasons for the origins of the autonomous movement among the Silinghol league and pacification conditions), 16 October 1933, in *ZMSD*, [5.1.5](#): 105-107; [Fu Zuoyi], “Fu Zuoyi wei baogao De Wang zizhi chouhua bingli ji ge meng daibiao taidu zhi Mengzhang weiyuanhui dian” (Fu Zuoyi’s cable to CMTA concerning De Wang’s plans to use military force and the attitude of all the Mongolian league delegates), 21 October 1933, in *ZMSD*, [5.1.5](#): 107; [Fu Zuoyi], “Fu Zuoyi wei baogao De Wang yunong Menggu ge qi shixing zizhi deng zhi Mengzhang weiyuanhui dian” (Fu Zuoyi’s cable to CMTA about how De Wang has hoodwinked all the Mongolian banners into carrying out autonomy and other matters), 22 October 1933, in *ZMSD*, [5.1.5](#): 107-108.

xx. Wen Tingxiang et al., “Diyici jianyi shu” (First petition), October 1933?, in Chen, *Neimeng zizhi shiliao jiyao*, 25-36. This document can also be found in Huang, *Neimeng mengqi zizhi yundong ji*, 129-30.

xxi. Wen Tingxiang et al., “Dierci jianyi shu” (Second petition), November 1933?, in Chen, *Neimeng zizhi shiliao jiyao*, 36-42; Also in Huang, *Neimeng mengqi zizhi yundong ji*, 126-29.

xxii. [Fu Zuoyi], “Suiyuan sheng zhengfu zhuyi Fu Zuoyi baogao De Wang zai Bailingmiao kaihui qingxing zhi Mengzhang weiyuanhui” (Suiyuan provincial government chairman Fu Zuoyi’s cable to CMTA reporting De Wang’s convening of a conference at Bailingmiao), 1 September 1933, in *ZMSD*, [5.1.5](#): 91-94; “Mengzhang weiyuanhui guanyu Menggu zizhi zhibiao zhiben yijuean” (CMTA’s draft proposal for the temporary and permanent solution of the Mongolian autonomous movement), 16 September 1933, in *ZMSD*, [5.1.5](#): 64.

xxiii. “Neizhengbu deng guanyu Menggu zizhi an huigao” (Ministry of Interior and others draft plan for Mongolian autonomy), September 1933, in *ZMSD*, [5.1.5](#): 63-64. The plan was signed by the heads of the Ministry of Interior, CMTA and Central Military Staff.

xxiv. On the Nanjing government’s struggle to gain control over the provinces see Lloyd Eastman, “Nationalist China during the Nanjing decade” in Lloyd Eastman et al., *The Nationalist Era in China, 1927-1949* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), 9-15.

xxv. [Fu Zuoyi], “Guomin zhenggu Xingzheng Yuan mishu chuwei chaosong Fu Zuoyi guanyu De Wang zizhi qingxing ji chuli banfa zhi Mengzhang weiyuanhui” (A duplicate copy of Fu Zuoyi’s description of De Wang’s autonomous movement and methods for dealing with it send by the

secretary of the Executive Yuan to the CMTA), 7 October 1933, in *ZMSD*, [5.1.1](#): 100-101.

xxvi. See “Xingzhengyuan guanyu gaige Menggu difang xingzheng xitong fangan” (Executive Yuan’s plan for revising the system of local Mongolian administration), 10 October 1934, in Chen, *Neimeng zizhi shiliao jiyao*, 77-79.

xxvii. See Lu, *Menggu “zizhi yundong” shiwei*, 43-44.

xxviii. “Xingzhengyuan wei guanyu Menggu zizhi wenti bugao” (Executive Yuan proclamation about the question of Mongolian autonomy), 13 November 1933, in *ZMSD*, [5.1.5](#): 68-69.

xxix. “Huang buzhang Zhao fuweiyuanzhang zai Bailingmiao yu Neimeng zizhi huiyi shangding Menggu zizhi banfa” (Methods for Mongolian autonomy negotiated between Minister Huang and vice-chairman Zhao and the Bailingmiao Inner Mongolian Autonomous Congress), December 1933, in *ZMSD*, [5.1.5](#): 116-18; Lu, *Menggu “zizhi yundong” shiwei*, 54-57.

xxx. Lloyd E. Eastman, *The Abortive Revolution: China under Nationalist Rule, 1927-1937* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1974), 112.

xxxi. Hao, *Neimenggu gemingshi*, 184.

xxxii. For a copy of the Taiyuan plan see “Guomin zhengfu wenguanchu wei niding Neimeng zizhi banfa zhi Xingzheng Yuan gonghan” (Public circular of the methods for Inner Mongolian autonomy drafted by the national government’s civil official department and presented to the Executive Yuan), 22 January 1934, in *ZMSD*, [5.1.5](#): 69-72.

xxxiii. “Neimeng zizhi banfa shiyi xiang” (Eleven Methods for Inner Mongolian Autonomy), 17 January 1934, in Chen, *Neimeng zizhi shiliao jiyao*, 68-69.

xxxiv. Lu, *Menggu “zizhi yundong” shiwei*, 63-64.

xxxv. Eastman, *Abortive Revolution*, 130-39.

xxxvi. Chen, *Neimeng zizhi shiliao jiyao*, 68-73; Lu, *Menggu “zizhi yundong” shiwei*, 61-62; Hao, *Neimenggu gemingshi*, 184.

xxxvii. Lu, *Menggu “zizhi yundong” shiwei*, 65, 70-71.

xxxviii. Chiang Kai-shek, “Zhongguo zhi bianjiang wenti” (China’s frontier problem), 7 March 1934, in *Zongtong Jiang Gong sixiang yanlun zongji* (Collection of President Jiang Kai-shek’s essays and speeches), ed. Jin Xiaoyi (Taipei [Taipei]: Zhongguo guomintang zhongyang weiyuanhui dangshi weiyuanhui, 1984), vol. 12, 108.

xxxix. Lattimore, “The Eclipse of Inner Mongolian Nationalism,” 436-8;

Sechin, *Menggu zhi Jinxi*, vol. 2, 270.

xl. Lu, *Menggu “Zizhi yundong” shiwei*, 77-86.

xli. Lattimore, “The Eclipse of Inner Mongolian Nationalism,” 438.

xlii. Ma and Zhao, “Qingdai bianjiang minzu zhengce jianlun,” 1.