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James Leibold  
University of Southern California\*

### **Positioning “*minzu*” within Sun Yat-sen’s Discourse of *Minzuzhuyi***

It is no coincidence that Sun Yat-sen placed his principle of *minzuzhuyi* first amongst his famous political programme for Republican China, the Three People’s Principles (*Sanminzhuyi*). Sun felt strongly that *minzuzhuyi* was the crux of his programme for saving China from potential “national extinction” (*guowang*). He described *minzuzhuyi* (literally, “the doctrine of the people’s lineage”), *minquanzhuyi* (literally, “the doctrine of the people’s sovereignty”) and *minshengzhuyi* (literally, “the doctrine of the people’s livelihood”) as the “three evolutionary stages” or “three great revolutions” through which China needed to pass in order to guarantee its survival as a race and a state in the modern world.<sup>1</sup> Sun believed the propagation of a spirit of ethnic inclusiveness among the Chinese people was a prerequisite for the successful

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implementation of both *minquanzhuyi* and *minshengzhuyi*. Ironically, however, Western scholarship on China's most famous "nationalist" has largely ignored the very principle—*minzuzhuyi*—upon which his historical reputation has been based, preferring instead to address the more controversial issues surrounding Sun's definitions of *minquanzhuyi* (viz. "democracy") and *minshengzhuyi* (viz. "socialism"). Furthermore, among those who have examined *minzuzhuyi*, the natural tendency to simplify, reify and canonize the highly enigmatic thought of Sun Yat-sen has lead most Chinese and Anglo scholars to focus almost solely upon his late Qing "anti-Manchuist" rhetoric or 1924 "anti-imperialist" *Sanminzhuyi* lectures, while failing to contextualize these two apparently disparate formulations with one another or any of Sun's numerous other discussions of *minzu*.

This article attempts to redress this imbalance through a careful analysis of the historical and intellectual development of Sun Yat-sen's discourse of *minzuzhuyi*. In particular, I will attempt to demonstrate how Sun's discourse of *minzuzhuyi* created new discursive categories for analyzing human diversity in China while simultaneously positioning China's non-Han frontier minorities firmly within the confines of a new bounded and organic Chinese nation/race, or what Sun termed the *Zhonghua minzu*.

Sun's thinking on *minzuzhuyi* evolved gradually over his more than 30 years as a political activist. Ideology, as far as Sun was concerned, was simply a tool for achieving practical ends; and thus, ideas needed to be flexibly interpreted depending upon the specific historical context in which they were employed.<sup>2</sup> Sun's self-professed intellectual utilitarianism has lead two leading scholars of his thought, Leonard Gordon and Sidney Chang, to describe the

Three People's Principles as "a doctrine in continuous development, an ideology that would grow and change according to the needs of the times."<sup>3</sup>

The dynamic and flexible nature of Sun's doctrine has contributed to an often contradictory characterization of his principle of *minzuzhuyi*—with Sun having been portrayed as everything from a rabid racist to a champion of Chinese multi-culturalism to an advocate of national minority self-determination and political independence. One scholar has made repeated use of the word "inconsistent" when describing Sun's ideas on ethnic diversity within China, while another expert on modern Chinese minority policy has concluded that Sun "was never very concerned about minorities and his ideas on that subject are not very well worked out."<sup>4</sup> Could Sun's thoughts and actions be more accurately described as "opportunistic" than "nationalistic," as one scholar has recently suggested?<sup>5</sup>

A deeper probe into the totality of Sun's writings on *minzuzhuyi* reveals, however, a marked continuity and single-mindedness. Sun's discourse of *minzuzhuyi* consistently viewed the relations between China's different *minzus* in stark social evolutionist terms. In Sun's mind, the peripheral minority peoples of the Qing empire (Tibetans, Mongols, Muslims, Miao, etc.) were ethnic relics destined for eventual assimilation with a superior "Han Chinese" majority via the dispassionate "scientific law" of "natural selection." The natural, evolutionary melding of China's peoples and cultures would gradually give rise to a new, organic *Zhonghua minzu* with a distinctly Han cultural and racial core. The language and specific policy initiatives embedded in Sun's *minzuzhuyi* provided the theoretical framework from which both Kuomintang and Chinese Communist Party intellectuals and policymakers approached the frontier and

national questions in early 20<sup>th</sup> century China, with its social evolutionary ontology firmly guiding the way both political party's positioning of the ethnic minorities within the new nation-state.

Before proceeding, however, it is essential that we first pause briefly to consider the semantic confusion surrounding the Chinese word *minzu*. The term is not indigenous to China; rather, it was adapted from the Japanese term *minzoku* (which itself was a neologism for translating the German word *volk*) around the early 1880's. The term did not however come into widespread use among Chinese intellectuals until the first decade of the 1900s.<sup>6</sup> In early twentieth century China, and one could argue today as well, *minzu* was often used to express a cluster of meanings and associations similar to those expressed by the English terms "race," "nation," "people," "ethnic group" and "nationality."<sup>7</sup> Some Chinese authors went to great lengths to define the term, listing any number of objective criterion necessary for *minzu* formation. Many others, however, employed it in a very loose and often contradictory fashion, frequently, for example, using it interchangeably with the term *zhongzu* or race. Although most users of the term undoubtedly believed that *minzu* expressed a specific objective reality, the ambiguous nature of the term added to its polemical value. Partha Chatterjee has pointed out that "'politics' necessarily operates in an ideological world in which words rarely have unambiguous meanings; where notions are inexact, and have political value precisely because they are inexact and hence capable of suggesting a range of possible interpretations."<sup>8</sup> The fluid nature of the terms *minzu* and *minzuzhuyi* requires that we avoid an *a priori* definition and instead interpret their meaning based upon the specific context in which they are employed. As a result, wherever it

is possible without confusing the reader, I have chosen not to translate *minzu* and *minzuzhuyi* in my text, allowing the broader context of the term's usage to determine its meaning.

*Anti-Manchuism & the Invention of Minzuzhuyi (1895-1911)*

When Sun Yat-sen, the self-proclaimed “son of a coolie” from the hamlet of Cuiheng situated in the Pearl River Delta, cut off his queue in 1894 and declared his intent to overthrow the Manchu Qing dynasty, he saw himself more as an anti-dynastic rebel than a modern-day revolutionary. Young Sun grew up within the shadows of Ming dynasty loyalism kept alive for over two centuries by the so-called Triad secret societies of southern and diasporic China. Inspired by the writings of Wang Fuzhi (1619-92) and other Ming loyalist scholars, the Triads continued to foster the image of the Manchu emperors as uncultured barbarian invaders who unjustly usurped the dragon throne from the Chinese Ming dynasty in 1644. During the decade immediately prior to Sun's birth in 1866, the smoldering embers of Triad “anti-Manchuism” were re-ignited by the Taiping rebels of southern China. In their bloody decade-long quest to overthrow the Qing dynasty the Taipings often characterized the Manchu emperor as a “Tartar caitiffs” (*dalu*) of “barbarian origin” and the “mortal enemy of us Chinese.”<sup>9</sup> As an impressionable youngster Sun was captivated by the vivid stories of the Taiping leader Hong Xiuquan told to him by his uncle and other village elders. And after Sun vandalized the wooden idols of a local temple in a manner similar to the Taipings with close pal Lu Haodong, he even earned himself the nickname *Hong Xiuquan* from his childhood friends.<sup>10</sup> Inheriting the Taiping's revolutionary mantle, Sun and his friends aimed to drive the Manchu barbarians out of the Middle Kingdom and restore the imperial

mandate of the Han majority.

Sun's own crusade to overthrow the Qing led to the creation of his own anti-Manchu secret society, the Xingzhonghui (Revive China Society), which was established first in Hawaii during November of 1894 and then moved to Hong Kong in early 1895. Sun insisted that all members swear a secret oath to "drive out the Tartar caitiffs and restore China" (*quchu dalu, hui fu Zhongguo*) when joining the society.<sup>11</sup> The Xingzhonghui's eight-character pledge represented a slightly revised version of the Ming dynasty slogan "expel the northern barbarians and restore China" (*quzhu hulu, fuxing Zhonghua*), first employed by Zhu Yuanzhang during his bid to drive the barbarian Mongol Yuan dynasty beyond the Great Wall.<sup>12</sup> The charter of the Xingzhonghui, written by Sun in early 1895, stressed the incompetent and corrupt nature of Qing rule while arguing that its Manchu rulers represented a "different lineage" (*yizu*) from the majority "Chinese people" (*Huaren*).<sup>13</sup> In a 1896 autobiographical essay, Sun claimed that since the Manchus crossed over the Great Wall, "our sacred altars have fallen into ruin and our civilization has sunken into savagery," and proclaimed the mission of "driving out the cruel [Manchu] robbers and re-creating China (*Zhonghua*) based upon a revival of the order during the [Chinese] Three Dynasties of Han, Tang and Ming and an emulation of Western ways."<sup>14</sup> Much like Zhu Yuanzhang and Hong Xiuquan before him, Sun Yat-sen believed that since the Manchus had lost the "mandate of heaven" (*Tianming*) by failing to uphold orthodox cultural rites a Chinese led "rebellion" (*zaofan*) was justified to restore Confucian morality and order. It was not until after the failure of Sun's 1895 Canton rebellion and his banishment from China that he began to conceptualize his movement as a

modern revolution and calling for the replacement of the Qing dynasty with a republican form of government.

In addition to the rich tradition of Ming loyalism imparted by his uncle, Sun's modern education outside China introduced him to another set of ideas that seemed to confirm his suspicions about the "barbaric nature" of the Manchu rulers. As a student first at a Hawaii missionary school and then the English curriculum Government Central School in Hong Kong, Sun came to accept the necessity and inevitability of the Victorian notion of progress, especially as embodied in the "scientific axiom" of human evolution. During his eight months of study at the British Museum in 1897, Sun undertook a comprehensive study of Charles Darwin's scientific findings as filtered through the lenses of Western sociologists.<sup>15</sup> Sun found that Darwin's discoveries while traveling aboard the HMS Beagle proved all species (including man) were locked in a continuous process of adaptation with their natural environment. This struggle lead to the survival of those species endowed with more favorable attributes, whereas less fortunate species perished. Darwin termed this struggle for existence "natural selection" or "the survival of the fittest." The so-called "Social Darwinists," men like Herbert Spencer and Thomas Huxley, expanded Darwin's theory from its rather narrow focus upon natural selection among individual species into a new political ideology about the competition for survival among racial and national groups within world history.

In China, Darwin's message came to signify the importance of an impending "racial war" (*zhongzhan*) among the world's human population. In his hugely influential 1895 essay "Whence Strength?" (*Yu qiang*), the eminent translator Yan Fu introduced the key ideas behind Spencer's multi-volume

*Principles of Sociology*. Yan Fu explained how Spencer used Darwin's biological organism as a paradigm for society, writing: "When a *qun* (group or society) is formed, it is in body, function, and capability no different from the body of a living thing...If we know what keeps our own bodies alive, we will know what makes a *qun* secure."<sup>16</sup> In Yan Fu's mind both biological and group survival hinged upon "group solidarity" (*qunzhuyi* or literally, "groupism"):

By struggle of species, it is meant struggle for survival. By natural selection, it is meant the survival of the fittest race (*zhong*). The idea is that people and living organisms appeared in the world and coexisted in all their variety, feeding together on the benefits of nature. When they come into contact with each other, they struggled for their own survival. In the beginning, races struggled with races (*zhongzheng*), then groups struggled with groups. The weak constantly became the prey of the strong, the stupid constantly become slaves of the intelligent. Those who survived and perpetuated their species had to be resistant and valiant, agile and ingenious.<sup>17</sup>

Unity, Yan Fu stressed to his readers, was the key to progress, evolutionary survival and the obtainment "wealth and power."

Given the expediency of Darwin's message, one of the central questions for 20<sup>th</sup> century Chinese intellectuals became: "What *qun* shall we unite?": the "Cantonese" or the "Fukienese"; the "Han" or the "Manchu"; the "Chinese" or the entire "yellow race." For Sun Yat-sen and other Cantonese members of the Xingzhonghui China's destiny rested with the majority "Chinese" (*Huaren*), an amorphous mass of people who appeared to share a common written language and set of cultural traditions. The minority "Manchu" (*Manren*) rulers had already proven themselves evolutionarily-unfit by failing to meet the challenge of the West and now stood in the way of all future Chinese progress. While Sun's thinking drifted towards a theoretical de-construction of the "yellow race"—distinguishing between an "us-group" (the *Huaren*) and a "them-group" (the *Manren*)—he did not initially perceive of this division in racial terms, but

rather the difference between a superior, awe-inspiring Chinese civilization and an inferior, debased barbarian tribe. In Sun's early writings the Manchus are described only as a "different lineage" (*yizu*) and not as a different "race" (*zhongzu* or *minzu*).

Around the turn of the century another group of Chinese youths—based mainly in the Yangtze River delta cities of Shanghai and Hangzhou and amongst the expatriate student community of Japan—began echoing the Xingzhonghui's calls for the overthrow of the Manchu dynasty. Their criticism of the Qing dynasty however went beyond Sun's charge of a corrupt and barbarian system of rule; rather, they drew upon the theories of classical scholar and self-proclaimed "madman" Zhang Binglin to arguing that the Manchus were a fundamentally different "race" (*zhongzu*, *renzhong* or *minzu*) from the vast majority of the Chinese. In *Qiusu* (*Book of Persecution*), originally published in 1900 and revised in 1902, Zhang Binglin merged the popular Qing discourse of "distinguishing lineages" (*bian zulei*) with the social evolutionist metaphor of blood (*xue*) in order to contend that all Chinese subjects of the Qing empire shared a common biological lineage, referred to by Zhang as the *Hanzu*, or "Han lineage-race," and a common progenitor in the mythical Yellow Emperor. Zhang also claimed that the "Manchu lineage-race" (*Manzhouzu*), a distinct and uncivilized *minzu* descended from the *Donghu* (Eastern Barbarians) of the Jin dynasty, were attempting to usurp the "heirship" (*zongzi*) of the *Hanzu* by systematically destroying their racial consciousness.<sup>18</sup>

While Zhang Binglin's *Qiusu* created a new analytical category for conceptualizing Manchu-Han difference, it was eighteen year-old Zou Rong's brazenly seditious *Gemingjun* (*Revolutionary Army*) that popularized Zhang

Binglin's often impenetrable language among young Chinese revolutionaries. In this lucid and vigorously argued polemic, which is reported to have sold over one million copies, Zou Rong used Zhang Binglin's racial theories to demonstrate the immutable difference between the Han and Manchu and the need for the Han lineage-race to "annihilate the five million or so furry and horned Manchu race."<sup>19</sup> After *Gemingjun*'s 1903 publication in the Shanghai journal *Subao* (*Jiangsu Journal*), Chinese authorities placed pressure on the municipal council of the Shanghai International Concessions to arrest, try and then imprison both Zou Rong and Zhang Binglin (who wrote the preface to *Gemingjun*). Zou Rong's eventual death in prison turned the entire "*Subao* affair" into a *cause célèbre* for the increasingly inflammatory and violent calls among Chinese students for "racial revolution" (*minzu geming*).

Zhang Binglin's brand of "narrow racism" (*xia'ai minzuzhuyi*) did not immediately appeal to Sun Yat-sen. While hiding from Manchu investigators in Japan, Zhang Binglin asked Sun to join him in convening a "Meeting to Commemorate the 242nd Year since the Ruination of China" in early 1902, but Sun refused. Zhang later recalled that Sun was "utterly lacking in wholehearted devotion to the idea of saving the Han race" at the time of their first meeting.<sup>20</sup> Prior to 1905 Sun Yat-sen's ideas on *minzu* seem to be closer to those of Liang Qichao. Liang and his mentor Kang Youwei rejected the violent racism of Zhang Binglin and instead called for a series of gradual reforms that would transform the Qing dynasty into a modern constitutional monarchy. After Kang Youwei left Tokyo for Canada during the summer of 1899, Liang and Sun—both natives of Guangdong—developed a close friendship that resulted in their cooperation on a number of joint ventures including the co-authoring of several

articles in Liang's journal *Qingyibao* (Public Opinion). Their collaboration, however, was short-lived. Fearing (perhaps justly) that his top protégé was about to join Sun's revolutionary movement, Kang Youwei ordered Liang to leave Japan in late 1899 and establish branches of Kang's "Society to Protect the Emperor" (Baohuanghui) in Hawaii and the United States.<sup>21</sup> The intellectual bond between the two men was not, however, so easily broken.

In their rush to separate late Qing dynasty intellectuals into two neatly divided camps—the so-called "revolutionaries" (Sun Yat-sen, Zhang Binglin and other members of the Tongmenghui) and "reformers" (Kang Youwei, Liang Qichao and other members of the Baohuanghui)—scholars have largely overlooked the affinity in nationalist thought between Sun Yat-sen and Liang Qichao.<sup>22</sup> A close examination of their writings on *minzu*, however, reveals an uncanny similarity in both language and conclusions. Avid disciples of social evolutionism, both men feared the destructive potential of Zhang Binglin's narrow "racial revengism" (*zhongzu fuchou zhuyi*) and attempted to re-direct public attention towards the larger evolutionary struggle of the yellow and white races (*renzhong*), and in particular the life or death struggle between these two races' strongest components the Chinese and Anglo-Saxon *minzu*.

In his 1902 call for a "New Historiography," Liang Qichao invented the term *guozu* (state/national lineage) to describe what he saw as the highest stage of human evolutionary struggle: the impending battle between truly global state/national lineages—such as the Chinese and Anglo-Saxon *minzu*. Liang contrasted this final evolutionary stage with the previous conflict between *jiazu* (clans) and *buzu* (tribes).<sup>23</sup> Soon after his forced exile to Japan following the Hundred Days of Reform debacle, Liang began arguing that racial mixing,

rather than the preservation of an unsullied bloodline, was the key to evolutionary survival. “Racial improvement,” Liang wrote in late 1898, “arises from the amalgamation of many different races.”<sup>24</sup> Inferior races, like the Manchus, who do not submit themselves to racial mixing with superior races, like the Han, were destined for evolutionary extinction. Liang was one of the first Chinese intellectuals to urge the Qing court, for the sake of its own survival, to “tear down the boundaries between Manchus and Han” (*ping Man-Han zhi jie*). By 1903, however, he appeared sufficiently satisfied with the Manchu court’s reform efforts—in particular the 1 February 1902 edict lifting the ban on Han-Manchu intermarriage—to begin echoing Kang Youwei’s assertion that the Manchus had already been “sinicized” (*zhongguohua*) by the Han majority, or at the very least were well on their way.<sup>25</sup> Liang found additional theoretical support for the unity of the “Chinese *minzu*” (*Zhongguo minzu*) in the work of Swiss legalist Johann Bluntschli. Liang pointed to the important distinction between the legal concept of *guomin* (citizenry) and the ethnological term *minzu* (race/nation) in Bluntschli’s *Theory of the Modern State* (*Lehre vom modernen Staat*). What Liang found most intriguing and useful in Bluntschli’s work was his historical observation that a *guomin* need not be comprised of only a single *minzu*. Liang used this notion to criticize the “petty *minzuzhuyi*” (*xiao minzuzhuyi*) contained within Zhang Binglin’s racist anti-Manchism and to distinguish it from his idea of a “broad *minzuzhuyi*” (*da minzuzhuyi*) which aimed at uniting all the *minzu* of China together into a single, unified *guomin* or *guozu*.<sup>26</sup>

Sun Yat-sen appeared to sympathize with both Liang’s non-racial definition of China and his brand of “broad *minzuzhuyi*,” yet he could not accept

Liang's assessment that the Manchus had already been "assimilated" (*tonghua* or *Hanhua*) by the Han majority. To do so would abrogate the very need for revolution. More a man of action than words, however, Sun shunned direct participation in the debate between Kang/Liang and Zhang/Zou, choosing instead to focus his efforts on raising money among overseas Chinese for yet another peasant uprising in southern China.

Sun's neglect of propaganda work cost him dearly. Upon returning to Japan in June 1903 he discovered that only a handful of his Cantonese activists remain loyal to him. Most others had been won over by Liang Qichao's persuasively argued case for gradual reform and national unity.<sup>27</sup> Sun quickly swung into action. Making use of the outrage over the *Subao* affair among Chinese students studying in Japan, Sun Yat-sen began using the racist language of Zhang Binglin to attack the reformers, stressing for the first time that the Manchus were a "different race" (*yizhong*) from the "Han race" (*Hanzu* or *Hanzhong*). In a passionate plea to his fellow countrymen, Sun declared that "as long as an uncivilized and debased race (*yefan jianzhong*) of nomads from northeastern Manchuria enjoy imperial authority, our Han people's race (*zhongzu*)—with its four thousand year-old civilization—cannot enjoy its civil liberties (*minquan*)."<sup>28</sup> In a long article entitled "Refutation of the Newspapers of the Society to Protect the Emperor," Sun upheld anti-Manchuism as the sole criterion of patriotism and criticized the reformers calls for a constitutional monarchy.<sup>29</sup>

Yet, at the same time as he began employing race to attack the reformers, Sun was also developing his own spatiocultural definition of the Chinese state or what he termed "Zhina." The neologism Zhina, first used to

transliterate the Sanskrit name for China (*Cina*) in Tang dynasty translations of Buddhist sutras, was the common name for China in Meiji Japan,<sup>30</sup> and Sun's usage of the term seemed to indicate an effort on his behalf to move beyond Zhang Binglin's narrow racialist definition of China as the Han race (*Hanzu*). In an August 1903 speech discussing the various arguments among foreigners for and against the dismemberment of China, Sun argued that while the cruel and ineffective rule of the Manchu Qing dynasty appeared to justify the imperialist partitioning of China, its single "national character" (*minxing*) did not:

During the last five or six hundred years, the territory of the eighteen provinces has been solidly unified and never suffered disintegration. Despite the vastness of its territory and the immensity of its population, nevertheless, except for the provinces of Fujian and Guangdong, where the spoken language differs from that of China proper, the spoken languages of the other regions are the same, with only slight local, dialectal difference, and the entire country shares a common written language and common customs....For the Powers to partition this nation, with its uniform habits, customs, and character would be tantamount to destroying a man's home and scattering his wife and children. Not only would this disrupt heavenly harmony, but it would also go completely against the grain of the Chinese people.<sup>31</sup>

When Sun attempted to semiologically imagine and spatially anticipate the "Chinese state" (*Zhinanguo*) in a 1900 map, he was careful to stretch the taut skin of the Chinese state firmly over the frontier regions of the Qing empire.<sup>32</sup> Furthermore, in an effort to physically bind the nation together, Sun drew a vast network of proposed railway lines—what he once termed "the arteries (*mingmai*) of the nation"<sup>33</sup>—on his map, physically linking "central China" (*Zhina benbu*) with the "dependencies" (*dishu*) of Manchuria, Mongolia, Tibet, and Xinjiang. Though Sun wanted the overthrow of the Manchu empire, he still hoped to preserve the nation as a bounded territory which included all the peoples of the Qing empire.<sup>34</sup>

Sun's new racist rhetoric however bore little fruit. The bloody defeat of

the group's 1900 Huizhou insurrection and Sun's inability to garner much support for his revolutionary cause among Japanese, French, British and American officials left the Xingzhonghui with few followers by 1905. Moreover, its membership remained almost exclusively Cantonese (186 out of 271 identified members). In fact, traditional prejudices and provincialism among the Chinese émigré community (especially in Japan) had caused the entire revolutionary movement to be divided along "native-place" (*tongxiang*) lines. The establishment of the Tongmenghui (Revolutionary Alliance) represented an attempt by three major factions to bridge this disunity. In July 1905 Huang Xing's Hunan/Hubei based Society for China's Revival decided to join forces with the Cantonese revolutionaries of Sun's Xingzhonghui to create the Tongmenghui; and, following Zhang Binglin's release from prison in late 1906, his Zhejiang/Anhui based Restoration Society also joined the Tongmenghui. Because of his advanced age, long revolutionary career and numerous overseas connections, Sun was made president of the new alliance. Yet, as Marie-Claire Bergère has pointed out, the decision of these divergent provincial and interest groups to rally under the leadership of Sun Yat-sen did little to eliminate the factionalism which continued to plague the revolutionary movement.<sup>35</sup>

The Tongmenghui's provincial sectarianism was exacerbated by the lack of a coherent ideology. Attempting to seize an early hold on the ideological direction of the Tongmenghui, Sun put forward what he called the "three great isms" (*san da zhuyi*)—*minzuzhuyi*, *minquanzhuyi*, *minshengzhuyi*—to serve as the new organization's guiding ideology in the inaugural forward of *Minbao* (*People's Journal*), the Tongmenghui's principle propaganda paper.<sup>36</sup> Sun's

three “isms” were incorporated into the Tongmenghui’s 1906 Manifesto in the form of a set of concrete but vaguely defined goals: 1) *minzuzhuyi*: the elimination of the Manchus and the restoration of China; 2) *minquanzhuyi*: the establishment of a Republic and; 3) *minshengzhuyi*: the equalization of land.<sup>37</sup> The task of expanding these broad goals into a systematic ideology was left to Sun’s trusted Cantonese adjutants and skilled polemicists Wang Jingwei, Hu Hanmin, Zhu Zhixin and Feng Ziyou in their capacity as editors of *Minbao*. With Sun’s daily guidance these men crafted what came to be known as the Three People’s Principles (*Sanminzhuyi*) during the first year of *Minbao*’s existence.

In several ways the task of theorizing Sun’s principle of *minzuzhuyi* proved the most difficult. The entire Tongmenghui agreed upon the need to overthrow the Manchu Qing dynasty, yet beyond that there was little consensus on what to do with the various non-Han peoples living along the empire’s frontier following the establishment of the Republic.

On one end of the spectrum, there were those like Zhang Binglin and Zou Rong who called for the creation of an ethnically homogeneous Han Republic. In *Revolutionary Army* Zou Rong called upon the Han to forcefully expel the Manchus from China (or even better, exterminate their entire race), while Zhang Binglin declared in 1907 that “if the Muslim chiefs’ hatred for the Manchus has so penetrated them to the bone that they extend their grudge to us, and fiercely desire independence to restore the domains of their Turkic ancestors, then we should give in to their desires, knowing they but look on us as we look on the Manchus.”<sup>38</sup> Sun Yat-sen clearly felt uncomfortable with this radical position. In a Tokyo speech before six thousand Chinese expatriates celebrating the one year anniversary of the *Minbao* and the controversial

passing of its editorship from Wang Jingwei to Zhang Binglin, Sun explicitly cautioned against Zou Rong's brand of racial vengeance: "I have heard claims among our brothers that the *minzu* revolution aims to exterminate the Manchus as a *minzu*. This is utterly mistaken." Sun continued, "...we do not hate the Manchus per se, but only those Manchus who are harming the Han. If, when we achieve the aims of our revolution, the Manchus do not oppose us or do us harm, there will be no reason for us to fight against them."<sup>39</sup> Here Sun added a new political dimension to Zhang Binglin's biological definition of *minzu*, arguing that "*minzuzhuyi* certainly does not mean that whenever people meet a person of a different *minzu* they exclude them, but rather that they do not permit a person of a different *minzu* to steal our *minzu*'s sovereignty."<sup>40</sup> In Sun's mind, the goal of *minzuzhuyi* was the return of political authority to the hands of the Han majority, "the globe's largest, oldest and most civilized *minzu*," and not the killing or driving out of the evolutionarily-unfit Manchu minority. The struggle to control the ideological direction of *Minbao* and the festering dispute over the meaning of *minzuzhuyi* eventually produced a cantankerous split between Zhang Binglin and Sun Yat-sen in November 1909 and the gradual decline of the Tongmenghui.

On the opposite end of the spectrum, Liang Qichao called for the fusion of all China's *minzu* into a single, composite "Zhonghua nation" (*Zhonghua minzu*). Liang argued that Western and Eastern scholars alike recognize the historical strength of China's "assimilationist powers" (*tonghuali*). The Manchus, like the Jurchen and Mongols before them, had already been drawn into Chinese civilization and transformed. In order for China's remaining *minzu*—the Han, Mongols, Tibetans and Miao—to construct a strong,

democratic state, it was necessary for all *minzu* to “smelt together in the same furnace (*rong er ru yu yilu*),” while the Han majority continued to serve as the cultural and ethnic core of the new *Zhonghua minzu*. During his visit to the United State in 1903, Liang had been struck by American’s own efforts to assimilation its numerous immigrant populations in a single national “melting pot.” And now back in China, he became convinced that China’s very evolutionary survival required “the adoption of imperialist policies to unite the Han, Manchus, Mongols, Hui, Miao and Tibetans into a ‘single large nation’ (*yida minzu*) that would comprise one-third of humanity, possess the greatest ambition on the five continents, and capture the respect of principled men.”<sup>41</sup> Sun Yat-sen clearly sympathized with Liang’s call for the creation of a single Chinese nation comprising the vast territory and peoples of the Qing empire, yet acceptance of Liang’s entire formula would nullify the very foundation of his revolutionary activism—the need to overthrow the Manchu dynasty. Sun’s predicament—what Pamela Crossley has labelled the “conceptual crisis” of late Qing nationalism and Michael Gasster as called the choose between Scylla and Charybdis—hinged upon the need, on the one hand, to explicitly exclude the Manchu from the “Chinese *minzu*” in legitimizing the creation of a Han-dominated Republic and, on the other hand, the desire to inherit the territorial boundaries, and by extension the various ethnic polities, of the Qing empire.<sup>42</sup>

The difficult task of squeezing Sun’s *minzuzhuyi* between the racial exclusionism of Zhang Binglin and the spatial inclusionism of Liang Qichao fell to Sun’s most trusted polemicists, Wang Jingwei. In a long two-part article entitled, “A *Minzu* of Citizens,” which was serialized in the first two issues of the *Minbao*, Wang attempted to tackle the meaning of Sun’s *minzuzhuyi*. Wang

Jingwei began his discussion by accepting Bluntschli's distinction between the legal concept of *guomin* (citizenry) and the ethnological term of *minzu*, and then asking whether it was necessary for a single *minzu* to comprise a single *guomin*.<sup>43</sup> Wang answered this question by arguing that the world's most evolutionarily fit states were those comprised of only a single *minzu*. Only in an ethnically homogenous state, Wang contended, would equality and freedom be completely assured. Members of the same *minzu* shared innate feelings of fraternity towards one another. Wang Jingwei called this "natural equality" (*tianran zhi pingdeng*), reversing the classic *Zuo Commentary* dictum: "If they are not of our kin, they are sure to have different minds" to contend that those of the same *minzu* were of a single mind and thus naturally inclined to protect the freedom of its members. It was this natural inclination, Wang told his readers, that served as the basis for Sun Yat-sen's principle of *minzuzhuyi*. Natural equality could be suppressed but never eliminated.

At this point *minzuzhuyi*'s goal for an ethnically homogeneous state appears to have differed little from the blueprint mapped out by Zhang Binglin; yet Wang went on to explicitly criticize what he termed the "narrow racial revengism" of Zhang while echoing Liang Qichao's call for the assimilation of all Chinese *minzu* into a single "*minzu* of citizens" (*minzu de guomin*). Next, Wang proceeded to disagree with Liang over whether or not the Manchus and other non-Han populations have already been assimilated by the Han. The bulk of his essay puts forth concrete examples demonstrating how the Manchus have not only preserved their own language, customs and bloodline, but also how they have attempted to assimilate the Han by destroying their ethnic consciousness. The evolutionary process of natural selection was a

gradual one, and one that still had not been completed in China. In a 1907 *Minbao* essay Wang Jingwei went so far as to advocate a “limited period” of ethnic equality among China’s *minzu* to protect their interests while the natural process of evolution did its work, stating: “Our party advocates the future implementation of assimilationist policy towards the various *minzu*; but now we have no alternative to establish a limited period of political equality without a system of ranks.”<sup>44</sup>

Most cursory discussions of late Qing anti-Manchuism highlight the central role of Sun Yat-sen in the formulation of Han racist attitudes towards the Manchu rulers of China. As the leader of the Tongmenghui, Sun’s principle, *minzuzhuyi*, is often described as the ideological fountainhead of anti-Manchu rhetoric, causing Frank Dikötter, among others, to translate *minzuzhuyi* as “racial nationalism”<sup>45</sup> and even inviting comparisons with the racist nationalism of Italian Fascist Enrico Corradini and Alfredo Rocco.<sup>46</sup> Chinese scholars, who always go to great lengths to depict Sun’s thought in its most positive light, have also stressed the “narrow nationalist” and “Han chauvinist” tendencies in Sun’s pre-1911 principle of *minzuzhuyi*.<sup>47</sup> Yet, I think it is unwise to assume, like Michael Gasster does, that Sun’s anti-Manchu views provide a “convenient summary of most of the revolutionaries’ later arguments.”<sup>48</sup> Despite the biological metaphors which interpolate his usage of *minzu*, the non-violent social evolutionism that underpinned Sun’s conceptualization of political community sharply differed from the violent racial exclusionism of Zhang Binglin and others anti-Manchuists.

From early in his political career Sun’s definition of China was based more upon geographic and cultural signifiers than biological ones. Sun’s

expedient use of anti-Manchu rhetoric cannot hide the fact that he envisioned the new “Chinese State” (*Zhinaguo*) as a single political community occupying the entire territory of the Qing empire. Any cultural and ethnic diversity within this community was only temporary, awaiting gradual homogenization through the natural forces of human evolution and Sun’s program for national development. Finally, the tendency of scholars to indiscriminately divide the thought of Liang Qichao and Sun Yat-sen into the neat categories of “reformer” and “revolutionary” has overshadowed the remarkable similarity between their conceptualization of *minzu*. Both men called for the gradual, non-violent fusion of all the Qing empire’s peoples into a single national citizenry, disagreeing only on whether or not this process had already occurred among the Manchu rulers and the type of political system best suited for the new nation.

*Minzuzhuyi and the Chinese Republic (1911-1920)*

Despite a triumphant proclamation that the goal of *minzuzhuyi* had been achieved upon stepping down as provisional president of the new Republic of China on 1 April 1912,<sup>49</sup> Sun Yat-sen and his fellow revolutionaries were soon forced to re-think the exclusivist rhetoric that helped bring down the multi-ethnic Qing dynasty. The new Republic was coming apart along its ethnic seams. Outer Mongolia and Tibet officially declared their independence from the provisional Nanjing government on 1 January 1912; Xinjiang, although nominally part of the new Republic, was under the autonomous rule of the Chinese warlord Yang Zengxin; and finally, Russian, British, Japanese and French imperialists were quickly encroaching upon the old Qing frontier regions with hopes of adding to their colonial territories. To make matters worse, several of China’s interior provinces had declared their independence from

Beijing, demonstrating the tenuous nature of the newly imagined Republic. Attempting to stem the centrifugal disintegration of the Qing empire, the new Republican government began downplaying racial and ethnic differences among its citizens and stressing instead the national unity of what it called the “five major *minzu*” (*wuda minzu*) of the Republic: the Han, Manchu, Mongols, Tibetan and Hui. Accordingly, Sun’s principle of *minzuzhuyi* quickly expanded to include a new “positive” dimension: the construction of what Liang Qichao had first called a single *Zhonghua minzu* from amongst the various ethnic inhabitants of the Qing empire.

By the time Sun returned to Canton from yet another fund-raising trip through America and Europe in December of 1911, the faltering Qing empire was already being declared a multi-ethnic, “Zhonghua Republic of Five Lineages” (*Zhonghua minzu wuzu gonghe*) by the revolutionaries, with these five lineages symbolically represented by a new five-color national flag. A good deal of confusion exists over Sun’s position on the “Republic of Five Lineages” (*wuzu gonghe*) and the “five-color flag” (*wuse guoqi*). In both China and the West, Sun is often held up as a proponent of ethnic pluralism and racial equality following the establishment of the Republic, representing what analysts have described as a “radical transformation” or “reinterpretation” of *minzuzhuyi* following the 1911 Revolution.<sup>50</sup> In reaching this conclusion scholars make frequent reference to Sun’s uses of these two new concepts of Chinese ethnic diversity. Prasenjit Duara, for example, points to the new “five-color flag” in arguing that “Sun Yat-sen began to speak of the doctrine of the autonomy of five major races as the basis of the Republic,” while Gottfried-Karl Kindermann uses Sun’s apparent support for the *wuzu gonghe* concept in

explaining his goal of integrating all Chinese minorities into the “framework of a multi-ethnic Chinese nation-state.”<sup>51</sup> In China, the officially sanctioned *Sun Yat-sen Encyclopedia* (*Sun Zhongshan Cidian*) defines *wuzu gonghe* as “the model used by Sun Yat-sen to solve the domestic national question during the early republican period.”<sup>52</sup> Upon closer examination, however, Sun’s attitude towards these two icons of pluralism reveals a radically different story—one that requires us to reconsider previous assumptions about his support for ethnic diversity within the Republic.

Recently several Chinese scholars have demonstrated Sun Yat-sen’s “extreme opposition” to the adoption of the five-color national flag first proposed by Song Jiaoren, Chen Qimei, Zhang Binglin and other Shanghai revolutionaries following the Wuhan Uprising. Sun favored instead the “white sun against a blue sky” (*qingtian bairi*) banner created by his old Cantonese friend and martyr of the failed 1895 Canton Rebellion, Lu Haodong. Alternatively, he proposed a modified version of this flag, which included three colors (red, blue and white) symbolizing the French revolutionary ideals of liberty, equality and fraternity. In a public appeal directed at the newly established national assembly, Sun gave three reasons why the five-color pennant was inappropriate as a national symbol: 1) the five-color flag was originally used to distinguish top-ranking Qing navy officials; 2) the distribution of the colors meant to represent the five great *minzu* of China were incorrect since the color yellow signified the Manchus and not the Han, and, most importantly, 3) now that the national integration of the five *minzu* had been established, it was no longer appropriate for the national flag to represent them as distinct groups.<sup>53</sup> After much debate, the provisional assembly rejected

Sun's plea and voted on 10 January 1912 to adopt the five-color pennant as the new national flag. However, Sun's refusal to remove the white sun/blue sky flag from the offices of the provisional national government in Nanjing created an impasse which was only broken after he stepped down as provisional president in favor of Yuan Shikai. The newly relocated national assembly in Beijing once again formally decreed the five-color banner as the national flag on 10 May 1912. Sun, however, continued to oppose the use of the multicolored Republican flag. Lu Haodong's white sun/blue sky banner became the Kuomintang (KMT) party flag in 1919, and Sun's tri-color pennant the "national flag" of his rogue Canton regime in 1925 and finally, after 1927, the Nanjing Republic founded by Chiang Kai-shek.<sup>54</sup>

Sun was equally opposed to the usage of the term "Republic of Five *Minzu*" (*wuzu gonghe*) when referring to the new Chinese state. The mainland Chinese scholar Deng Hui pointed out that following the outbreak of racial violence between the Han and Manchus in the wake of the Wuhan Uprising, a group of prominent gentry raised the issue of declaring the new state a republic of five *minzu* in the hopes of neutralizing this rising tide of violence. Under pressure to quickly organize a new government and stabilize the national situation, Sun reluctantly agreed with their proposal.<sup>55</sup> Yet several times during the subsequent years Sun expressed his disapproval of the notion of a five-minzu republic and its symbolic five-color flag. In 1919, for example, Sun stated:

After the Han *minzu* toppled the political power of the Manchu Qing dynasty and escaped the yoke of alien rule, the goal of *minzuzhuyi* was at last achieved. But then the strangest thing happened. Just as the revolution succeeded, some bureaucrats took hold of the idea of a republic of five *minzu* made up of the Han, Manchus, Mongols, Hui and Tibetans, and selected a five-color flag [devised by] some Qing

general as the national flag of the Chinese Republic, with the five colors representing the Han, Manchu, Mongols, Hui, and Tibetans. Members of the revolutionary party took little notice and made use of this decrepit bureaucratic flag, abandoning the national flag of the Zhonghua Republic with its Blue Sky and White Sun designed by the first martyr of the Republic, Lu Haodong. I relentlessly opposed this, but the Senate made the Blue Sky and White Sun into the navy's flag. Alas! This is why ever since the establishment of the Republic, China has been rent asunder, and the navy has always upheld justice. The misfortunes of the Republic are all due to the inauspicious five-color flag.<sup>56</sup>

In a 1920 speech in Shanghai, Sun stated even more unequivocally: "Now some people have said that our Republic is a five *minzu* republic; yet, actually, the term five-*minzu* is inappropriate. How can we say there are only five *minzu* in China?"<sup>57</sup> Instead, Sun followed Liang Qichao in calling for "all the different *minzu* of China to meld together (*ronghe*) into a single *Zhonghua minzu* (like America, which was originally a mix of different European *minzus* and now forms only a single American *minzu* making it the most glorious *minzu* in the world)."<sup>58</sup> In his articles and speeches Sun rarely employed the term *wuzu gonghe*, preferring instead the more inclusive term *Zhonghua minzu*, which stressed the ethnic and cultural homogeneity of all citizens of the Republic.

Like *Hanzu* and *minzu*, the term *Zhonghua minzu* is a modern construct. It entered the Chinese lexicon around the turn of the century with the combination of the common Tang Dynasty term for China, *Zhonghua* (literally "central flower"), and the neologism *minzu* to create *Zhonghua minzu* or the "Central flower nation." Prior to the revolution, the term was popular among the cultural conservatives and constitutional monarchists, with Liang Qichao, for example, making frequent use of the term to stress the ethnic and cultural unity of China's different *minzu*.<sup>59</sup> Following the 1911 revolution the term gradually entered Sun's vocabulary, replacing both the exclusivist terms *Hanzu*

and *Manzu* and the pluralistic republican slogan of *wuzu gonghe*. By 1919, Sun was not only championing the existence of a single, unified *Zhonghua minzu*—which he proudly declared the world’s “oldest, biggest, and most civilized *minzu* with the greatest powers of assimilation (*tonghuali*)”<sup>60</sup>—but also arguing that all symbols of ethnic diversity (such as the five-color flag and the *wuzu gonghe* cliché) hindered the natural evolutionary fusion of a single Chinese people.

Sun’s speeches and articles during the early years of the Republic contain numerous references to its citizens as either a “single race” (*tongzhong*), “single family” (*yijia*), “single people” (*yiren*), or “single body” (*yiti*). In his inaugural speech as provisional president in 1912, for example, Sun stressed the theme of ethnic and territorial unity:

The essence of the state exists in its people. The uniting of the Han, Manchu, Mongol, Hui and Tibetan territories into a single country also means the uniting of the Han, Manchu, Mongol, Hui, Tibetan and other lineages (*zu*) into a single people (*yiren*). This you could say is *minzu* unity. Since the Wuhan Uprising ten provinces have successively declared their independence; yet, this so-called independence only represents a breaking away from the Qing court and the union of each province. The desire of Mongolia and Tibet is the same. The entire movement does not represent a divergence, but rather a movement towards the center, and a consolidation of the four corners of China. This you could say is territorial unity.<sup>61</sup>

This territorial and ethnic unity was grounded upon the equality of all citizens (regardless of *minzu*, age, and gender) and their freedom of expression, demonstration and redress now that the “poisonous autocratic system” of the Manchus had been replaced with a “democratic republic.” Sun referred to this state of political equality as *minzu pingdeng* or the “equality of *minzu*”<sup>62</sup>

The benefits of the new republic, however, were not to be distributed evenly amongst the various social and cultural groups of the new state. Though Sun argued for the political equality of all Chinese peoples within a republican

system of government, he did not harbor any illusions about the equality of men before nature. He called Rousseau's notion of inalienable natural right "unreasonable" and in fundamental conflict with the principle of historical evolution.<sup>63</sup> "There are no two things absolutely equal or alike. There is no equality in the natural world," Sun confidently declared; rather, "science has revealed the truth that men are not born equal and that equality is a social creation." Instead of manufacturing some sort of "artificial equality" (as existed in autocratic societies) or "false equality" (as existed in communal societies), Sun argued for the establishment of "true equality."<sup>64</sup> In other words, Sun favored the equal opportunity of all individuals to develop to *the best of their natural ability* without hindrances imposed by society. It naturally followed in Sun's mind that the discordant natural abilities of China's ethnic groups meant that the "advanced" Han majority and "backwards" minority peoples could not expect to benefit equally from the changes brought about by the establishment of a republican government. Sun theorized that the puerile and underdeveloped natural ability of China's minority peoples slated them for eventual assimilation with the superior Han *minzu*, whose historical destiny it was to lead all Chinese people into the modern world.

Besides differences in natural ability, population size was also a crucial factor in determining a group's piece of the republican pie. Since the Han people were the largest *minzu* in China, it again followed in Sun's mind that the promotion of their interests would benefit the nation as a whole. The new science of demography allowed Sun to claim that the overthrow of the minority Manchu rulers had successfully solved the problem of ethnic and political inequality in China. "Never again," he boldly proclaimed to a Hong Kong

correspondent in 1912, “will a situation of strife arise. From this day forward the five great *minzu* will work in concert with a common heart and a common plan for advancing the state, advancing China into a position as the largest and most civilized state in the world.” How could Sun be so confident of this? Naturally, because the majority Han *minzu* now occupied their rightful position as the dominant ethnic and political group of China. As Sun stressed to a reporter in May 1912:

Because there is certainly no racial animosity (*zhongzu zhi e'gan*) in China, it does not matter if there are disturbances along the frontier region. All four hundred million Chinese people (*Huaren*) are wholly of the same race and heart (*tongzhong tongxin*). How can this mass of people be compared with the less than one million Mongols, over two million Manchus, and five million Tibetans, who along with the other lineages (*zu*) comprise only fifteen million people? Even if there exists some animosity among these races (*zhongzu*), they are merely an extremely small minority—not a strong enough force to stir up trouble.<sup>65</sup>

The demographic “reality” of China’s ethnic composition was enough to justify in Sun’s mind the continued marginalization of these peoples within the new Republic.

What was to become of this small and insignificant group of peripheral peoples living along the strategic frontiers of the Chinese Republic? Borrowing one of Liang Qichao’s colorful expressions, Sun declared in 1919 that they were destined along with the Han majority “to be combine in a single furnace (*hewei yilu*) to create a new order of the *Zhonghua minzu*.”<sup>66</sup> Sun’s goal was the ethnically homogenous “melting pot” championed by American and Swiss nationalism. “When we speak of China,” Sun asserted in 1921, “no matter what *minzu* may be added to our country in the future, they must be assimilated (*tonghua*) into our *Hanzu*.”<sup>67</sup> With the establishment of the Republic the goal of racial amalgamation became central to Sun’s formulation of *minzuzhuyi*. In one

of his first official proclamations to the citizens of the republic as provisional president, for example, Sun declared that in order to unite the Han, Manchu, Mongol, Hui and Tibetan people into a single family “from this day forward our citizens should serve the “melding” (*xiaorong*) of ideas in order to remove boundaries and private interests with no benefit to the public good.”<sup>68</sup> This melding of ideas was supposed to work in concert with the natural process of “racial evolution” (*zhongzu jinhua*) listed second among the Tongmenghui’s nine-point political agenda.<sup>69</sup> The fact that this evolutionary process was to occur through the assimilation of smaller, weaker *minzu* with the Han majority was confirmed when the Tongmenghui was re-organized into the Chinese Kuomintang (Chinese Nationalist Party) in 1911, and the new Party’s manifesto listed “the strict implementation of racial assimilation (*zhongzu tonghua*)” as one of its five point agenda.<sup>70</sup> It is important to note, however, that in Sun’s mind, the establishment of national homogeneity was not to be carried out through the “forced assimilation” (*qiangxing tonghua*) of peripheral peoples, but rather the non-violent and natural process of “*minzu* melding (*minzu ronghe*).” It was Darwin’s “invisible-hand” of natural selection and not human coercion that would fuse the diverse peoples of Qing empire China into a new homogeneous *Zhonghua minzu*.

Social Darwinism was first popularized in China through the slogan “survival of the fittest” (*yousheng liebai*), literally “the superior survival and weak perish.” However, this emphasis upon violent struggle conflicted with the ideals of harmony and non-action enshrined in the Confucian and Taoist Classics.<sup>71</sup> Following the 1911 revolution, Sun and other Chinese intellectuals began distancing themselves from the contentious notion of survival of the

fittest in favor of what they perceived to be the more scientific and humane law of “natural selection” (*ziran xuanze*).

In a 1912 lecture, Sun stated that the principle of the survival of the fittest, which rests upon the concept of “the superiors dominating inferiors and the strong devouring the weak,” was no longer applicable in the modern world, but rather was “tantamount to barbarism.” “World evolution,” Sun argued, “depends upon learning,” that is “learning how to advance from barbarism to civilization,” from lower forms of intelligence to “the divine sagacity of sages (*ruizhi*).”<sup>72</sup> In his 1919 *Programme for National Reconstruction* [*Jianguo Fanglüe*], Sun divided the process of evolution into three distinct stages: the “evolution of matter” (*wuzhi jinhua*); the “evolution of species” (*dongwu jinhua*); and the “evolution of humanity” (*renlei jinhua*). He argued that the principle of survival of the fittest only guided animal evolution, whereas human evolution was directed by what the Russian populist Kropotkin called “mutual aid” (*huzhu*), a principle already encapsulated in the age-old Confucian maxims of morality, love, friendship and justice. Although the instincts of animal heritage have yet to be completely extinguished, “once mankind entered the period of civilization, his inner being spontaneously sought the principles of mutual aid.”<sup>73</sup> The Darwinian principle of natural selection assured that more civilized *minzu* (those who practice the principles of mutual aid) would be “selected by nature” (*tianze*) for evolutionary advancement over those *minzu* that continued to act according their instincts like “birds and beasts (*qinshou*).” When considering China’s own domestic *minzus*, it naturally followed in Sun’s mind that since the Han *minzu* possessed the most “civilized knowledge” (*wenming zhishi*), they inherited the Yellow Man’s Burden of civilizing China’s instinct-

ridden minority peoples, helping to lead them and other uncivilized members of the yellow race out of the darkness of barbarism and into the light of civilization.<sup>74</sup> Sun referred to this non-violent, civilizing project as *ganhua*, or the “reforming the people’s minds through examples of moral superiority.”<sup>75</sup> The result of this civilizing project would be the dissolution of all “backward” *minzu* through their gradually melding into the “civility” of Han society.

The principle of *ganhua* served as the cornerstone of Sun’s policy towards those frontier regions—such as Tibet and Mongolia—which were struggling to break to the new Republican government. Sun argued that improved education and communication rather than violent confrontation were the best methods for reunifying the country and fusing all its inhabitants into a single Zhonghua nation. Sun dismissed those militarists who advocated the use of punitive military campaigns to bring the Tibetan and Mongolian people back into the Chinese fold. In response to a reporter’s query on the 1912 Tibetan declaration of independence, Sun stated: “I strongly oppose the use of force in pushing this matter. In time the Tibetan people will rise up against outside aggression and be pulled towards the interior. The [historical] relationship between China and Tibet is quite deep.”<sup>76</sup> Both Tibet and Mongolia had broken away from China because they did not completely understand the benefits associated with membership in the Chinese nation-state, he told another reporter that same year: “Their education is still not sufficient, and it is not easy to enlighten them on this question; we can only gradually help them see what is right.”<sup>77</sup> During a 1923 speech before Kuomintang Party members, Sun stressed that “if we want people to understand the benefits of a republic, we must use popular propaganda, to ‘reform people’s minds’ (*ganhua*). We

cannot achieve this through the use of military force to control the people. If we use military force we will only achieve temporary success and fundamentally fail to change people's thinking and habits...propaganda is the process of reforming people's minds."<sup>78</sup>

Besides improved education, another way to speed up the natural process of amalgamation was by opening the frontier to Han migration and development. In one of Sun's first political acts, a 1894 letter to Qing minister Li Hongzhang, he suggested that China "emulate the West by recruiting people to open up the wasteland (*kaiken*)" along the Qing dynasty's vast frontier region.<sup>79</sup>

Following the success of the 1911 revolution and his resignation as provisional president, Sun dusted off his 1900 map of proposed railway lines and developed it into an extensive plan for China's national development. The plan, which was eventually published in 1917, and translated into English in 1919 under the title *The International Development of China*, called for massive infrastructure development projects to unify China proper with its frontiers, including the laying of around one hundred thousand miles of railway tracks, one million miles of macadam roads, and an equally massive telephone and telegraph system. Arguing that "the wealth of a nation can be judged by the mileage of its railroads," Sun proposed that the government spend nearly six billion Chinese silver dollar on the construction of a three-section railway network binding the costal cities of Tianjin, Shanghai and Canton with frontier outposts in Mongolia, Xinjiang and Tibet. This new communication and transportation network was intended to facilitate what Sun called his "cultivation and colonization (*fuzhi zhimin*)" scheme. Sun proposed to develop and civilize the backward frontier peoples through the forced migration of tens of

thousands of decommissioned soldiers and property-less Han peasants to the frontier. He also envisioned a land-grant system similar to the American Homestead Act that would allow the new Chinese nation-state to tap the abundant natural resources of the frontier region for its own national development.<sup>80</sup> In one of his last acts prior to stepping down as provisional president, Sun requested an annual budget of 300,000 *yuan* from the Ministry of Finance to carry out a migration scheme proposed by *defacto* Prime Minister Huang Xing. In justifying the large nature of this appropriation from the coffers of the cash-strapped Republic, Sun referred to the development of the “withering Northwest region” (*tiaoling xibei*) through forced migration of peoples from the crowded Southwest was one of the country’s main routes towards national wealth and strength.<sup>81</sup>

The growing discourse of *minzuzhuyi* as Chinese territorial and national unity was most clearly revealed in Sun’s first attempt since 1906 to systematically present his doctrine of *Sanminzhuyi*. In his 1919 hand-written draft of the *Three People’s Principles*, *minzuzhuyi* was no longer defined as some vague principle of Han racial exclusion, but rather as the “righteous spirit of a *minzu*.” “The basis for *minzuzhuyi*,” Sun wrote, “has sometimes been a common bloodline (*xuetong*) and religion, sometimes a shared history and tradition, or, more rarely, a common language and literature. But the loftiest and most civilized *minzuzhuyi* of all is rooted in common will (*yizhi*).”<sup>82</sup> Sun offered both Switzerland and America as examples of this most civilized type of *minzuzhuyi*, what he termed “positive *minzuzhuyi*,” and argued that both countries had successfully merged an ethnically diverse population into a single national unit in their quest for modernization and national greatness. The

citizens of the Zhonghua Republic shared a similar common aspiration to become the most powerful and developed nation on the earth. The key to achieving this goal in Sun's mind was the development of a more positive or constructive nationalist spirit:

In overthrowing the Manchu Qing dynasty and restoring the *Hanzu* we have achieved only the negative aspect of the goal of *minzuzhuyi*. From now on, we must struggle boldly to advance toward the positive side of this goal. What is the positive side of this goal? It is for the *Hanzu* to sacrifice the bloodline, history, and identity that they are so proud of and merge in all sincerity with the Manchus, Mongols, Hui, and Tibetans in a single furnace to create a new order of the *Zhonghua minzu*, just as America has produced the world's leading *minzuzhuyi* by melding scores of different peoples, black and white. This is a positive goal. Why should we talk of five *minzu*? I am convinced that when the *Hanzu*, the world's oldest and largest *minzu* and the one richest in assimilative power, is infused with the new world principles and takes positive action to bring about the full expression and development of the new *Zhonghua minzu*, we will quickly surpass America and Europe and become first in the world.<sup>83</sup>

Sun refers to his program of ethnic amalgamation as “broad *minzuzhuyi*” (*da minzuzhuyi*), a term ironically first used by Liang Qichao in 1903 to criticize the “petty *minzuzhuyi*” (*xiao minzuzhuyi*) embodied in the Tongmenghui's racist anti-Manchu rhetoric.

#### *Minzuzhuyi and Chinese Anti-Imperialism (1923-1925)*

Kuomintang scholar George Yu has pointed out that: “The year 1923 was important in the annals of the Kuomintang, for during the year the basic foundation was laid for the total transformation of its organization and ideology.”<sup>84</sup> After several years of preliminary contacts with Comintern and Bolshevik officials, Sun signed a Joint Statement of Understanding with Moscow envoy Adolf Joffe on 26 January 1923. The Sun-Joffe Accord cleared the way for the Soviet Union to provide political, military and financial assistance to Sun Yat-sen's rump national government of Canton in exchange

for the admission of Chinese Communist Party (CCP) members into the Kuomintang and its reorganization along the lines of a Bolshevik-style, highly-centralized political party.

George Yu, Hung-Ting Ku and other scholars have persuasively demonstrated that a fundamental ideological shift accompanied Sun's political re-orientation towards Moscow. During the last three years of his life, Sun's lectures and writings focused less on domestic reforms through Western assistance and more on the external oppression caused to China by foreign imperialism. A similar redirection occurred in the rhetoric of Sun's discourse of *minzuzhuyi*. Less emphasis was placed on the need for internal unity and more upon the struggle of the entire *Zhonghua minzu* to obtain equality with the other nations of the world. The repeal of the unequal treaties imposed on China by the foreign powers was now described as tantamount to the full resumption of Chinese sovereignty and its equality within the international community of nation-states.<sup>85</sup> Yet, despite the concrete influence of Comintern advisors upon KMT party and military organization, thought and training, the re-orientation of Sun's ideology after 1923 had only a minor impact upon the positioning of Chinese peripheral peoples within his discourse of *minzuzhuyi*. It must be remembered that, in the words of Gordon and Chang, "since the earliest Soviet contact in 1920, Sun's interest in communist assistance was pragmatic, not ideological, and this attitude prevailed in subsequent years."<sup>86</sup> Despite the use of new rhetorical terms, chiefly "imperialism" (*diguozhuyi*) and "national self-determination" (*minzu zijue*), the underlying social evolutionist logic of Sun's *minzuzhuyi* remain unchanged.

The rhetorical redirection of Sun's *minzuzhuyi* discourse was not

immediate. The January 1923 manifesto proclaiming the re-organization of the Kuomintang only added a new external dimension to Sun's policy of internal ethnic amalgamation: "The principle of *minzuzhuyi* that our party supports, in the negative sense, advocates the elimination of inequalities among all *minzu*, and in the positive sense, the unification of all *minzu* within China into a single, large Zhonghua Republic."<sup>87</sup> The new dualism between "negative nationalism" (the elimination of external *minzu* domination) and "positive nationalism" (the fusion of all internal *minzu*) did little to alter Sun's insistence upon the creation of an ethnically composite *Zhonghua minzu*. The Party's new political outline continued to insist that *minzuzhuyi* was the principle guiding "the consolidation of the various *minzu* of our country into a great *Zhonghua minzu*."<sup>88</sup> Although Sun first employed the term *minzu zijue* (national self-determination) in March 1921 and *diguozhuyi* (imperialism) in April 1922,<sup>89</sup> they did not become a regular part of his lexicon until late in 1923.

In fact it was not until after the arrival in Canton of the Comintern's chief political advisor to the Kuomintang, Mikhail Borodin, in early October 1923, that one notices a significant change in the language of Sun's principle of *minzuzhuyi*. A man of exceptional talent and personal charisma, Borodin quickly won Sun's trust by demonstrating the usefulness of the Comintern's anti-imperialist doctrine in his quest to reunify China. At Borodin's insistence the Kuomintang convened its First National Congress (or Reorganization Congress) in January 1924 with the task of formalizing a new ideological programme for the party. The Congress' Manifesto endorsed Sun's Three People's Principles as the party's official doctrine and the "only means of saving the people of China." The document also provided a thoroughly

revamped interpretation of Sun's *minzuzhuyi*:

The Kuomintang's principle of *minzuzhuyi* contains two meanings: 1) the self-seeking liberation of the Chinese *minzu* and 2) the equality of all the *minzu* living within Chinese territory. In support of the first aim, the KMT proposes to secure the recognition of the freedom and independence of China among the nations of the world.... In the eyes of the masses the fight for the emancipation of the Chinese people is an anti-imperialist movement....When imperialism has been beaten down, the people can then enlarge their activities and unify themselves to accomplish the other aims of the revolution....In support of the second aim...equality of all *minzu* living within China...the KMT will work for alliances and organized discussion of problems which concern us all. The KMT hereby formally guarantees the right of self-determination for all domestic *minzu*; and as soon as the revolution achieves victory over the imperialists and the warlords, we will do our best to organize (upon the voluntary agreement of all *minzu*) a free and united Zhonghua Republic.<sup>90</sup>

At first glance, the document appears to mark a radical transformation of Sun's *minzuzhuyi* in support of the right of Chinese peripheral peoples to determine their own national form and a condemnation of all forms of imperialist domination.

The explicit inclusion of the right of national self-determination for China's minority peoples within the Reorganization Congress' Manifesto has lead several analysts to speak about yet another "remarkable ideological shift" within Sun's *minzuzhuyi*—this time from what Bruce Elleman has described as "Wilson's ethnically based definition of nationalism" to "Lenin's anti-capitalist definition of nationalism."<sup>91</sup> It must be remembered, however, that the Reorganization Congress marked a high-point of both Bolshevik (in the person of Borodin) and Chinese Communist Party (in the form of the first so-called "United Front" between the KMT and CCP) influence on Sun Yat-sen's ideology. Yet, in the end, the Manifesto not only met with Sun's approval at the time of the 1924 Congress, but was also listed by Sun in his last will and testament as one of the four major texts to guide the Kuomintang's ideology

after his death.<sup>92</sup> In light of the complex background surrounding Sun's use of Bolshevik rhetoric during the last years of his life, it behooves us to take a closer look at his specific understanding of *diguozhuyi* (imperialism) and *minzu zijue* (national self-determination).

It is my contention that Sun Yat-sen interpreted the Bolshevik discourse of imperialism and national self-determination through the same social Darwinian prism as he did the survival and extinction of individual *minzu* and *guojia* (states), and not Lenin's theory of imperialism as the "highest stage of capitalism." In Sun's first Canton University lecture on *minzuzhuyi*,<sup>93</sup> which was delivered only four days after the passage of the Kuomintang's new Manifesto, he argued that the difference between *guojia* and *minzu* lies in the nature of their origins. States develop through military force—the compelled assimilation of small and weak *minzu* into a single unified state or the violent splitting apart of a single *minzu* into several different states. Sun used the Chinese term *badao* or the "way of might" in reference to this unnatural process of state formation. A *minzu*, on the other hand, was forged out of natural forces, such as a common livelihood, language, religion, customs, and most importantly bloodline (*xuetong*). Sun referred to this process of *minzu* evolution as the *wangdao* or the "way of right."

According to Sun, China occupied a unique place within the international family of nation-states, for unlike others that have formed numerous states from a single *minzu* (i.e., the Anglo-Saxon *minzu*) or combined several *minzu* into a single state (i.e., the United Kingdom), only in China does a single *minzu* form a single *guojia*. In other words, Sun declared, "the principle of *minzuzhuyi* is equivalent to the doctrine of *guojiazhuyi*" in China. Once again Sun borrowed

a term from his old nemesis Liang Qichao, this time the neologism *guozu* (state/national lineage), to express the completely homogeneous nature of the Chinese nation-state.

What about China's minority *minzu*? The other four so-called "great *minzu*" (*da minzu*) which once comprised the Qing empire? Sun dismissed them, as he had done in the past, as numerically insignificant:

China's *minzu* total four hundred million people. Among these people there are only a few million Mongols, over a million Manchus, a few million Tibetans, and some hundred thousands Mohammedan Turks—all totaling no more than ten million non-natives. Thus, considering the vast majority, we can say that the four hundred million Chinese people are entirely *Hanzu*: sharing a common bloodline, common language, common religion, and common customs—a single, pure *minzu*.<sup>94</sup>

In Sun's mind the Manchus, Mongols, Tibetans and Hui did not have an independent role in China's political future; rather, their historical destiny was to be their assimilation into the superior Han lineage-race in the evolutionary process of constructing a single *Zhonghua minzu*. When Sun used the term "minzu equality" (*minzu pingdeng*) during the last years of his life, he referred not to the equality of the various *minzu* within China but rather the freedom of the entire Chinese *guozu* (state/national lineage) to obtain equal footing with the other nations of the world; and when he spoke of "our *minzu*," he did not mean the so-called "five great *minzu*" of China, but rather a single Han-dominated *Zhonghua minzu*.

In his second lecture Sun argued that although military force has proven the key factor in the victory of one state over another, the evolutionary force of "natural selection" (*tianran taotai*) has guided the survival or extinction of individual *minzu*. Sun rejected Malthus' theories about the demographic limits of human population, arguing that population size was the key variable in the

natural selection process among *minzu*. “From ancient times,” Sun stated, “the increase and the decrease of population has played a large part in the rise and fall of *minzu*. This is the law of natural selection.”<sup>95</sup> The Han people’s large population had frequently led its intellectuals to boast that China could not be easily exterminated, using the example of the assimilation of the Yuan Dynasty Mongols and the Qing Dynasty Manchus to prove their point. Yet, Sun cautioned his listeners that during the last hundred years the population of the United States has increased tenfold; that of England and Japan, threefold; that of Russia, fourfold; that of Germany, two-and-one-half-fold; and that of France increased by one fourth, while the population of China had failed to increase the slightest bit. At this rate, Sun warned, China would be exterminated by the white race within the next one hundred years. Furthermore, this figure of a hundred years declines to only ten years once one considers the un-natural human forces affecting evolution.

Sun’s next three lectures turned to the “man-made factors” (*renweili*) impacting *minzu* evolution, namely political and economic hegemony. It was these factors, Sun told his audience, that weighed most heavily upon the continued survival of the *Zhonghua minzu*:

If it were a matter merely of natural selection, our *minzu* might survive, but evolutionary force in the world depends not only on natural forces, but rather a combination of natural and human forces. Human agencies may displace natural agencies, so called man over nature. Of these man-made forces the two most potent are political forces and economic forces. They have a greater influence on the rise and fall of *minzu* than the forces of nature. Amongst global trends, our *minzu* is not only being oppressed by these two forces but is also stuck deep within its scourge.<sup>96</sup>

Sun emphasized China’s century long suffering at the hands of Western political and economic domination. This long period of imperialist subjugation

had transformed China into a “hyper-colony” (*cizhimindì*), the slave of not one imperialist power but several. Prior to the First World War many European countries adopted imperialist policies in order to expand their influence and power, and more recent Japan was following in their foot-steps by forcefully colonizing Korea, Taiwan and other small Asian *minzu*. Sun defined imperialism as a “policy of aggression on other countries by means of political force, or, in the Chinese phrase, long-range aggression (*jin yuan lü*).”<sup>97</sup> In other words, imperialism was the use of political and economic hegemony, or as Sun often called it, the “way of might” (*badao*), to forcefully subjugate and eventually exterminate small and weak *minzu*.

Sun viewed the First World War as a watershed in the white race’s *badao* expansionism. Unlike Lenin, he did not perceive the war to be a form of inter-imperialist aggression, rather as first and foremost a race war. The war was essentially a struggle between the four major sub-branches of the white race (i.e., the Teutonic, Anglo-Saxon, Slavic and Latin) for supremacy in Europe; and, now that the Anglo-Saxon race had triumphed, the attention of the entire white race had turned towards Asia and Africa. Greatly influenced by the race war theories found in Homer Lea’s *The Valor of Ignorance* (1909) and Lothrop Stoddard’s *The Rising Tide of Color Against White World Supremacy* (1920),<sup>98</sup> Sun believed the white race was on a mission to “swallow up (*tunmie*) all colored races.” They had already succeeded in destroying the “red barbarians” (*hongfan*) of America, he told his audience, while the “black people” (*heiren*) of Africa were on the verge of extermination with the “brown people” (*zongseren*) of India soon to follow. Finally, the white race was exploiting the yellow race of Asia and, if it did not take preventative action, it

too would be destroyed. The First World War was only imperialist in so far as the various sub-branches of the white race were attempting to use violent aggression to expand their influence throughout Europe and Asia. Sun was not opposed to the evolutionary expansion and decline of *minzu* through the non-violent means of ethnic amalgamation so long as this process occurred according to the yellow race's "way of right" (*wangdao*) and not the white race's "way of might" (*badao*).

In their haste to promote Sun as a stalwart of anti-imperialism and racial equality, both Western and Chinese scholars have failed to consider Sun's own imperialist tendencies toward what he called the "small and weak *minzus*" (*ruoxiao minzu*) of Asia. James Gregor and Maria Hsia Chang, for example, are clearly misguided in stating that "there is no suggestion that Sun conceived the Chinese 'race' superior to any of the others."<sup>99</sup> Rather, it was precisely because of the perception of superiority that Sun believed the *Hanzu* was destined to assimilate and rule over all the small and weak *minzus* of Asia.

In a key section in his fourth lecture, Sun implied that China's past history of benevolent imperialism differed significantly from the type currently being practiced by the European powers and the Japanese. Historically, Sun told his audience, the territorial expansion of the Chinese state was based upon the consensual recognition of China's cultural superiority among her small and weak neighbors, and the institutionalization of this hierarchical world order (following the fall of the Yuan Dynasty) in the tribute system. "If at that time all the small states of Malaysia wanted to pay tribute (*jingong*) and adopt Chinese culture (*guihua*)," Sun stated, "it was because they admired Chinese civilization and spontaneously wished to submit themselves; it was not

because China oppressed them through military force.”<sup>100</sup> This type of consensual veneration, Sun argued, does not exist among the colonial subjects of Western imperialism. Even the United States’ “benevolent and generous” colonialism in the Philippines has failed to win the allegiance of the Filipino people. Yet, according to Sun, the small *minzus* bordering China continue to “admire” and “respect” its cultural superiority. To illustrate this point, Sun described a meeting he had with the Foreign Office of Siam (*Xianluo*) more than ten years previously, during which “the Siam Vice-Minister of Foreign Affairs stated, ‘If China could have a revolution and become a strong people and wealthy country, we Thai would gladly renew our allegiance to China and become a province of China’.”<sup>101</sup> Since the meeting was held in public offices and the individuals involved were all government representatives of the Thai people, Sun concluded that the comment must represent the sentiments of all the Thai people. Sun clearly longed for the day when Han civilization would resume its ancient duty as protector and cultural model for its less civilized neighbors. Along with Siam, Sun’s dream for a “greater China” explicitly included Annam, Korea, Burma, Nepal, Bhutan, Borneo, Sulu, Java, Ceylon, Taiwan and other former Qing dynasty tribute states.<sup>102</sup>

In his sixth and final lecture on *Minzuzhuyi*, Sun concluded that “amongst all the states and the peoples of the world today, China alone preaches peace while all other countries talk only in terms of war and advocate the overthrow of states by imperialism.” As a result, it was the “heavenly duty” (*tianze*) of the *Zhonghua minzu* to “aid the weaker and smaller *minzu* and oppose the great powers of the world.”<sup>103</sup> Sun took yet another step forward in his call for an Asian anti-imperialist alliance during his famous speech on “Pan-

Asianism” (*dayazhouzhuyi*) delivered in Kobe Japan on 28 November 1924. Sun argued that the fundamental difference between Occidental and Oriental culture was that the former was *badao* while the latter was *wangdao*. “The rule of right [Orient] respects benevolence and virtue, while the rule of might [Occident] only respects force and utilitarianism.” Thus, while “Oriental civilization,” contended Sun, “was far behind the Occident [materially], morally the Orient was superior to the Occident.” He went on in his lecture to argue that only by applying benevolence and virtue throughout Asia and unifying the entire yellow race in an anti-imperialist, Pan-Asian alliance could the yellow race fight off extermination and eventually triumph over the aggressive white race.<sup>104</sup>

How did Sun’s call for assisting the weak and small *minzu* of Asia relate to the Kuomintang’s pledge to work for the self-determination of China’s minority peoples? A good deal of debate continues to surround Sun Yat-sen’s usage and interpretation of the term *minzu zijue* (national self-determination). Many Western scholars make uncritical reference to Sun’s usage of the term in describing yet another fundamental shift in his discourse of *minzuzhuyi*, namely support for the minority people to determine their own political form independent of domestic Chinese imperialism.<sup>105</sup> Only a few scholars however have taken a closer look at Sun’s specific interpretation of *minzu zijue*. American political scientist Walker Connor has argued that Sun never took the concept seriously—failing to envision an actual desire among the minorities for secession from their motherland—and only allowed it to be inserted into the Manifesto of Kuomintang’s First Party Congress at the insistence of his Soviet advisers. The Taiwanese scholar Hong Quanhu, on the other hand, has

argued that Sun's interpretation of the concept contained two complementary meanings: the self-seeking liberation and independence of the entire Chinese nation and the implementation of self-rule (not secession) and equality among the minority nationalities of China.<sup>106</sup> Both arguments contain a kernel of truth; yet, I feel that in order to fully appreciate Sun's usage of the term *minzu zijue* during the last years of his life, it must be placed within the context of his understanding of human evolution.

Although the term national self-determination is quite old, it did not gain international prominence until American President Woodrow Wilson began advocating its implementation as the First World War drew to a close. Wilson believed that only the gradual dismemberment of the global imperialist system and the granting to colonial peoples the right to determine their own national form could prevent another world war. Wilson thus made national self-determination an important part of the Fourteen Point Agenda he took to the post-war Paris Peace Conference. Along with Wilson, Vladimir Lenin was also an early champion of the right of national self-determination, calling for the liberation of all downtrodden nationalities from the globally intertwined system of capitalist imperialism and colonial oppression. Unlike Wilson however, Lenin believed that (in theory at least) all "national minorities" (including colonized minorities living within a nation that itself was colonized by the Western imperialists) should be granted the right to break away from their oppressors and form their own independent political state regardless of size. In other words, the right of political secession became a crucial component of Lenin's interpretation of national self-determination.<sup>107</sup>

Late in his life, Sun Yat-sen admitted being greatly inspired by the

“current trend toward national self-determination” championed by US President Wilson. China—like Poland, Turkey, Czechoslovakia and other oppressed European peoples—should also have the right to rid itself of imperialist powers and carry out its own national liberation. Sun first used the term national self-determination in a 6 March 1921 speech in Canton, stating that Wilson’s principle of *minzu zijue* was “essentially the same as our party’s principle of *minzuzhuyi*.”<sup>108</sup> Initially, Sun only applied the principle of national self-determination to the development of the Chinese *minzu* as a whole, making no mention of its right being applicable to “domestic *minzu*” (*guonei ge minzu*). For example, in accepting the “spirit” of national self-determination, the 1923 Manifesto of the Kuomintang called for “the internal promotion of the evolution of the entire country’s *minzu* and the external quest for equality with all the world’s *minzu*.” Towards this aim, the Manifesto advocated “encouragement of popular education to advance the culture of our country’s *minzu* and the employment of every effort to revise the [unequal] treaties in restoring ourselves to a position of international freedom and equality.”<sup>109</sup> At this point, Sun’s usage of the term *minzu zijue* represented only the unhindered evolutionary development of the entire *Zhonghua minzu* in its struggle with the other *minzus* of the world.

But why then the apparent reversal of language with the issuing of the Manifesto of the Kuomintang’s First Party Congress, which stated: “The KMT hereby formally guarantees the right of self-determination for all domestic *minzu*”? Recently declassified Russian documents reveal the tenuous and conditional nature with which the Bolshevik policy of national self-determination entered the Reorganization Congress’ Manifesto. Sun Yat-sen and other KMT

leaders played only a minor role in the actual drafting of the Manifesto. Rather, Sun asked Borodin to draft an English copy of the Manifesto which would then be translated into Chinese by Liao Zhongkai and checked personally by him.<sup>110</sup> Unbeknownst to Sun and other KMT leaders, Borodin wrote the Manifesto in strict accordance with a 28 November 1923 Comintern Central Executive Committee Directive that outlined a new interpretation of Sun's Three People's Principles. Among the proposed revisions, the Directive called for the explicit inclusion within Sun's *minzuzhuyi* of the "principle of national self-determination for all nationalities within China."<sup>111</sup> Yet, when Borodin's draft was read out before the delegates of the Reorganization Congress on 20 January 1923, it met with cantankerous opposition from several party veterans who felt Borodin's broad ranging re-interpretation of the *Sanminzhuyi* betrayed their original meaning. In particular, Wang Jingwei, Hu Hanmin and others opposed Borodin's insistence that the KMT grant its frontier minorities the right of political national self-determination prior to the victory of the Chinese revolution.<sup>112</sup> In a private meeting with Borodin several days later, Sun Yat-sen suggested the replacement of Borodin's contentious draft Manifesto with a more benign document, *Jianguo Dagang (Outline for National Reconstruction)*, recently drafted by Sun.<sup>113</sup> In the Outline all explicit mention of ethnic minority political independence was removed in favor of a more paternalistic and vaguely worded pledge that it was the responsibility of the national government to "prop-up and foster" (*fuzhi*) the ability of all China's "domestic small and weak *minzu*" to "self-determination and self-rule (*zijue zizhi*)."<sup>114</sup> In order to save his Manifesto Borodin agreed to revise and in some places water-down its language (particularly on the national and land questions) and to have Sun's

*Jianguo Dagang* published alongside the Manifesto.

The precise language of the Manifesto finally approved by the Reorganization Congress on January 23rd reveals the extent of Borodin's compromise. First, the Kuomintang only promised to recognize the "right of self-determination for all domestic *minzu* (*neige minzu zhi zijuequan*)" rather than the Comintern's insistence that "national self-determination" (*minzu zijue*) explicitly include the right of political secession. Second, the carefully worded promise of self-determination is immediately followed by a contradictory pledge that the Party would "organize (upon the voluntary agreement of all *minzu*) a free and united Zhonghua Republic."<sup>115</sup> Finally, the Manifesto states that the implementation of domestic *minzu* self-determination could only occur "after the revolution achieves victory over the imperialists and the warlords." In other words, until the *badao* of imperialism and warlordism had been successfully defeated and a Han-dominated Kuomintang government was established throughout China, the *wangdao* of ethnic evolution could not proceed unhindered. In a report before the CCP, Borodin admits his disappointment with the vague and antipodal nature of the Kuomintang's insistence upon both minority self-determination and the construction of a united Zhonghua Republic, and called upon the CCP to publicize these inconsistency and work for a revision of its wording.<sup>116</sup>

In a recent monograph Bruce Elleman has used what he perceived to be a change in Sun Yat-sen's policy towards Outer Mongolia to argue that Sun's discourse of *minzuzhuyi* "changed dramatically after January 1923." Elleman claims that after the signing of the Sun-Joffe Accord, Sun "supported the USSR's imperialist policies in Outer Mongolia."<sup>117</sup> At the request of the

Mongolian People's Revolutionary Party (MPP), the Bolshevik Red Army entered Outer Mongolia in July 1921 to drive out the White Russian general Baron Ungern-Sternberg. Although Sun did agree in the Sun-Joffe Accord to the continuation of the "status quo" in Outer Mongolia, declaring that he did not "view an immediate evacuation of Russian troops from Outer Mongolia as either imperative or in the real interest of China," Sun had good reason at this point to trust the intentions of the Soviet leaders towards Outer Mongolia. Not only had Moscow unconditionally renounced all Tsarist unequal treaties and territorial concessions in China, its Beijing emissaries made repeated promises to return Outer Mongolia to Chinese sovereignty following the cessation of White Russian hostilities in the region.<sup>118</sup> This promise was personally conveyed to Sun on a number of occasions during 1923-24 by Borodin and other Moscow representatives, and was eventually confirmed when the Soviet Union formally agreed that Outer Mongolia was "an integral part of the Republic of China" and promised to respect "China's sovereignty therein" in the Sino-Soviet Treaty on 31 May 1924.<sup>119</sup>

The Kuomintang alliance with Moscow did nothing to change Sun Yat-sen's insistence upon the inclusion of Outer Mongolia within a single, unified *Zhonghua minzu*. In late 1923 he rejected a personal plea by CCP chairman Chen Duxiu for the Kuomintang to formally recognize the political independence of Outer Mongolia in accordance with the principle of national self-determination.<sup>120</sup> Sun also used the presence of Dazan, the chairman of the Red Army backed Mongolia People's Revolutionary Government, at the Kuomintang's Reorganization Congress to highlight the common historical destiny of the Chinese and Mongolian peoples. Despite the fact that Dazan

was under strict orders from Moscow's Beijing envoy, Lev Karakhan, not to discuss Outer Mongolia's political relationship with China, Sun placed his own words in the mouths of the Mongolian representative during a 20 January 1924 welcoming ceremony for the Congress' delegates: "The reason for Mr. Dazan's visit to Canton was to call for Mongolia to again unite with China in creating a single, large Zhonghua Republic."<sup>121</sup> In one of his lectures on *minzuzhuyi* after Dazan's departure, Sun even claimed that when the Mongolian representative saw "the fostering of small and weak *minzu* and lack of imperialist thought within our Congress' political programme, he enthusiastically advocated the uniting of everyone together into a single, large Oriental country."<sup>122</sup> Finally, Sun informed the Urga authorities in late February that he had personally dispatched Mongolian Kuomintang (and recently elected Central Executive Committee member) Bai Yunti to carry out party and propaganda work among the people of Outer Mongolia.<sup>123</sup> In spite of the Red Army's activities in Urga, Sun clearly had no intention of allowing Outer Mongolia its political independence from China.

In Sun Yat-sen's mind, national self-determination was always something which could only apply to the superior Han lineage-race. This fact was not only confirmed by the evolutionary backwardness of China's minority peoples but also the gradual transformation of their frontier territories into imperialist spheres of influence. Because "Manchuria was surrounded by the Japanese, Mongolia by the Russians and Tibet by the English," he stated during a 1921 speech, China's minority peoples "no longer possess the ability to defend themselves" and thus must now "depend upon the help of the *Hanzu*".<sup>124</sup> In another 1921 speech before the general staff of the Canton

regime's military, Sun related this point to the principle of *minzu zijue*:

Today, although the Manchus are gone, the Zhonghua Republic is still only a half independent country. The so-called Five *Minzu* Republic is simply the words of deceitful men! In fact, the Tibetans, Mongols, Hui and Manchus lack the ability of self-defense. The task of fostering a glorious and large *minzuzhuyi*, assimilating the Tibetans, Mongols, Hui, and Manchus into our *Hanzu* and constructing of the biggest possible nation-state (*minzu guojia*) rests solely with the self-determination of the Han people.<sup>125</sup>

In short, when it came to national self-determination, Sun believed only the Han were capable of leading all China's peoples towards their historical destiny.

### *Concluding Remarks*

In her now classic biography of Sun Yat-sen, Lyon Sharman remarks: "It might be cogently argued that, in dealing with an easily absorbent, propagandist mind like Sun Yat-sen's one should not look to the shifting ideas for his real opinion, but to those formations which he clung to tenaciously all his life."<sup>126</sup> Social Darwinism, I believe, was one of those formations. Despite the obvious development in his thinking on *minzuzhuyi*, I have attempted to demonstrate how a persistent social evolutionist logic underlay Sun's representations of political community in modern China. Sun's discourse of *minzuzhuyi* hinged on the overriding desire to assimilate the evolutionarily-unfit Chinese minorities with the superior, majority Han *minzu* in fashioning a homogeneous and more evolutionarily-robust *Zhonghua minzu*. The global discourse of social Darwinian marked at least two important departures from past Chinese conceptualizations of human diversity: first, the use of scientific empiricism to reinforce the cultural distinction between "civilization" and "barbarism" in the Confucian worldview; and second, the employment of the new category of "blood" (*xue*) to scientifically validate the traditional Han

Chinese bias towards non-sedentary minorities.

As Daniel Kwok and others have pointed out, Sun Yat-sen came to intellectual maturity during the era of rising “scientism” in China, which was marked by an intense faith in the ability of “scientific knowledge” to transform China from a backward and weak empire into a powerful and modern nation-state.<sup>127</sup> For Sun and most other 20<sup>th</sup> century Chinese intellectuals, social Darwinism provided not only a scientific framework for analyzing social diversity and change but also a new “epistemological truth” or constitutive discourse to replace the crumbling Confucian worldview. In the imperial discourse on *yixia zhibei*, or “the distinction between Chinese and barbarians,” the Chinese literati contended that the frontier barbarians needed to adopt “Chinese ways” (read culture) to become “human” and participate in the “universal cosmology” (*tianxia*). Now Darwin seemed to be telling Sun and other Chinese intellectuals that the frontier “*minzus*” must adopt Han blood and culture in order to “survive” and remain part of world historical progress. In short, social Darwinism provided Sun Yat-sen with a new “scientific ontology” which strengthened the traditional cultural bias among the Han elite against the non-sedentary frontier minorities.

It was the supposed empiricism of this social Darwinian ontology, I would argue, that lent Sun Yat-sen’s discourse of *minzuzhuyi* such authority in the eyes of most 20<sup>th</sup> century Chinese intellectuals. Unlike the speculative or idealistic assumptions of the Mandarins, social Darwinism carried with it a new level of “axiomatic truth” which could be measured, quantified and verified through the new scientific disciplines of biology, demography, anthropology, ethnology, history and archaeology. As Edward Said has demonstrated among

European Orientalists, the modern social sciences played an important role in supporting and reinforcing the antiquarian biases of one group of people against another, giving rise to the modern discourse of racism.<sup>128</sup>

Social Darwinism played a central role in the introduction of “blood” (*xue*) as a new discursive category for analyzing human variation in Chinese intellectual thought. Central to modern racism is the notion that inherent sociocultural and physical differences are transmitted from generation to generation through the blood. In his own “scientific” inquiry into the forces constituting a *minzu*, Sun concluded in 1924 that “blood is the most powerful force.” “Since the blood of one’s ancestors is always transmitted by heredity down through the *minzu*,” Sun asserted, “bloodline (*xuetong*) is the greatest force.”<sup>129</sup> In Sun’s mind, the importance of blood was closely related to population size. Breeding—that is the passing of one’s blood, and by extension culture, onto future generations—was a decisive factor for Sun in the evolutionary struggle for survival. It was precisely because of their small and insignificant populations that the Mongol, Tibetan and other frontier peoples of the Qing empire had no choice but to physically meld together with the numerically and culturally superior Han Chinese. Thus, when Sun noticed the relative decline of the Han population in comparison to the other leading *minzus* of the world, he was quick to stress that: “Just as the Miao, Yao and other indigenous Chinese people, whose ancestral sacrifices of blood and food have long ago been severed, if we [Han] do not broaden our horizons and use the strength of all our lineages (*zongzu*) to form a single *guozu* in resisting the foreigners, our ancestors might some day find themselves without sacrifices just like the Miao and Yao.”<sup>130</sup>

Frank Dikötter, Prasenjit Duara and others have demonstrated a polarity or tension within imperial Chinese thought between an inclusivist cultural universalism and “a circumscribed notion of the Han community and fatherland (*guo*) in which the barbarians had no place.”<sup>131</sup> Rather than marking a shift from “culturalism to nationalism” as Joseph Levenson and others have claimed,<sup>132</sup> Sun Yat-sen’s discourse of *minzuzhuyi* represented the introduction of new “scientific” categories for conceptualizing human diversity and, through its underpinning social Darwinian ontology, a global framework for categorizing and explaining the rise and fall of different “races” (*minzu* or *zhongzu*). At the same time, however, it needs to be stressed that it was not a case, as Dikötter has recently argued, of race “permanently replacing more conventional emblems of cultural identity.”<sup>133</sup> Rather, in the thought of Sun Yat-sen and other 20<sup>th</sup> century Chinese intellectuals, the new discourse of “race” (*minzu* or *zhongzu*) came to reconfigure and reinforce a whole series of premodern markers of difference, such as “lineage” (*zu*), “nature” (*xing*), “substance” (*zhi*) and “psycho-physical energy” (*qi*),<sup>134</sup> while interacting with other, distinctly modern, social scientific categories of human diversity, such as “people,” “citizenry,” “ethnic group,” “nationality,” and “national minority.” The complex interplay between these various categories of difference is evident in the ambiguity within Sun’s discourse of *minzuzhuyi* over the ultimate markers of *minzu* variation. In addition to stressing the importance of blood in his 1924 lectures on *minzuzhuyi*, Sun also listed a common livelihood, language, religion and customs among the forces responsible for constituting a *minzu*. In his 1919 draft of the Three People’s Principles, Sun even argued that “the loftiest and most civilized *minzuzhuyi*” was rooted, not in a common bloodline, but rather in

an amorphous “common will” (*yizhi*). Finally, as we have seen, there were other times when Sun’s formulation of *Zhonghua minzu* was based upon a distinctly cultural or even spatial notions of difference.

Despite Sun’s use of the Social Darwinian metaphor of blood, one finds no evidence within his writings that he viewed biological markers, or any other marker of difference for that matter, as an impermeable or hard boundary between the Han majority and the various frontier minorities. Racial mixing rather than the purity of one’s blood was the key to evolutionary survival. Like Confucius before him, Sun Yat-sen was a strong advocate of “using Chinese ways to transform the barbarians” (*yongxia bianyi*). As the Confucian literati believed the barbarians could be culturally absorbed—literally *laihua* or “to come and be transformed”—through the adoption of a sedentary lifestyle and Chinese clothing and language, Sun now contended that the frontier minorities could be *tonghua* (assimilated) through the infusion of Han blood and culture. After encountering the American paradigm of the “melting pot” in either Liang Qichao’s writings or through his own travels in the United States, Sun championed the American model of fusing, or literally “smelting” (*rongye* or *ronghua*), together the racially and culturally diverse populations of the Qing empire into a single, homogenous *Zhonghua minzu*. Evolutionary strength in Sun’s mind lay in the size and strength of one’s population and not the purity of its blood.

Finally, one finds within the thought of Sun Yat-sen and other turn of the century Chinese intellectuals a marked tension and analytical slippage over the spatial scope and temporal origins of the *Zhonghua minzu*. Sun failed to offer a consistent or coherent answer to the question of which “group” ultimately

mattered in China's evolutionary struggle for survival. In his revolutionary quest to overthrow the Manchu Qing dynasty, the boundaries of China's *minzu* were intentionally circumscribed to highlight the difference between the majority *Hanzu* and the minority Manchu rulers. Following the 1911 Revolution and the threatened dismemberment of the Qing empire, Sun stretched the boundaries of the Chinese *minzu* firmly over the heterogenous polities of the Qing empire or what he began to call the *Zhonghua minzu*. At other times, however, such as his 1924 trip to Japan, Sun redrew the lines of the global evolutionary struggle along supranational racial lines, calling on all members of the yellow race to unite together in opposition to white imperialist oppression. This spatial tension over the ethnic boundaries of the Chinese *minzu* dovetailed with a temporal ambiguity over its historicity. Sun failed to develop a consistent attitude, as Prasenjit Duara has pointed out, on "whether the nation is already fully awakened or whether national consciousness needs to be further aroused," reflecting a systemic anxiety within nationalists thought between the desire to root the nation in history while also expressing it as an unprecedented form of consciousness.<sup>135</sup> While Sun emphasized the long and glorious national tradition of the *Hanzu*, he also acknowledged that the natural and ongoing evolutionary process by which the diverse peoples of the Qing empire were being transformed into a new and homogenous *Zhonghua minzu*. The enigmatic and fluid nature of Sun Yat-sen's discourse of *minzuzhuyi* contributed to the continued debate among Chinese intellectuals and policymakers over the exact composition and origins of the Chinese *minzu* long after Sun's death in 1924. Yet, the one thing that none of them seemed to doubt was the urgent need to unify the various peoples of the new Republic

into a single political and cultural entity.

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## NOTES

<sup>1</sup> Sun Yat-sen, “Sanminzhuyi” (Three People’s Principles [draft]), 1919, in *Sun Zhongshan Quanji (Complete Works of Sun Yat-sen)*, comp., Zhongguo shehui kexueyuan jindaishi yanjiusuo Zhonghua minguo shi yanjiushi et al. (Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 1981), 5: 185 (hereafter cited as *SZSQJ*). There are primarily three English language translations of Sun’s *Sanminzhuyi*. The most widely available is Frank W. Price, trans., *San Min Chu I: The Three Principles of the People* (Taipei: China Cultural Services, 1977). This Taiwan reprint is a revised and abridged edition of Price’s complete translation, Frank W. Price, trans., *San Min Chu I: The Three Principles of the People* (Shanghai: The Commercial Press, 1929). Another complete English language translation is itself a translation from a French edition, Paschal M. D’Elia, trans., *The Triple Demism of Sun Yat-sen* (Wuchang: The Franciscan Press, 1931). Although all translations from the original text are my own, I have drawn upon Price and D’Elia for guidance.

<sup>2</sup> With reference to cosmopolitanism, and one could also safely assume *minzuzhuyi*, Sun stated: “We cannot say in general that ideas, are good or bad. We must judge whether, when put into practice, they prove useful to us or not. If they are of practical value to us, they are good; if they are impractical, they are bad. If they are useful to the world, they are good; if they are not useful to the world, they are not good.” See Sun Yat-sen, “Minzuzhuyi - Disanjiang” (Principle of *Minzu* - Third Lecture), 10 February 1924, in *SZSQJ*, 9: 216.

<sup>3</sup> Sidney H. Chang and Leonard Gordon, *All Under Heaven: Sun Yat-sen and His Revolutionary Thought* (Stanford: Hoover Institution Press, 1991), 96.

<sup>4</sup> David Deal, “National Minority Policy in Southwest China, 1911-1965” (Ph.D diss., University of Washington, 1971), 52; Colin Mackerras, *China’s Minorities: Integration and Modernization in the Twentieth Century* (London: Oxford University Press, 1994), 261. In her

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classic biography of Sun Yat-sen Lyon Sharman writes: “As a matter of fact ‘Nationalism’ was the one of the Three Principles that had in the course of years proven most variable in interpretation.” In her analysis, Sharman speaks about three different connotations of Sun’s *minzuzhuyi*. See Lyon Sharman, *Sun Yat-sen: His Life and its Meaning* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1968), 286-7.

<sup>5</sup> Bruce A. Elleman, *Diplomacy and Deception: The Secret History of Sino-Soviet Diplomatic Relations, 1917-1927* (Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe, 1997), 63.

<sup>6</sup> See Altan et. al., *Lun Minzu (On Minzu)* (Beijing: Minzu chubanshe, 1989).

<sup>7</sup> Much like *minzu*, these English language terms are also imprecise and ambiguous. Generally speaking, these expressions are all malleable social constructs used in the creation of both exclusivist and transgressable boundaries between different social groups. Furthermore, these boundaries are constantly in flux and determined by external issues of power and resource distribution. I would argue that the difference between these terms should lie in the type of boundaries constructed. I would like to suggest that we use the terms “race” and “racial” to define those boundaries that are based upon biological signifiers (i.e. skin color, body height, hair texture, head-shape, etc.). The terms “ethnicity” and “ethnic group” should be used to define those boundaries that are based upon cultural signifiers (i.e., customs, habits, language, food, religion, etc.). Finally, the terms “nation” and “nationality” should be reserved for those boundaries that are based upon territorial signifiers (i.e., China, Xinjiang, Mongolia, *huaqiao*, Guangdong etc.). In the daily reality of Western society, of course, these terms are often conflated or used interchangeably to express one or all three of these meanings. I am only suggesting that scholars adopt a more precise and standardized definition in order to better isolate and analyze various discourses of group identity. I have dealt with this issue in more detail in James Leibold, “Problematizing *Minzu*: Re-thinking and Expanding our Conceptualization of Ethnicity in Modern China,” unpublished paper presented at the Regional Conference of Asian Studies on the Pacific Coast, Pacific University (June 16-18th, 1995).

<sup>8</sup> Partha Chatterjee, *Nationalist Thought and the Colonial World: A Derivative Discourse* (London: Zed Books Ltd, 1986), vii.

<sup>9</sup> On the Taiping’s anti-Manchu rhetoric see Jonathan D. Spence, *God’s Chinese Son:*

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*The Taiping Heavenly Kingdom of Hong Xiuquan* (New York: W.W. Northon & Company, 1996) and Li Guoqi, “Zhongguo jindai minzu sixiang” (Contemporary Chinese nationalist thought), in *Jindai Zhongguo Sixiang Renwu Lun: Minzuzhuyi (Essays on Modern Chinese Thoughts and Personalities: Nationalism)*, ed. Li Guoqi (Taipei: Shibao wenhua chuban shiye, 1981), 29-31.

<sup>10</sup> Jen Yu-wen, “The Youth of Dr. Sun Yat-sen,” in *Sun Yat-sen: Two Commemorative Essays*, Lindsay Ride and Jen Yu-wen (Hong Kong: University of Hong Kong, Centre of Asian Studies, 1970), 1-22.

<sup>11</sup> Sun Yat-sen, “Tanxiangshan Xingzhonghui Mengshu” (The oath of the Honolulu branch of the Revive China Society), 24 November 1894, in *SZSQJ*, 1: 20.

<sup>12</sup> On Zhu Yuanzhang’s proto-nationalist attitudes toward the Mongol Yuan dynasty see Chen Wutong, “Lun Zhu Yuanzhang de minzu zhengce” (Discussion of Zhu Yuanzhang’s nationality policy), in *Zhu Yuanzhang Yanjiu (Research on Zhu Yuanzhang)*, ed. Chen Wutong (Tianjin: Renmin chubanshe, 1993), 241-63; Also see Edward Farmer, *Zhu Yuanzhang and early Ming Legislation: the Reordering of Chinese Society following the Era of Mongol Rule* (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1995).

<sup>13</sup> Sun Yat-sen, “Xianggang Xingzhonghui zhangcheng” (The charter of the Hong Kong branch of the Revive China Society), 21 February 1895, in *SZSQJ*, 1: 21-24. The term *yizu* dates back the 3rd century B.C. *Rites of Zhou (Zhouli)* where it referred to anyone with a different *xing* (surname). During the “barbarian” Jurchen Jin Dynasty (1115-1234) it began to be used in reference to “barbarian” tribes that observed non-Chinese cultural habits. See the entry in Luo Zhufeng, comp., *Hanyu Dacidian (Encyclopaedia of the Chinese Language)*, miniaturized 3 vols. ed. (Shanghai: Hanyu dacidian chubanshe, 1997), 2: 4639.

<sup>14</sup> Sun Yat-sen, “Fu Zhai-li-si han” (Letter to H.A. Giles), November 1896, in *SZSQJ*, 1: 46-48. Sun’s autobiography essay was written at the request of English Sinologist Herbert Giles for inclusion in his *Chinese Biographical Dictionary* that was published in 1898.

<sup>15</sup> Gao Zhengyi, *Zhongshan Xiansheng Jinhua Sixiang Xilun (An Analysis of Sun Yat-sen’s Thought on Evolution)* (Taipei: Cheng Chung Book Co., 1993), 40-42.

<sup>16</sup> Quotation adapted from James Pusey, *China and Charles Darwin* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1983), 64; also see Benjamin Schwartz, *In Search of Wealth and*

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*Power: Yen Fu and the West* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1964); Chang Hao, *Liang Ch'i-ch'ao and Intellectual Transition in China* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1971), 105-12. On the impact of the "Darwinian revolution" in Europe see George W. Stocking, *Race, Culture, and Evolution: Essays in the History of Anthropology* (New York: The Free Press, 1968).

<sup>17</sup> Cited in Frank Dikötter, *The Discourse of Race in Modern China* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1992), 104.

<sup>18</sup> See Kai-wing Chow, "Imagining Boundaries of Blood: Zhang Binglin and the Invention of the Han "Race" in Modern China," in *The Construction of Racial Identities in China and Japan*, ed. Frank Dikötter (Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press, 1997), 39-40; Dikötter, *Discourse of Race in Modern China*, 61-96; Onogawa Hidemi, "Zhang Binglin paiman sixiang" (Zhang Binglin's anti-Manchuist thought), in *Jindai Zhongguo Sixiang Renwu Lun: Minzuzhuyi*, 246-52; Kauko Laitinen, *Chinese Nationalism in the Late Qing Dynasty: Zhang Binglin as an Anti-Manchu Propagandist* (London: Curzon Press, 1990).

<sup>19</sup> Tsou Jung (Zou Rong), *The Revolutionary Army: A Chinese Nationalist Tract of 1903*, trans. John Lust (The Hague: Mouton & Co., 1968), 108-9. My translation differs slightly from Lust's and is based on the accompanying Chinese text, p. 34. On the Subao affair see Lust's introduction, pp. 3-17; Marie-Claire Bergère, *Sun Yat-sen*, trans. Janet Lloyd (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1998), 110-111; Harold Z. Schiffrin, *Sun Yat-sen and the Origins of the Chinese Revolution* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1968), 265-74.

<sup>20</sup> Cited in Shimada Kenji, *Pioneer of the Chinese Revolution: Zhang Binglin and Confucianism*, trans. Joshua Fogel (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1990), 28.

<sup>21</sup> Schiffrin, *Sun Yat-sen and the Origins*, 148-67.

<sup>22</sup> Two classic examples of this tendency are Robert Scalapino and George Yu, *Modern China and its Revolutionary Process: Recurrent Challenges to the Traditional Order 1895-1920* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1985), in which chapter three is titled "Liang Qichao and the Defense of Reform" (pp. 109-47) and chapter four "Sun Yat-sen and the Revolutionary Movement" (pp. 148-230), and the extremely influential textbook John Fairbank and Edwin Reischauer, *China: Tradition & Transformation* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1978), which

portrays to Sun and Liang as the two competing “protagonists” of the 1911 revolution, see pp. 406-11.

<sup>23</sup> Liang Qichao, “Xin shixue” (New historiography), 1902, in *Liang Qichao, Yinbingshi Wenji (Collected Works from the Ice Drinker’s Studio)* (Taipei: Taiwan Zhonghua shuju, 1960), 4: 7 (hereafter cited as *YBSWJ*).

<sup>24</sup> Cited in Edward J.M. Rhoads, *Manchu & Han: Ethnic Relations and Political Power in Late Qing and Early Republican China, 1861-1928* (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 2000), 3.

<sup>25</sup> The question of whether or not the Manchus were already assimilated became the primary focus of a 1902-03 written debate between Kang Youwei and Zhang Binglin. In a late 1902 article written from the United States, Kang argued that the Manchus had already adopted the doctrines, rites and music, language and clothing of the Han Chinese, removing any cultural or racial barrier between the two people. See Kang Youwei, “Bian geming shu” (On Revolution), 16 September 1902, in *Xinhai Geming Qianshinian jian Shilunxuan (Select Works from Ten Years Prior to the 1911 Revolution)*, comps. Zhang Xiang and Wang Renzhi (Shanghai: Xinzhi sanlian shudian, 1977), 1.1: 210-217. In a 1903 reply to Kang’s article, Zhang Binglin listed, in excruciating detail, examples of how the Manchus had not only retained their own religion, hair-style, dress and language, but also forced these barbaric customs upon the Han Chinese. See Zhang Binglin, “Bo Kang Youwei lun geming shu” (Disputing Kang Youwei’s Letter on Revolution), May 1903, in *Zhang Taiyen Quanji (Complete Works of Zhang Binglin)* (Shanghai: Renmin chubanshe, 1985), 4: 173-84.

<sup>26</sup> Liang Qichao, “Zhengzhi xuejia Bo-lun-zhi-li zhi xueshuo” (The theories of political scientist Bluntschli), 4 October 1903, in *YBSWJ*, 5: 71-77.

<sup>27</sup> Schiffrin, *Sun Yat-sen and the Origins*, 306-07. Liang not only convinced the president of the Yokohama cell of the Revive China Society to finance his publications, he also persuaded Sun Yat-sen’s own brother, Sun Mei, to become president of the Hawaii branch of the Society to Protect the Emperor. See Bergère, *Sun Yat-sen*, 123.

<sup>28</sup> Sun Yat-sen, “Jinggao tongxiang shu” (Respectful declaration to fellow countrymen), December 1903, in *SZSQJ*, 1: 232.

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<sup>29</sup> Sun Yat-sen, “Bo Baohuangbao shu” (Refutation of the newspapers of the Society to Protect the Emperor), January 1904, in *SZSQJ*, 1: 233-38.

<sup>30</sup> On the etymology of *Zhina* see its entry in Luo, *Hanyu dacidian*, 2: 2730.

<sup>31</sup> Sun Yat-sen, “Zhina baoquan fenhai helun” (A joint discussion on the preservation or dismemberment of China), 21 September 1903, in *SZSQJ*, 1: 218-224. The translation has been adapted from Julie Lee Wei, Ramon Myers and Donald Gillin, eds., *Prescriptions for Saving China: Selected Writings of Sun Yat-sen* (Stanford: Hoover Institute Press, 1994), 23-28.

<sup>32</sup> Sun Yat-sen, “Zhina xianshi ditu” (Map of Chinese Territory), 14 July 1900, in *Sun Zhongshan Ji Waiji (Supplement to the Works of Sun Yat-sen)*, eds. Chen Xulu and Hao Shengchao (Shanghai: Renmin chubanshe, 1990), 17-28.

<sup>33</sup> Cited in Key Ray Chong, “Cheng Kuan-yin (1841-1920): A Source of Sun Yat-sen’s Nationalist Ideology?” *Journal of Asian Studies* 28.2 (February 1969), 262. For the original text see Sun Yat-sen, “Shang Li Hongzhang shu” (Memorial to Li Hongzhang), June 1894, in *SZSQJ*, 1: 14.

<sup>34</sup> Once again, here, Sun’s thinking closely dovetailed that of Liang Qichao. On the Liang Qichao’s reconceptualization of China as a bounded territory within a modern system of competing nation-state see Tang Xiaobing, *Global Space and the Nationalist Discourse of Modernity: The Historical Thinking of Liang Qichao* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1996).

<sup>35</sup> Bergère, *Sun Yat-sen*, 123. The Tongmenghui began with seventy founding members but quickly grew to 963 members by 1906. The Cantonese members of Sun’s Revive China Society comprised less than 10% (112 members) of the Tongmenghui.

<sup>36</sup> Sun Yat-sen, “*Minbao* fakanci” (Forward to *Minbao*), 12 October 1905, in *SZSQJ*, 1: 288-89. Sun describes *minzuzhuyi* in the forward as some vague evolutionary force that transformed the Roman empire into the various independent countries of Europe and would now eliminate the evil Manchu dictatorship and revitalize China.

<sup>37</sup> Sun Yat-sen et al., “Zhongguo Tongmenghui reming fanglüe” (Revolutionary manifesto of the Chinese Tongmenghui), Fall 1906, in *SZSQJ*, 1: 296-318.

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<sup>38</sup> Cited in Pusey, *China and Charles Darwin*, 331. For the original text see Zhang Binglin, “*Shehui Tonglun shangdui*” (A discussion of *Survey of Sociology*), March 1907, in *Zhang Taiyan Quanji*, 2: 333. Chang Hao refers to Zhang Binglin’s conception of “perfect nationalism” as a “moral vision of universal racial-ethnic liberation,” a concept that not only applied to the Chinese Muslims but also the Indians, Burmese, Vietnamese and other Asian people who had traditionally suffered under Chinese hegemony and were now being colonized by the Western powers. See Chang Hao, *Chinese Intellectuals in Crisis: Search for Order and Meaning (1890-1911)* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1987), 113. Yet, in contrast to Chang Hao, my own reading of Zhang Binglin reveals a marked tension between the construction, on the one hand, of an ethnically pure Han Republic and a multi-ethnic Zhonghua Republic. Take, for example, Zhang’s assertion in his 1907 article “Explaining the Republic of China” (*Zhonghua minguo jie*) that “from the standpoint of regulating the borders of the Republic of China, the two prefectures Vietnam and Korea must be recovered and the district Burma follows slightly behind in priority; as for Tibet, the Hui areas and Mongolia, let them decide themselves if they want to be incorporated or rejected.” Cited in Torbjörn Lodén, “Nationalism Transcending the State: Changing Conceptions of Chinese Identity,” in *Asian Forms of the Nation*, eds. Stein Tønnesson and Hans Antlöv (Richmond: Curzon Press Ltd., 1996), 281. Wong Young-tsu has notes that while Zhang was “sympathetic to the aspirations of self-determination for all races, including the Manchus,” he also realized that it was impractical to identify all Manchu people and send them back to Manchuria. At different times Zhang suggests everything from their extermination or the creation of an autonomous state of Manchuria to finally their naturalization and assimilation into a homogenous Han Republic. See Wong Young-tsu, *Search for Modern Nationalism: Zhang Binglin and Revolutionary China, 1869-1936* (Hong Kong: Oxford University Press, 1989), 61-66.

<sup>39</sup> Sun Yat-sen, “Zai Dongjing ‘Minbao’ chuanli zhounian qingqu dahui de yanjiang” (A Speech at a ceremony in Tokyo to celebrate the ten anniversary of *Minbao*), 2 December 1906, in *SZSQJ*, 1: 324.

<sup>40</sup> *Ibid.*, 324-25.

<sup>41</sup> Liang, “Zhengzhi xuejia Bo-lun-zhi-li zhi xueshuo,” 76.

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<sup>42</sup> Pamela Kyle Crossley, *A Translucent Mirror: History and Identity in Qing Imperial Ideology* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1999), 344; Michael Gasster, *Chinese Intellectuals and the Revolution of 1911: The Birth of Modern Chinese Radicalism* (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1969), 82.

<sup>43</sup> Wang Jingwei, “Minzu de guomin” (A *minzu* of citizens), October-November 1905, in Zhang and Wang, eds., *Xinhai Geming Qianshinian jian Shilunxuan*, 2.1: 82-114.

<sup>44</sup> Cited in Rao Huaimin, “Shilun ‘Minbao’ shiqi Wang Jingwei de minzuzhuyi sixiang” (Inquiry into Wang Jingwei’s nationalist thinking during the period of *Minbao*), in *Jinian Xinhai Geming Qishi Zhounian Xueshu Taolunhui Wenji* (Collected Essay from an Academic Seminar on the Seventy Anniversary of the 1911 Revolution), ed. Zhonghua shuju bianjibu (Beijing: Zhonghua Shuju, 1983), 3: 1978. Wang made this suggestion in a *Minbao* article entitled, “Yanjiu minzu yu zhengzhi guanxi zhi ziliao” (Materials on the research into the relationship between *minzu* and politics), *Minbao*, 13 (1907).

<sup>45</sup> Dikötter, *The Discourse of Race in Modern China*, 123-25.

<sup>46</sup> A. James Gregor and Maria Hsia Chang, “Nazionalfascismo and the Revolutionary Nationalism of Sun Yat-sen,” *Journal of Asian Studies* 39.1 (November 1979): 21-37.

<sup>47</sup> See, for example, Deng Hui, “Xinhai geming shiqi Sun Zhongshan de minzu tongyi sixiang” (Sun Yat-sen’s national unification thought during the time of the 1911 Revolution), *Zhongnan minzu xueyuan xuebao* 2 (1996): 83-87; Li Shiyue and Zhao Shiyuan, “Sun Zhongshan de minzuzhuyi he ‘fanman’ wenti” (The problem of Sun Yat-sen’s *minzuzhuyi* and anti-Manchuism), in *Sun Zhongshan yu Zhongguo Minzhu Geming* (Sun Yat-sen and China’s National Revolution) (Shenyang: Liaoning renmin chubanshe, 1984), 68-84.

<sup>48</sup> Gasster, *Chinese Intellectuals and the Revolution of 1911*, 71.

<sup>49</sup> Sun Yat-sen, “Zai Nanjing Tongmenghui huiyuan jianbiehui de yanshuo” (An address given at a Tongmenghui farewell banquet in Nanjing), 1 April 1912, in *SZSQJ*, 2: 319.

<sup>50</sup> See, for example, Deal, “National Minority Policy in Southwest China,” 49; Germaine A. Hoston, *The State, Identity, and the National Question in China and Japan* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994), 190.

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<sup>51</sup> Prasenjit Duara, *Rescuing History from the Nation: Questioning Narratives of Modern China* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1995), 142; Gottfried-Karl Kindermann, “An Overview of Sun Yat-sen’s Doctrine” in *Sun Yat-sen’s Doctrine in the Modern World*, ed. Cheng Chu-yuan (Boulder: Westview Press, 1989), 55-56.

<sup>52</sup> Zhang Lei, ed., *Sun Zhongshan Cidian (Encyclopedia of Sun Yat-sen)* (Guangdong: Guangdong renmin chubanshe, 1994), 83. For other notable examples of Chinese and Western misinterpretations of Sun’s position on these two symbols see Dru C. Gladney, *Muslim Chinese: Ethnic Nationalism in the People’s Republic* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, Council on East Asian Studies, 1991), 83; Stevan Harrell, “The Nationalities Question and the Prmi Problem,” in *Negotiating Ethnicities in China and Taiwan*, ed. Melissa J. Brown (Berkeley: Institute of East Asian Studies, University of California, Center for Chinese Studies, 1996), 277; Norma Diamond, “Defining the Miao: Ming, Qing and Contemporary Views” in *Cultural Encounters on China’s Ethnic Frontiers*, ed. Stevan Harrell (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1995), 106; Mackerras, *China’s Minorities*, 53-58; Lin Jiayou, *Sun Zhongshan Zhenxing Zhonghua Sixiang Yanjiu (Research on the Development of Sun Yat-sen’s Chinese Thought)* (Guangdong: Guangdong renmin chubanshe, 1996), 118 & 159; Li Jiayou, *Xinhai Geming yu Minzu Wenti (The 1911 Revolution and the National Question)* (Guangdong: Zhongshan daxue chubanshe, 1992), 356-57; Tao Xu, *Wanqing Minzuzhuyi Sichao (Nationalist Thought during the Late Qing)* (Beijing: Renmin chubanshe, 1995), 215-218.

<sup>53</sup> Sun Yat-sen, “Fu canyihui lun guoqi han” (Letter on revising the assembly debate on the national flag), 12 January 1912, in *SZSQJ*, 2: 17-18.

<sup>54</sup> See Li Xuezhi, “‘Zhonghua minguo guoqi shilue’ zhengwu” (A correction of errors contained in ‘A discussion of the Republic of China’s national flag’), *Lishi Dang’an* 2 (1996), 105-07; Qu Youci, “Zhonghua minguo guoqi shilue” (A discussion of the Republic of China’s National Flag), *Lishi Dang’an* 1 (1991), 133-34; Xin Ping, “Wuseqi—qingtian bairi mandi hongqi” (Five color flag—Blue sky, white sun, and red background flag), in *Minguo Shehui Dagan (The Grand Sight of Republican Society)*, Xin Ping et. al. (Fuzhou: Fujian renmin chubanshe, 1991), 32-35.

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<sup>55</sup>Deng, “Xinhai geming shiqi Sun Zhongshan de minzu de sixiang,” 87.

<sup>56</sup> Sun, “Sanminzhuyi,” 1919, in *SZSQJ*, 5:187. The translation is adapted from John Fitzgerald, *Awakening China: Politics, Culture, and Class in the Nationalist Revolution* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1996), 183.

<sup>57</sup> Sun Yat-sen, “Zai Shanghai Zhongguo guomindang benbu huiyi de yanjiang” (Speech before the Shanghai Branch of the Chinese Nationalist Party), 4 November 1920, in *SZSQJ*, 5: 394.

<sup>58</sup> Ibid.

<sup>59</sup> On the origins of *Zhonghua minzu* see Chen Liankai, “Zhongguo, Huayi, Fanhan, Zhonghua, Zhonghua minzu—yige zai lianxi fazhan bei renshi de guocheng” (One Process for recognizing the developmental relationship between the terms *Zhongguo*, *Huayi*, *Fanhan*, *Zhonghua*, and *Zhonghua minzu*), in *Zhonghua Minzu Yanjiu Chutan (Preliminary Research on the Zhonghua minzu)* (Beijing: Zhishi chubanshe, 1994), 62-66; It is quite possible that the term was coined by Liang Qichao himself. To the best of my knowledge the earliest usage of the term in Liang’s written occurring in October 1903 when Liang return from his tour of the United States. See Liang, “Zhengzhi xuejia Bo-lun-zhi-li zhi xueshuo,” 75.

<sup>60</sup> Sun, “Sanminzhuyi,” 186.

<sup>61</sup> Sun Yat-sen, “Linshi Dazongtong Xuanyanshu” (Proclamation of the Provisional President), 1 January 1912, in *SZSQJ*, 2: 2.

<sup>62</sup> Sun Yat-sen, “He wuzu wei yiti jianshe gonghe” (Uniting the Five *Minzu* into one Body to Construct the Republic), 7 September 1912, in *Geming Wenxian (Documents from the Revolution)*, ed. Luo Jialun (Taipei: Zhongyang wenhua kongyingshe jingshou, 1953- ), 2: 264-65 (hereafter cited as *GMWX*).

<sup>63</sup> Sun Yat-sen, “Minquanzhuyi - Diyijiang” (The Principle of *Minquan* - Lecture Number One), 9 March 1924, in *SZSQJ*, 9: 264.

<sup>64</sup> Cited in Yu-long Ling, “The Doctrine of Democracy and Human Rights,” in *Sun Yat-sen’s Doctrine in the Modern World*, 181-2.

<sup>65</sup> Sun Yat-sen, “Zai Xianggang yu Nanqing zaobao fangyuan Wei Luchen tanhua

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‘Nanbei Tongyi hou zhi Zhengzhi yu Waijiao Fangzhen’” (Commenting in Hong Kong on ‘The Political and Diplomatic Principles following North and South Reunion’ with *Nanqing Morning Daily* reporter Wei Luchen), May 1912, in *Mengzang Zhengce ji Faling Xuanji* (*Selection of Pronouncements on Mongolian and Tibetan Policy*), comp. Mengzang weiyuanhui (Taipei: Mengzang weiyuanhui, 1966), 2.

<sup>66</sup> Sun, “Sanminzhuyi,” 187.

<sup>67</sup> Sun Yat-sen, “Zai Zhongguo guomindang benbu teshe zhu ou banshi chu de yanjiang” (Speech given at the special founding of a branch office of the Nationalist Party in Canton), 6 March 1921, in *SZSQJ*, 5: 475.

<sup>68</sup> Sun Yat-sen, “Bugao guomin xiaorong yijian juanchu zhenyutu wen” (Announcement declaring the melding of ideas among our citizens in order to remove boundaries), 18 February 1912, in *SZSQJ*, 2: 105.

<sup>69</sup> Sun Yat-sen, “Zhongguo Tongmenghui kai quanti dahui tonggao,” (Notice on the Convening of a National Conference of the Tongmenghui ), 3 March 1912, in *Guofu Quanji* (*Complete Works of the National Father*), comp. Zhongguo guomindang zhongyang weiyuanhui dangshi weiyuanhui (Taipei: Zhongguo Guomindang zhongyang weiyuanhui dangshi weiyuanhui, 1973), 1: 787.

<sup>70</sup> Sun Yat-sen, “Guomindang xuanyan” (Manifesto of the Nationalist Party), 13 August 1912, in *SZSQJ*, 1: 399.

<sup>71</sup> Pusey, *China and Charles Darwin*, 116 & 60.

<sup>72</sup> Sun Yat-sen, “Zai Beijing Hu-Guang huiguan xuejia huanyinghui de yanshuo” (Speech given at a welcoming ceremony of education circles at the Beijing’s Guangdong-Hunan Club), 30 August 1912, in *SZSQJ*, 2: 422-24.

<sup>73</sup> Sun Yat-sen, *Memoirs of a Chinese Revolutionary: A Programme of National Reconstruction for China* (Taipei: China Cultural Service, 1953), 73; For the original text see Sun Yat-sen, “Jianguo fanglüe” (The International Development of China), 1917-1919, in *SZSQJ*, 6: 157-493.

<sup>74</sup> This idea was a fundamental part of Sun’s lecture on “military spiritual education”

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before the commanders of his Canton regime's army in 1921. See Sun Yat-sen, "Zai Guilin dui Dian-Gan-Ou jun de yanjiang" (Speech before the Yunnan-Jiangxi-Guangdong Army at Guilin), 10 December 1921, in *SZSQJ*, 6: 9-16.

<sup>75</sup> Sun Yat-sen, "Zai Guangzhou dui Guomindang yuan de yanshuo" (Speech to KMT members in Canton), 30 December 1923, in *SZSQJ*, 8: 574.

<sup>76</sup> Sun Yat-sen, "Zai Beijing yu Yuan Shikai de tanhua" (Discussion in Beijing with Yuan Shikai), August 1912, in *SZSQJ*, 2: 427-28.

<sup>77</sup> Sun Yat-sen, "Yu Xianggang 'Shimie Xibao' jizhe de tanhua" (Discussion with a reporter from Hong Kong's *Shimie Xibao*), May 1912, in *SZSQJ*, 2: 363.

<sup>78</sup> Sun, "Zai Guangzhou dui Guomindang yuan de yanshuo," 74.

<sup>79</sup> Sun, "Shang Li Hongzhang Shu," 18.

<sup>80</sup> Sun Yat-sen, "Zai Shanghai yu *Minlibao* jizhe de tanhua" (Discussion with a reporter from Shanghai's *Minlibao*), 25 June 1912, in *SZSQJ*, 2: 382-84; Sun, "Jianguo fanglüe," 157-493.

<sup>81</sup> Sun Yat-sen, "Ling Caizhengbu jiang bo zhu tuo zhi xiehui jingfei bianru yusuan wen" (Request from the Finance Ministry to allocate money for the budget of the Association for Assisting the Opening Up and Colonization of the Frontier), 30 March 1912, in *SZSQJ*, 2: 296-97.

<sup>82</sup> Sun, "Sanminzhuyi," 186.

<sup>83</sup> *Ibid.*, 187-88. The translation has been adapted from Wei, Myers, and Gillian, eds., *Prescriptions for Saving China*, 224.

<sup>84</sup> George T. Yu, *Party Politics in Republican China: The Kuomintang, 1912-1924* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1966), 168-69.

<sup>85</sup> Hung-Ting Ku, "The Emergence of the Kuomintang's Anti-imperialism," *Journal of Oriental Studies* 16.1-2 (1978): 87-97.

<sup>86</sup> Chang and Gordon, *All Under Heaven*, 133-34.

<sup>87</sup> Sun Yat-sen, "Zhongguo guomindang xuanyan" (The Manifesto of the KMT), 1 January 1923, in *GMWX*, 69: 69.

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<sup>88</sup> Sun Yat-sen, “Zhongguo guomindang danggang” (The Party Outline of the KMT), 1 January 1923, in *GMWX*, 8: 39.

<sup>89</sup> See Sun Yat-sen, “Sanminzhuyi zhi juti banfa” (Concrete methods for implementing the Three People’s Principles), 6 March 1921, in *SZSQJ*, 5: 480; Sun Yat-sen, “Yu Meiguo ‘Huashengdun Youbao’ jizhe de tanhua” (Conversation with a Reporter from the *Washington Post*), April 1922, in *SZSQJ*, 6: 101-102.

<sup>90</sup> Sun Yat-sen, “Zhongguo guomindang diyici quanguo daibiao dahui xuanyan” (The Manifesto of the KMT’s First National Party Congress), 30 January 1924, in *SZSQJ*, 9: 118-19.

<sup>91</sup> Elleman, *Diplomacy and Deception*, 61.

<sup>92</sup> Sun signed this will drafted by Wang Jingwei the day before his death at a Beijing hospital on 12 March 1925. The will was printed in all the National papers and greatly influenced the ideological development of the KMT following his death. The four documents included in Sun’s last revolutionary programme were *Manifesto of the First National Congress*, *Outline for National Reconstruction (Jianguo Dagang)*, *Fundamentals of National Reconstruction (Jianguo Fanglüe)*, and the *Three People’s Principles*. See Chang and Gordon, *All Under Heaven*, 133-34.

<sup>93</sup> Sun, “Minzuzhuyi – Diyijiang,” 184-96.

<sup>94</sup> *Ibid.*, 188.

<sup>95</sup> Sun Yat-sen, “Minzuzhuyi - Dierjiang” (The Principle of *Minzu* - Lecture Number Two), 3 February 1924, in *SZSQJ*, 9: 197.

<sup>96</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>97</sup> Sun Yat-sen, “Minzuzhuyi - Disijiang” (The Principle of *Minzu* - Lecture Number Four), 17 February 1924, in *SZSQJ*, 9: 221.

<sup>98</sup> For the influence of these two writers upon Sun see Paul M.A. Linebarger, *The Political Doctrines of Sun Yat-sen: An Exposition of the San Min Chu I* (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1937), 195-96; Chang and Gordon, *All Under Heaven*, 87-88.

<sup>99</sup> A. James Gregor and Maria Hsia Chang, “Thought of Sun Yat-sen in Comparative Perspective,” in *Sun Yat-sen’s Doctrine in the Modern World*, 121.

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<sup>100</sup> Sun, “Minzuzhuyi – Disijiang,” 227.

<sup>101</sup> Ibid., 228.

<sup>102</sup> See Ibid.; Sun Yat-sen, “Zai Guangzhou Quanguo Xuesheng Pingyihui de yanshuo” (Speech before a Canton session of the All Students Discussion Society, 15 August 1923, in *SZSQJ*, 8: 116; In this 1921 speech Sun went so far as stating: “With regards to Chinese territory, Vietnam, Korea, Burma, Tibet and others are all either China’s vassal states or dependencies.” See Sun, “Zai Guilin dui Dian-Gan-Ou jun de yanjiang,” 16.

<sup>103</sup> Sun Yat-sen, “Minzuzhuyi - Diliujiang” (The Principle of *Minzu* - Lecture Number Sixth), 2 March 1924, in *SZSQJ*, 9: 246 & 253.

<sup>104</sup> Sun Yat-sen, “Dui Shenhu shangye huiyi suodeng tuanti de yanshuo” (Speech before the various organizations of a Kobe commercial meeting), 28 November 1924, in *SZSQJ*, 11: 401-09.

<sup>105</sup> For example, Colin Mackerras states: “Sun Yat-sen’s policies in the latter part of his life were based rather closely on those of the Soviet Union, which meant that he was inclined to accept notions of self-determination and autonomy for the minorities,” See Colin Mackerras, *China’s Minority Cultures: Identities and Integration Since 1912* (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1995), 9. For other notable examples see Linda Benson, *The Ili Rebellion: The Moslem Challenge to Chinese Authority in Xinjiang, 1944-1949* (Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe, 1990), 11-12; Wei, Myers, and Gillian, eds., *Prescription for Saving China*, xxi; June Dryer, *China’s Forty Millions: Minority Nationalities and National Integration in the People’s Republic of China* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1976), 17.

<sup>106</sup> See Walter Connor, *The National Question in Marxist-Leninist Theory and Strategy* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984), 67-8; Hong Quanhu, *Zhongshan Xiansheng Minzu Zijuelun zhi Yanjiu (Research on Mr. Sun Yat-sen’s Theory of Self-determination)* (Taipei: Guoli zhengzhi daxue sanminzhuyi yanjiusuo yanshi lunwen, 1980), 117-150.

<sup>107</sup> On Wilson and Lenin’s interpretation and usage of the term national self-determination see Derek Heater, *National Self-determination: Woodrow Wilson and his Legacy* (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1994); Connor, *The National Question*, 45-66.

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<sup>108</sup> Sun Yat-sen, “Sanminzhuyi zhi juti banfa,” 480.

<sup>109</sup> Sun, “Zhongguo guomindang xuanyan,” 69-70.

<sup>110</sup> Sun Yat-sen, “Pi Deng Zeru de shangshu” (Criticism of Deng Zeru written on his letter to Sun), 29 November 1923, in *SZSQJ*, 8: 458. Sun revealed this information in reply to the charge by veteran KMT party member Deng Zeru that CCP leader Chen Duxiu had drafted the Manifesto.

<sup>111</sup> “Gongchan guoji shining weiyuanhui zhuxituan guanyu Zhongguo minzu jiefang yundong he Guomindang wenti de jueyi” (The resolution of the Presidium of the Comintern’s Central Executive Committee concerning China’s national liberation movement and the question of the Kuomintang), 28 November 1923, in *Liangong (Bu), Gongchanguoji yu Zhongguo Guomin Geming Yudong (1920-1925) (Russian Bolshevik Party, Comintern and the Chinese National Revolutionary Movement, 1920-25)*, trans. and comp. Zhonggong zhongyang dangshi yanjiushi diyi yanjiubu (Beijing: Xinhua shudian, 1997- ), 1: 342-345 (hereafter cited as *LGZY*).

<sup>112</sup> [Michael Borodin], “Bao-luo-ting zai you Sun canjia de weiyuanhui shang suozuo de shengming”(Borodin’s statement during a meeting of the committee attended by Sun Yat-sen) in “Bao-luo-ting de zhaji he tongbao” (Reading notes and reports of Borodin), 12 February 1924, in *LGZY*, 1: 448-50.

<sup>113</sup> [Michael Borodin], “Xuanyan de weiji shike” (The crisis moment of the manifesto), n.d., in “Bao-luo-ting de zhaji he tongbao,” 16 February 1924, in *LGZY*, 1: 471.

<sup>114</sup> Sun Yat-sen, “Zhongguo zhengfu jianguo dagang” (Outline for the reconstruction of the Chinese government ), 23 January 1924, in *SZSQJ*, 9: 127.

<sup>115</sup> Sun, “Zhongguo guomindang diyici quanguo daibiao dahui xuanyan,” 119; [Michael Borodin], “Daiqianyan” (Preface), in “Bao-luo-ting de zhaji he tongbao,” in *LGZY*, 1: 425; [Leo Karakhan], “Jia-la-kan gei Bao-luo-ting de xin” (Letter from Karakhan to Borodin), 13 February 1924, in *LGZY*, 1: 418.

<sup>116</sup> [Michael Borodin], “Gongchandang dangtuan huiyi” (United Meeting of the Chinese Communist Party), 18 January 1924, in “Bao-luo-ting de zhaji he tongbao,” in *LGZY*, 1: 465-66.

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<sup>117</sup> Elleman, *Diplomacy and Deception*, 60-64.

<sup>118</sup> For background information on the Sun-Joffe Accord and the discussions between Soviet representatives and Chinese officials over Outer Mongolia and the resumption of Sino-Russian relations see Allen Whiting, *Soviet Policies in China, 1917-1924* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1953); Peter S.H. Tang, *Russian and Soviet Policy in Manchuria and Outer Mongolia, 1911-1931* (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1959). As early as August 1922, Sun expressed his “complete confidence” in Soviet intentions towards Outer Mongolia in a letter to Moscow emissary Ignatii Iurin, stating “I accept Moscow’s guarantee that it had no intention to separate or destroy the Zhonghua Republic’s territory or political system.” See [Sun Yat-sen], “Sun Zhongshan zhi Yue-fei de xin” (Sun Yat-sen’s letter to Iurin), 27 August 1922, in *LGZY*, 2: 393.

<sup>119</sup> See Appendix C, “The Sino-Russian Agreement, May 31, 1924,” in Ken Shen Weigh, *Russian and Soviet Policy in Manchuria and Outer Mongolia, 1911-1931* (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1959), 349-53.

<sup>120</sup> Zou Lu, *Zhongguo Guomindang Shigao (Draft History of the Kuomintang)*, 2nd ed. (Shanghai: Shangwu yinshuguan, 1938), 636n9.

<sup>121</sup> Sun Yat-sen, “Huanyan Guomindang gesheng daibiao ji Menggu daibai de yanshuo” (Speech at a welcoming feast for KMT representative from each province and Outer Mongolia), 20 January 1924, in *SZSQJ*, 9: 107. In a secret cable to Borodin, Karakhan warned: “Danzan does not have the authority to sign any agreements or to make any detail guarantees or promises [with the KMT officials]. His task in general is to circulate information on the situation. He has the authority to circulate information on the conditions in Mongolia and the situation and work of the MPRP. During negotiations, [you] can also allow him to say that the Mongolian people desire Mongolian independence. I suggest that you express clearly to Sun Yat-sen that the chief reason why they are demanding independence is because of China’s situation: If they were to become part of Chinese territory, [China] would not be able to ensure the obtainment of their national aspirations, nor would it be able to provide them with order and stability. Thus, now they insist upon a stance of independence. Yet, you can imagine that if China had a democratic and honest national government and they provided a basis for a scheme of

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autonomy with which the Mongolian people agree, they would join the territory of the Republic.” See [Karakhan], “Jia-la-kan gei Bao-luo-ting de xin,” 27 December 1923, in *LGZY*, 1: 389.

<sup>122</sup> Sun, “Minzuzhuyi – Dierjiang,” 200.

<sup>123</sup> Sun Yat-sen, “Zhi Zhongguo guomindang kunlun benbu tongzhi bao”(Telegram to the comrades of the Urga branch of the Chinese KMT), 28 February 1924, in *SZSQJ*, 9: 474-5. Also see Li Jikui, “Sun Zhongshan yu waimeng wenti” (Sun Yat-sen and the problem of Outer Mongolia,” *Shehui Kexue Zhanxian* (1991): 193-200.

<sup>124</sup> Sun, “Sanminzhuyi zhi juti banfa,” 6 March 1921, in *SZSQJ*, 5: 473.

<sup>125</sup> Sun, “Zai Guilin dui Dian-Gan-Ou jun de yanjiang,” 24.

<sup>126</sup> Sharman, *Sun Yat-sen: His Life and Its Meaning*, 282.

<sup>127</sup> D.W.Y Kwok, *Scientism in Chinese Thought, 1900-1950* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1965).

<sup>128</sup> Edward W. Said, *Orientalism* (New York: Vintage Books, 1979), 231-33.

<sup>129</sup> Sun, “Minzuzhuyi – diyijiang,” 9: 187.

<sup>130</sup> Sun Yat-sen, “Minzuzhuyi – diwujiang,” (The Principle of Minzu – Lecture Number Five), 24 February 1924, in *SZSQJ*, 9: 239.

<sup>131</sup> Prasenjit Duara, “Bifurcating Linear History: Nation and Histories in China and India,” *Positions: East Asia Cultures Critique*, 1.3 (1993): 786; Also see Dikötter, *The Discourse of Race in Modern China*, 1-96; Duara, *Rescuing History From the Nation*, 56-65.

<sup>132</sup> Joseph Levenson, *Confucian China and Its Modern Fate* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1968), 95-116; James Townsend, “Chinese Nationalism,” in *Chinese Nationalism*, ed. Jonathan Unger (Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe, 1996), 1-30.

<sup>133</sup> Frank Dikötter, “Racial Nationalism in Modern China,” *Jindai Zhongguo shi yanjiu tongxun*, 24 (1997): 61 and Frank Dikötter, “Racial Discourse in China: Continuities and Permutations,” in *The Construction of Racial Identities in China and Japan*, 16.

<sup>134</sup> On premodern Chinese conceptualizations of human diversity, in addition to Dikötter and Duara, also see Marta Hanson, “Robust Northerners and Delicate Southerners: The Nineteenth-Century Invention of a Southern Medical Tradition,” *Positions: East Asian Culture*

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*Critique* 6.3 (Winter 1998): 515-50; Pamela Kyle Crossley, "Thinking about Ethnicity in Early Modern China, *Late Imperial China* 11.1 (1990): 1-35; Trauzettel, "Sung Patriotism as a First Step toward Chinese Nationalism," in *Crisis and Prosperity in Sung China*, ed. John W. Haeger (Tucson: University of Arizona Press, 1975), 199-214; Hoyt Cleveland Tillman, "Proto-Nationalism in Twelfth-Century China? The Case of Ch'en Liang," *Harvard Journal of Asiatic Studies* 39.2: 403-27.

<sup>135</sup> Duara, *Rescuing History From the Nation*, 32.