

INSTITUTE FOR HUMAN SECURITY WORKING PAPER SERIES



WOMEN, PEACE AND SECURITY: MOVING FROM RHETORIC TO ACTION

JASMINE-KIM WESTENDORF

LA TROBE UNIVERSITY
INSTITUTE FOR HUMAN SECURITY
WORKING PAPER 2011/4
ISSN 1838-4978

INSTITUTE FOR HUMAN SECURITY
LA TROBE UNIVERSITY
VICTORIA, 3086
AUSTRALIA

T: +61 (0)3 9479 4702
F: +61 (0)3 9479 1997
E: t.lee@latrobe.edu.au

The Institute for Human Security at La Trobe University is a university-wide institute. The concern for human security in its broadest definition has a long history at La Trobe University and the Institute for Human Security seeks to enable, enhance and co-ordinate discussion, research, and concrete policy advice from university staff and students across the university for dissemination in academia, the policy sector and to the general public.

WOMEN, PEACE AND SECURITY:
MOVING FROM RHETORIC TO ACTION

Jasmine-Kim Westendorf

Jasmine-Kim Westendorf is a doctoral candidate in International Relations at La Trobe University. She has worked with a range of NGOs, including the IWDA, World Vision, ActionAid, Oxfam Australia and the Centre for Public Policy at Melbourne University, and is a co-founder of the Melbourne Free University. An earlier version of this working paper was developed for IWDA.

Executive Summary

With the changing nature of warfare over the past half century, and the increasing awareness of the specific impact of warfare on women, the international legal framework has been expanded to address the particular challenges faced by women in conflict and post-conflict contexts. This process culminated in 2000 with the adoption of UN Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1325 on women, peace and security, which was the first UN document to explicitly address the role and needs of women in peace processes. Ten years on, this paper assesses the current state of UNSCR 1325 implementation globally, and explores the opportunities and challenges involved in using National Action Plans (NAPs) to systematise the resolution's implementation at national level. It finds a significant gap between the rhetoric of support for the principles enshrined in UNSCR 1325 and its comprehensive implementation, which highlights the broader difficulties in getting firm state commitment to meaningful action on 'soft' security issues such as human security, as opposed to more traditional 'hard' security concerns. The case of the Regional Assistance Mission to the Solomon Islands (RAMSI) is used to explore the extent to which Australian commitment to women, peace and security principles at the level of international norm development actually translates into meaningful action on the ground, in peace operations. The RAMSI intervention demonstrates a significant gap between Australia's rhetorical commitment to the norms enshrined in UNSCR 1325 and the reality of their non-implementation in peace operations, suggesting that an NAP would offer significant benefits in terms of mainstreaming the implementation of the resolution within the Australian context, thereby facilitating Australia's adherence to its international obligations.

Table of Contents

Executive Summary	2
Table of Contents.....	3
Acronyms.....	3
Introduction.....	4
PART 1: UNSCR 1325 and the international legal framework.....	6
International legal framework	6
The protection framework.....	12
Scope and implications of UNSCR 1325.....	15
Challenges to implementation	22
PART 2: National Action Plans.....	25
PART 3: The RAMSI intervention in the Solomon Islands and Australia’s adherence to UNSCR 1325.....	35
Conclusion: Moving from rhetoric to action.....	42
References.....	46

Acronyms

AusAID	Australian Agency for International Development
CEDAW	Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women
CIDA	Canadian International Development Agency
DDR	Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration
DFID	Department for International Development (UK)
DPKO	United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations
ICC	International Criminal Court
ICRC	International Committee of the Red Cross
IDP	Internally Displaced Person
FCO	Foreign and Commonwealth Office (UK)
GAU	Gender Affairs Unit
NAP	National Action Plan
NCW	National Council of Women (Solomon Islands)
NGO	Non-Government Organisation
OCHA	United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
OGA	Office of the Gender Advisor
PNG	Papua New Guinea
RAMSI	Regional Assistance Mission in the Solomon Islands
R2P	Responsibility to Protect
SGBV	Sexual and Gender Based Violence
SSR	Security Sector Reform
TCC	Troop Contributing Country
UK	United Kingdom
UN	United Nations
UNHCR	United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
UNIFEM	United Nations Fund for Women
UNMIL	United Nations Mission in Liberia
UNSC	United Nations Security Council
UNSCR	United Nations Security Council Resolution
UNTAET	United Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor

Introduction

As the nature of war has changed over the last half century, with the advent of irregular and asymmetrical warfare, so too has the effect of armed conflict on women. Sexual and gender-based violence have become defining characteristics of modern warfare, and women, often seen as the vessels of cultural identity, are increasingly considered legitimate strategic targets by armed forces, especially where conflicts revolve around identity politics.¹ In response to the changing nature of war, and, the growing number of civilian casualties in conflicts since the Second World War, numerous instruments of international law have been developed which aim to protect civilians from the excesses of violent conflict. Although few of these are dedicated to addressing gender issues specifically, provisions relating to women contained within them do build up a space for women within international law. Increasing awareness of the need to address women's issues within the international legal framework has led to the development of various documents and discussions about the topic, culminating in 2000 in the adoption of United Nations Security Council Resolution 1325 (UNSCR 1325), the first UN document to explicitly address the role of women in peace processes and the particular challenges faced by women during conflict and post-conflict phases. Although states bear primary responsibility for the implementation of UNSCR 1325, the resolution, though binding, lacks enforcement mechanisms, and a number of states have therefore endeavoured to systematise the resolution's implementation through the development and adoption of National Action Plans (NAPs). These plans can guide and ensure the proper implementation of the resolution's mandates by relevant actors, thereby improving coordination, policy coherence and accountability.

¹ Such violence takes many forms, including rape, forced impregnation, forced abortion, trafficking, prostitution, sexual slavery and forced marriage-like arrangements, torture and genital mutilation. (see Sanam B. Naraghi-Anderlini, *Women, Peace and Security: A Policy Audit*, International Alert, June 2001 , p. 12; United Nations Secretary General, *Women, Peace and Security: Study submitted by the Secretary-General pursuant to Security Council resolution 1325 (2000)*, New York, United Nations, 2002 , pp.2-3; and Buelent Diken and Carsten Bagge Laustsen, "Becoming Abject: Rape as a Weapon of War," *Body & Society*, Vol. 11, No. 1, 2005.)

Australia has not yet developed an NAP on UNSCR 1325, although it has supported numerous civil society initiatives related to the resolution, and is a member of *Friends of 1325*, the ad hoc group of UN Member States that has been instrumental in advocating for the implementation of UNSCR 1325 at government level. The development and adoption of an Australian NAP would improve the comprehensiveness of Australia's efforts to operationalise the resolution's mandates, and would make gender considerations a priority in Australian security policy. Currently, there is a significant gap between the Australia's rhetoric of commitment to the principles enshrined in the resolution, and adherence to the mandates in terms of policy and practice. As will be demonstrated below, Australia's engagement in the Regional Assistance Mission in the Solomon Islands (RAMSI) intervention in the Solomon Islands demonstrates the ways in which rhetoric is not being translated into action, highlighting the need for an overarching policy to guide and ensure compliance with Australia's responsibilities under UNSCR 1325.

This paper seeks to assess the current state of UNSCR 1325 implementation globally, particularly by focusing on the opportunities and challenges involved in using NAPs to implement the resolution at the national level. In doing so, it attempts to identify processes and components in the development of NAPs that have been successful elsewhere, and could be adapted to suit the Australian context. In order to do this, I will first position UNSCR 1325 in relation to the broader human rights and protection frameworks, and explore the resolution's scope and implications, as well as the challenges to its implementation. I will then look at how governments have sought to systematise UNSCR 1325's implementation through NAPs, analysing the benefits and challenges of using NAPs as tools for implementing UNSCR 1325. I will then briefly discuss the main way in which the resolution affects Australian policy, namely through our engagement in peace operations globally, and I will use the case of RAMSI to explore the extent to which Australian commitment to women, peace and security principles at the level of international norm development actually translates into

meaningful action on the ground in peace operations. The RAMSI intervention demonstrates a significant gap between Australia's rhetorical commitment to the norms enshrined in UNSCR 1325 and the reality of their non-implementation in peace operations, suggesting that an NAP would offer significant benefits in terms of mainstreaming the implementation of the resolution within the Australian context, thereby facilitating Australia's adherence to its international obligations.

PART 1: UNSCR 1325 and the international legal framework

International legal framework

The first major instrument to exclusively focus on women was the powerfully-worded and broad-reaching Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW), which was adopted in 1979, came into force in 1981, and has been ratified by 185 out of 192 UN member states. Interestingly, only the Convention on the Rights of the Child has more ratifications than CEDAW. The Optional Protocol to CEDAW (which was adopted in 1999 and came into force in 2000) recognizes the right of the Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women to consider complaints of human rights violations within the jurisdiction of ratifying states, and remains one of the only instruments relating to women with an accountability mechanism. It speaks volumes though, that only 90 states have ratified the Optional Protocol, and that women continue to be marginalised and discriminated against in many countries, indicating that responsibilities under CEDAW are not taken seriously, and that impunity for breaches remains common.

The General Assembly's Declaration on the Protection of Women and Children in Emergency and Armed Conflicts (1974) was the first document to address the specific vulnerabilities of women and children in conflict zones, and the international legal framework has developed this protection over time by including provisions for women and girls within instruments of international humanitarian law, international human rights law, international criminal law, and international refugee law. These include the

UN Convention Against Transnational Organized Crime, which covers trafficking, the Convention on the Rights of the Child and its Optional Protocols, and international humanitarian law such as the Geneva Conventions, which regulate the conduct of hostilities and draw distinctions between combatants and non-combatants, and thus, legitimate and illegitimate targets. The definition of war crimes in the Geneva Conventions has also been expanded to encompass sexual and gender-based violence (SGBV), and military 'command responsibility' has been established as a basis for liability.² International criminal law also addresses crimes of sexual violence against women and girls during armed conflict, and sexual and gender-based violence have been included as crimes in the statutes of the International Tribunals for the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda, the Rome Statute for the ICC and the Statute of the Special Court for Sierra Leone.

Despite the development of these instruments, women continued to be directly targeted during conflicts, and the Fourth World Conference on Women in Beijing in 1995 identified 'women and armed conflict' as a critical area of concern and called for the upholding and reinforcement of international and human rights law in relation to offences against women during armed conflict, and the prosecution of all those responsible for such offences.³ Another critical area of concern was the inclusion of women in formal peace processes, given their general exclusion from such processes. The Mission Statement of the Beijing Platform for Action stated unequivocally that '[e]quality between women and men is a matter of human rights and a condition for social justice and is also a necessary and fundamental prerequisite for equality, development and peace.'⁴ Despite this, progress in increasing women's participation and representation in decision making in peace processes remained slow.

² Geoffrey Robertson QC, *Crimes Against Humanity: The Struggle for Global Justice*, 3rd ed., London, Penguin Books, 2006, pp. 422-38.

³ See Beijing Platform for Action, available at <http://www.un.org/womenwatch/daw/beijing/platform/index.html> (cited 7/4/2008).

⁴ 'Mission Statement', Beijing Platform for Action, Para.1.

In 2000, a UN General Assembly entitled 'Women 2000: Gender, Equality, Development and Peace for the 21st Century' called for the full participation of women at all levels of decision making in peace processes, peacekeeping and peace-building, and explicitly addressed the need to increase the protection of women and girls in situations of armed conflict.⁵ This, combined with the report of the Secretary-General's Panel on UN Peace Operations,⁶ led to the development of the Windhoek declaration and the Namibia Plan of Action on Mainstreaming a Gender Perspective in Multidimensional Peace Operations in June 2000, which in turn preceded the adoption on UNSCR 1325 on 31 October 2000. As such, UNSCR 1325 is seen by many in the women's movement as 'the culmination of several decades of growing realisation of the diverse roles that women play both in conflict and building peace, and the result of active involvement and advocacy by women's organizations.'⁷

UNSCR 1325 was a landmark resolution because the UNSC had never before turned its full attention to the issue of women, peace and security, and also because it represented the first time that the UNSC officially endorsed the participation of civil society, and particularly women, in formal peace processes and operations. As a Security Council Resolution, 1325 is binding on all UN member states. However, it lacks an enforcement or accountability mechanism, and consequently it holds clout primarily as an advocacy tool and in the realm of norm creation. As with most such norms around human rights, human security, and other 'soft' international relations issues, there is an inevitable quicksand of interpretation and implementation that means that state responses to the norms enshrined in UNSCR 1325 will vary greatly, and depend in large part on their intersection with 'hard' security and national interest issues. This highlights the importance of continued advocacy in order to keep such issues on the

⁵ UN General Assembly Resolution S-23/3, 'Further actions and initiatives to implement the Beijing Declaration and Platform for Action', available at <http://www.un.org/womenwatch/daw/followup/reports.htm#GA%20Resolutions> (accessed 5/4/2008).

⁶ *Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations, A/55/305, S/2000/809*, (August 2000 [cited 15 March 2006]); available from www.un.org/peace/reports/peace_operations/(accessed 15/3/2006).

⁷ Peace and Security IANGWE Taskforce on Women, *From the Charter to the SCR 1325* (17/03/2008 [cited 17/3/2008]); available from <http://www.un.org/womenwatch/ianwge/taskforces/wps/history.html>

agenda of national governments and international bodies, and to lobby for ongoing implementation.

This is especially important in light of political actors' tendency to pay lip service to the ideals of women's rights and protection and then shy from implementing relevant policies – this tendency is evidenced in the fact that documents relating to women in conflict zones have been passed regularly since 1974, to little effect. The adoption eight years after UNSCR 1325 of UNSCR 1820 on sexual violence in situations of conflict further illustrates this trend, and may actually undermine the effectiveness of the former resolution to some extent, by watering down the issues faced by women in conflict contexts to sexual violence and victim-hood.

UNSCR 1820 was unanimously adopted on 19 June 2008 under the presidency of the US, and further adds to the international legal framework around women's rights, particularly in relation to situations of conflict. This resolution represents the first time that the UNSC has acknowledged that sexual violence can have implications for international peace and security, and belongs on the Council's agenda. This potentially paves the way for the mandates of UN peacekeeping forces to be broadened to include protecting civilians from sexual violence. Central to the resolution is a demand that 'all parties to armed conflict immediately take appropriate measures to protect civilians, including women and girls, from all forms of sexual violence,' including through debunking the myths that fuel such violence.⁸ UNSCR 1820 also notes that rape and other forms of sexual violence can constitute war crimes, crimes against humanity or constitutive acts with respect to genocide, and stresses the need to end impunity for such crimes. This mirrors the clause on impunity in UNSCR 1325, albeit in stronger language. Interestingly, this resolution explicitly makes the connection that sexual violence may undermine and prevent women's full and effective participation in conflict resolution and peace-building processes. It is also important to note UNSCR 1820's

⁸ "S/RES/1820 (2008)," 19 June 2008, Article 3.

provisions for monitoring and reporting mechanisms, which are absent from UNSCR 1325.

Although UNSCR 1820 was generally welcomed by international civil society as another instrument to support work on women, peace and security issues, there has been criticism that it reduces women to victims in conflict contexts, and may take the focus away from the broad-reaching and more comprehensive implications of UNSCR 1325.⁹ Critics argue that the prevalence of human rights abuses against women in conflict contexts is not for lack of international legal instruments or norms, but rather is the result of a widespread reluctance of relevant actors to recognise sexual violence as a serious human rights abuse that undermines peace and security. This suggests a need to improve the conceptual acceptance of women's rights among those actors, and to further develop the capacity of the international legal system to demand compliance on issues such as those stipulated in both UNSCR 1325 and 1820. Further, Amy Barrow argues that by their nature the norms enshrined in these two resolutions, although significant, 'may not be radical enough to expand constructions of gender within international humanitarian law,' given their inherent weaknesses, and argues that 'stronger links need to be established with substantive legal provisions, including the Geneva Conventions and respective Protocols, the CEDAW and the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court' in order to avoid an 'add women and stir' approach to 'gendering' international legal frameworks.¹⁰

Since 2008, four further Women, Peace and Security resolutions have been passed by the UNSC to augment and strengthen elements of the earlier resolutions, in response to UNSC recognition that progress in implementing UNSCRs 1325 and 1820 was slow. In 2009 UNSCR 1888 built on UNSCR 1820, and called for the appointment of a Special

⁹ See Amy Barrow, "UN Security Council Resolutions 1325 and 1820: constructing gender in armed conflict and international humanitarian law," *International Review of the Red Cross*, Vol. 92, No. 877, March 2010, pp. 232-234; and Sam Cook, "Security Council Resolution 1820: A Move to End Sexual Violence in Conflict," *1325 PeaceWomen E-News*, Vol., No. 102, June 2008.

¹⁰ Barrow, "UN Security Council Resolutions 1325 and 1820: constructing gender in armed conflict and international humanitarian law," Vol., p. 234.

Representative of the Secretary-General on sexual violence in conflict, and to establish Women Protection Advisors within UN peace operations, a rapid deployment Team of Experts to respond to situations of sexual violence, the production of an annual report providing information on perpetrators of sexual violence in conflicts and the potential to engage sanctions committees on the issue of sexual violence.¹¹ The subsequent UNSCR 1889 built on UNSCR 1325 in response to the continued low participation of women in peace-building processes, particularly in the post-conflict phase. It called for the development of indicators to measure the implementation of UNSCR 1325 within the UN system and by Member States, particularly in relation to post-conflict peacebuilding, and also requested the Secretary-General to submit a report within 12 months addressing women's inclusion in post-conflict peace-building and planning.¹² The recommendations of this report were operationalised in UNSCR 1960, which was passed in December 2010 under the Presidency of the US, as were UNSCRs 1820 and 1888. UNSCR 1960 noted the continued systematic and widespread use of sexual violence during armed conflicts, and created institutional tools to combat impunity, outlining specific steps to prevent and protect civilians from such violence. This included provisions for a 'naming and shaming' mechanism whereby perpetrators of sexual violence are listed, in an attempt to bring them to justice for crimes violating human rights and international law.

That the UNSC itself recognizes the need to continue to develop international norms around the protection of civilians from sexual and gender based violence (SGBV) in conflict zones is positive. However the resolutions subsequent to UNSCR 1325 have increasingly focused on women as victims in conflicts, rather than on the need to systematically increase their involvement and engagement in decision making and peace processes, which is where the real thrust of UNSCR 1325 lies. This is compounded by the fact that, unlike for the previous women, peace and security resolutions, women on the ground were not consulted in the development of UNSCR 1960, further isolating

¹¹ "S/RES/1888 (2008)," ed. UNSC, 30 September 2009.

¹² "S/RES/1889 (2009)," ed. UNSC, 5 October 2009.

them from important international decision making processes concerning them.¹³ This trend to focus only on women's victimhood is problematic, and coupled with the continued slow progress in implementing the women, peace and security resolutions indicates the challenges in translating rhetorical commitment to these norms into meaningful action.

The protection framework

UNSCR 1325 should be understood in the context of the broader protection framework, as distinct from the international legal framework. Protecting civilians from the excesses of violent conflict has long been a central concern of humanitarian actors, although the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) and UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) were traditionally the two primary actors engaging in protection work in conflict contexts. However, as the understanding of the dynamics of warfare has developed, so too has the role of humanitarian actors in protection work. Consequently, there has been a proliferation of actors engaging in this sector, and responses have shifted from a narrow focus on the provision of relief to longer-term human security issues. Thus, the protection discourse has extended beyond just conflict situations, although it is the protection of civilians in conflict contexts that is relevant to UNSCR 1325, and will be addressed here.

Protection work is based on the concept of the rule of law, and is framed within the human rights discourse. It is generally defined as

all activities aimed at obtaining full respect for the rights of the individual in accordance with the letter and spirit of the relevant bodies of law (i.e. human rights law, international humanitarian law and refugee law.) Human rights and

¹³ For a discussion of this, see the open letter to members of the Security Council by the Global Network of Women Peacebuilders: Global Network of Women Peacebuilders, "UNSCR 1960 and the need for focus on full implementation of UNSCR 1325: Open letter to Member States of the Security Council Re: Res. 1960," 7 January 2011.

humanitarian organizations must conduct these activities in an impartial manner (not on the basis of race, national or ethnic origin, language or gender).¹⁴

This is the ICRC's definition of 'protection,' and has clear implications for work around women, peace and security issues. It is important to note that while this is accepted as an overarching definition, actors often have their own working definitions, reflecting their particular agendas. A selection of these is presented in Table 1 below. Providing and ensuring human security is central to the concept of protection, and for protection work to be effective, it must engage three interlinked approaches: humanitarian, human rights, and political. Unfortunately, protection actors can tend to over-emphasize the humanitarian approach (e.g. deployment of humanitarian protection officers) and underemphasize the political approach – which undermines the establishment of sustainable and meaningful human security.¹⁵ This indicates the need for concurrent bottom-up and top-down approaches to protection, with some actors working at the micro level to alleviate and address the causes and consequences of suffering and insecurity, and others working at the meso and macro levels to negotiate diplomatic and international solutions respectively. The Responsibility to Protect (R2P) framework has significant implications for the protection discourse, and can be used to inform political approaches to protection. R2P principles reconceptualise the international community's 'right to intervene' in civil conflicts (for example through peacekeeping operations) as a 'responsibility to protect' the citizens of other countries when those states are themselves unable or unwilling to provide for the basic human and security needs of their citizenry.¹⁶ As discussed earlier, UNSCR 1820 may be used as the basis for peacekeeping forces to be mandated to respond to sexual violence in

¹⁴ Sorcha O'Callaghan and Sara Pantuliano, "Protective action: Incorporating civilian protection into humanitarian response," London, Overseas Development Institute, December 2007, p. 3.

¹⁵ Giuseppe Calandrucio, "Protection in practice: concepts, strategies and dilemmas" (paper presented at the Roundtable on Protection in Practice hosted by the HPG, Geneva, January 2007), pp. 2-3.

¹⁶ This shift in emphasis was initially made by the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS), which was sponsored by the Canadian government, and in 2001 produced the report *The Responsibility to Protect*. See International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty, *The Responsibility to Protect: Report of the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty*, Ottawa, International Development Research Centre, 2001.

conflicts, indicating that sexual violence may be considered a violation of basic human and security needs, triggering the R2P to be transferred to the international community. However, R2P as a norm suffers the same weaknesses as women, peace and security principles and other 'soft' security issues discussed earlier, meaning that it is unlikely that this sort of broad reading of UNSCR 1820 and the R2P doctrine will be invoked as the basis for international action. While states adopted the R2P principles in the 2005 World Summit Outcome Resolution,¹⁷ and largely reaffirmed their commitment to them at the 2009 General Assembly Debate on Implementing the Responsibility to Protect,¹⁸ there remains little consensus over when to turn rhetoric into action and when it is appropriate to invoke R2P as the basis for major international intervention into the affairs of a sovereign state, as demonstrated by the recent debate over whether the emerging situation in Libya triggered the R2P or not.

Essentially, civilian security is the object and goal of protection work, but it cannot be achieved through humanitarian work in isolation of higher-level political actions designed to promote behaviour and normative change around human rights. Thus, UNSCR 1325 is one element of the broader protection agenda, and action must be taken on all three levels in order to fully implement the resolution. This will become apparent in the analysis of the resolution and its implications, below.

¹⁷ UN, "Resolution Adopted by the General Assembly, 2005 World Summit Outcome," in *A/RES/60/1*, 24 October 2005, Articles 138-140.

¹⁸ At this debate, 94 speakers representing 180 countries reaffirmed their commitment to the R2P principles, with only four seeking to roll back what states had adopted in the 2005 General Assembly statement. See "General Debate of the 63rd Session of the General Assembly," September 2008; and Global Centre for the Responsibility to Protect, "Implementing the Responsibility to Protect The 2009 General Assembly Debate: An Assessment," New York, Ralph Bunche Institute for International Studies, The CUNY Graduate Center August 2009.

Table 1: Definitions of Protection

Agency	Focus of approach to protection
ICRC	Safety, integrity and dignity. For the ICRC, protection, in its strictest sense, encompasses those activities aimed at obtaining full respect for the rights of the individual and of the obligations of the authorities/arms bearers in accordance with the letter and the spirit of international humanitarian law and other fundamental rules that protect persons in situations of violence. This includes activities aimed at preventing, putting an end to, and avoiding the recurrence of violations and human suffering, as well as activities aimed to mitigate human suffering and help people overcome the consequences of abuses. ¹⁹
UNHCR	A range of concrete activities that ensure that all women, men, girls and boys of concern to UNHCR have equal access to and enjoyment of their rights in accordance with international law. The ultimate goal of these activities is to help them rebuild their lives within a reasonable amount of time.
UNICEF	Freedom from violence, injury or abuse, neglect, maltreatment or exploitation.
OCHA	All activities aimed at ensuring full respect for the rights of the individual in accordance with international human rights law, international humanitarian law, and refugee law. A concept that encompasses all activities aimed at obtaining full respect for the rights of the individual in accordance with the letter and spirit of human rights, refugee and international humanitarian law. Protection involves creating an environment conducive to respect for human beings, preventing and/or alleviating the immediate effects of a specific pattern of abuse, and restoring dignified conditions of life through reparation, restitution and rehabilitation.
NRC (Norwegian Refugee Council)	Protection of refugees and IDPs involves protection of rights pursuant to internationally accepted conventions, principles and standards.
IRC	All activities aimed at ensuring full respect for the rights of the individual in accordance with the letter and spirit of the relevant bodies of law.
WFP	Protection programming is understood in terms of ‘safe and dignified programming’.
Oxfam	Protection is described as safety from violence, coercion and deliberate deprivation.
MSF-H	Protection is described as freedom from violence, abuse and deliberate neglect.
Save the Children	Protection is described as freedom from violence, injury or abuse, neglect, maltreatment or exploitation.

Source: Adapted from p. 13.

Scope and implications of UNSCR 1325

UNSCR 1325, as the cornerstone women, peace and security resolution, has implications in four interrelated areas: the participation of women in decision-making and peace-processes; the incorporation of gender perspectives and training in peacekeeping; the protection of women; and gender mainstreaming in UN reporting and implementation mechanisms.

The first four articles of UNSCR 1325 mandate member states and the Secretary-General to increase and ensure the participation of women at all levels of decision-making and peace-processes. They include an encouragement to ‘expand the role and contribution of women in United Nations field-based operations, and especially among

¹⁹ Angelo Gnaedinger, ‘Protection of civilians in conflict – the ICRC perspective’, address to the Humanitarian and Resident Coordinators’ Retreat, Geneva, 9 May 2007.

military observers, civilian police, human rights and humanitarian personnel', and to increase the 'representation of women at all levels in national, regional and international institutions and mechanisms for the prevention, management, and resolution of conflict.²⁰ Although the implications of this part of the resolution are clear and entail building a critical mass of women involved in decision-making and peace-processes, the lack of quotas for women's participation and appointments is problematic. Therefore, women's groups, as well as other NGOs, UN agencies and governments, must continue to monitor and lobby to ensure the inclusion and participation of women in these processes. The involvement of women in formal peace processes also has clear benefits, and Elisabeth Porter argues that these benefits are threefold. Firstly, peace processes ideally both resolve conflicts, and establish the conditions and foundations for just societies that take into account diverse perspectives – women's inclusion is essential to this. Secondly, women's involvement is a vital element of inclusive social justice. Thirdly, the involvement of women generally affects the range of issues addressed in policy and decision-making contexts, with issues of health, education, nutrition, childcare and human security brought to the table when they might otherwise have been overlooked.²¹ Despite playing these important roles, women often remain excluded from official processes and negotiations.²² For instance, women were altogether absent from the Peace Negotiations of Darfur that took place in Abuja, Nigeria, and were only marginally involved in the Sudanese North-South Peace Negotiations in 2005.²³ On the other hand, the Afghan Women's Summit was an influential player in the peace and reconstruction process in Afghanistan, and women were included as Observers in the Liberian peace negotiations, illustrating some international commitment to the ideal of

²⁰"S/RES/1325 (2000)," 31 October 2000, Articles 1-4.

²¹ Elisabeth Porter, *Women and security: 'You cannot dance if you cannot stand'* (OpenDemocracy, September 2005 [cited 19/5/2008]; available from http://www.opendemocracy.net/democracy-resolution_1325/dance_2937.jsp (accessed 19/5/2008), pp. 2-3.

²²Elisabeth Rehn and Ellen Johnson Sirleaf, "Women, War, Peace: The Independent Experts' Assessment on the Impact of Armed Conflict on Women and Women's Role in Peace-Building (Progress of the World's Women 2002, Vol.1, Executive Summary)," New York, United Nations Development Fund for Women, 2002, pp. 19-20.

²³ United Nations, "Facts and Figures on Women, Peace and Security," New York, United Nations Department of Public Information, 2005, p.6.

ensuring equal participation of the sexes in peace processes.²⁴ However, it is important to note that the most recent available statistical analyses show that, as of April 2008, while women accounted for approximately 30 percent of international civilian staff in UN peace operations, only 10 percent of high-level management positions were occupied by women, and only 1.9 percent of military personnel were women, with no military forces led by a women. Further, women constituted only 7.3 percent of UN police, and only 19.6 percent of nationally recruited civilian staff (mostly in service and clerical posts at the lowest grade).²⁵ This shows that a great deal of work remains to ensure the full implementation of UNSCR 1325 in relation to the participation of women in decision-making and peace processes.

The second part of the resolution addresses the importance of incorporating gender perspectives and training into peacekeeping operations, expressing UNSC 'willingness to incorporate a gender perspective into peacekeeping operations' and urging 'the Secretary-General to ensure that, where appropriate, field operations include a gender component'.²⁶ 1325 goes on to mandate that the Secretary-General provide training guidelines and materials on gender issues to Member States, and ask that all military, police and civilian personnel in peacekeeping operations receive this training, as well as HIV/AIDS awareness training. It 'urges' Member States to increase their support for gender-sensitive training efforts, and '[c]alls on all actors involved, when negotiating and implementing peace agreements, to adopt a gender perspective'.²⁷

The UNSC's acknowledgement of the importance of incorporating gender perspectives and gender components into peacekeeping operations has significant implications for establishing gender equality as a cornerstone of all interventions;

²⁴ For a discussion of the role of the Afghan Women's Summit in the Afghan peace and reconstruction process, see Jessica Neuwirth, "Women and Peace and Security: The Implementation of U.N Security Council Resolution 1325" *Duke Journal of Gender Law & Policy*, Vol. 9, Summer 2002, pp. 253-61.

²⁵ Camille Pampell Conaway and Jolynn Shoemaker, "Women in United Nations Peace Operations: Increasing the Leadership Opportunities," Washington D.C., Women in International Security, Georgetown University, July 2008, p. 23.

²⁶ "S/RES/1325 (2000)," Article 5.

²⁷ "S/RES/1325 (2000)," Articles 7-8.

however, the weak language may undermine the implementation of this article. It is telling that in 2005 less than 10 percent of Security Council resolutions adopted made reference to UNSCR 1325, whereas by 2009 80 percent of them did.²⁸ This demonstrates that, although progress was initially slow, there has been a greater recognition of the importance of building women, peace and security clauses into Security Council resolutions. However, it is obvious that simply incorporating gender language into a resolution is not enough to ensure gender issues are effectively and comprehensively addressed – but it is nevertheless a positive step in that it demonstrates increasing willingness on the part of states to keep these ‘soft security’ issues on the Council’s agenda. In terms of practical steps to incorporate gender perspectives in peace operations, there has been progress through the establishment of gender offices within peace operations, and five years after the resolution’s adoption, more than half of the UN’s peacekeeping and political missions had a full-time gender advisor, and those that did not, had Gender Focal Points.²⁹ Since 2005, the number of missions with gender advisors has continued to rise.³⁰ However, some analysts argue that the gender mandates contained in mission mandates are not adequately reflected in the operational directives and Terms of Reference produced by the UNSC, showing again the disjunct between rhetoric and action in implementing resolutions like UNSCR 1325.³¹ Another challenge to the implementation of this part of the UNSCR 1325 is the lack of Member State commitment to provide funds for gender and HIV/AIDS awareness training for

²⁸ NGO Working Group on Women, Peace and Security, "Accountability for Implementing Security Council Resolution 1325," in *NGO Working Group on Women, Peace and Security Issue Brief*, New York, NGO Working Group on Women, Peace and Security, October 2007, p. 4; and Maria Butler et al., "Women, Peace, and Security Handbook: Compilation and Analysis of United Nations Security Council Resolution Language 2000-2010," New York, The PeaceWomen Project of Women's International League for Peace and Freedom, October 2010, p. 7.

²⁹ Missions with a full-time gender advisor included UNAMA in Afghanistan, ONUB in Burundi, ONUCI in Côte d'Ivoire, MONUC in the DRC, MINUSTAH in Haiti, UNMIK in Kosovo, MUMIL in Liberia, UNAMSIL in Sierra Leone, UNMIS in Sudan and UNOTIL in Timor-Leste. See United Nations, "Facts and Figures on Women, Peace and Security," p. 3.

³⁰ Butler et al., "Women, Peace, and Security Handbook: Compilation and Analysis of United Nations Security Council Resolution Language 2000-2010," p. 21.

³¹ See NGO Working Group on Women, Peace and Security, "Accountability for Implementing Security Council Resolution 1325," p. 4.

operation personnel, although some states, such as Canada and the UK, have begun to provide such training to their peacekeepers.³²

UNSCR 1325 also has major implications for the protection of women in conflict zones and during humanitarian interventions. It '[c]alls upon all parties to armed conflict to respect fully international law applicable to the rights and protection of women and girls, especially as civilians,' and 'to take special measures to protect women and girls from gender-based violence ..., and all other forms of violence in situations of armed conflict'.³³ The resolution also calls for Member States to end impunity for genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes, including those relating to SGBV, and 'stresses the need to exclude these crimes ... from amnesty provisions.'³⁴ It goes on to encourage actors to take into account the different needs of women and men in refugee camps and during disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration (DDR) processes, and to commit the UNSC to ensuring that gender considerations are taken into account when mandating peacekeeping missions, in consultation with women's groups.

A major implication of this part of UNSCR 1325 is that all actors can be held accountable for crimes against women during conflicts and peace processes. The concurrent problem is that ensuring accountability is difficult in the absence of an effective monitoring mechanism, such as the Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women, or the accountability tools established in UNSCR 1612 (2005) on Children and Armed Conflict. These include leadership, mandate reform, incentives, monitoring and reporting mechanisms, and a compliance regime.³⁵ The accountability deficit inherent in UNSCR 1325 can potentially be mitigated at least in part by the full and proper implementation of UNSCR 1820, which has stronger accountability measures, including provisions for regular and systematic reporting on the issue of sexual violence in conflict contexts. Despite the fact that accountability

³² Naraghi-Anderlini, *Women, Peace and Security: A Policy Audit*, p. 41.

³³ "S/RES/1325 (2000)," Articles 9-10.

³⁴ "S/RES/1325 (2000)," Article 11.

³⁵ UNIFEM, "Progress of the World's Women 2008/08: Who Answers to Women? Gender and Accountability," New York, UNIFEM, 2008, pp. 98-100.

mechanisms are not explicitly set out in UNSCR 1325, some accountability structures have been developed in response to the resolution, such as Gender Focal Points. These have been established in all peacekeeping operations to facilitate the receipt of complaints of sexual abuse and exploitation by peacekeeping forces.³⁶ This is an important move to address the problem of organized prostitution that often arises in response to a major military presence in conflict zones. It has been bolstered by the Secretary-General's directive on sexual exploitation and abuse, which established a zero-tolerance policy applying to all personnel in peacekeeping operations,³⁷ and the training on sexual exploitation and abuse that is now compulsory for all operation personnel.³⁸ That said, comprehensive research evaluating the effectiveness of such training has not yet been carried out, and training seems to be targeted particularly at the officer level, which may mean that rank-and-file soldiers are not adequately trained in these issues. This is an area that deserves further investigation. Ending impunity for war crimes and SGBV against women is an important step in elevating women's rights to an integral aspect of sustainable peace. As Ellen Johnson Sirleaf argues,

accountability on the part of states and societies for crimes against women means more than just punishing perpetrators. It means establishing the rule of law and a just social and political order. Without this, there can be no lasting peace. Impunity weakens the foundation of societies emerging from conflict by legitimising violence and inequality. It prolongs instability and injustice and exposes women to the threats of renewed conflict.³⁹

The resolution also has significant implications for DDR and security sector reform (SSR) processes, which are 'encouraged' to adopt gender-perspectives. DDR and SSR processes have a poor track record of gender inclusivity and responsiveness. For instance, although gender was effectively mainstreamed during the DDR in Liberia

³⁶ United Nations, "Facts and Figures on Women, Peace and Security," p. 3.

³⁷ *Secretary-General's Bulletin on Special Measures for Protection from Sexual Exploitation and Sexual Abuse*, ST/SGB/2003/13, .

³⁸ Pampell Conaway and Shoemaker, "Women in United Nations Peace Operations: Increasing the Leadership Opportunities," pp. 21-22.

³⁹ Ellen Johnson Sirleaf, "United Nations Security Council Resolution 1325: What are the Challenges" (paper presented at the Wilton Park Conference, London, May 30, 2006).

(2003-06), where 24 percent of the demobilized forces were women, it was sidelined in many other interventions, such as in Eritrea (2003), where women made up 30 percent of the People's Liberation Front, but constituted only 17 percent of combatants demobilized.⁴⁰ The consequences of excluding women from DDR can be severe. As Dan Smith shows, the influx of cash and opportunities for men as a result of gender-blind DDR is coupled with a comparative lack of money and opportunities for women, which can result in increased prostitution, urbanization and criminality.⁴¹ A serious repercussion of this may be increased HIV-infection rates. The final implication of this third part of the resolution is that women's groups are recognised as important and legitimate participants in the planning process of UNSC missions, and the UNSC undertakes to consult them as necessary.

UNSCR 1325 addresses gender mainstreaming in UN reporting and implementation mechanisms in its final two articles. Firstly, the Council requested that the Secretary-General carry out a study 'on the impact of armed conflict on women and girls, the role of women in peace-building and the gender dimensions of peace processes and conflict resolution'. This resulted in the publication in 2002 of the 'Report of the Secretary-General on Women, Peace and Security', and the study *Women, Peace and Security*.⁴² Lastly, UNSCR 1325 mandates that gender be mainstreamed in reports on peacekeeping missions and other issues relating to women and girls. This mainstreaming is largely the Secretary-General's responsibility, and implies that reports on peacekeeping missions will be disaggregated by gender as necessary to track progress on achieving gender equality. This is important, but risks undermining reporting quality unless adequate resources are invested in supporting consultations and data-collection processes.

⁴⁰ United Nations, "Facts and Figures on Women, Peace and Security," p. 5.

⁴¹ Dan Smith, "Why SCR 1325 and gender matter" (paper presented at the GAPS Conference: Involving Men in the Implementation of UN Security Council Resolution 1325 on Women, Peace and Security, London, March 13, 2007) 2007, 2007, 2007, 2007, pp. 7-8.

⁴² United Nations Secretary General, *Women, Peace and Security: Study submitted by the Secretary-General pursuant to Security Council resolution 1325 (2000)*, and United Nations Secretary-General, "Report of the Secretary-General on Women, Peace and Security", S/2002/1154, New York, October 2002.

Challenges to implementation

As a policy with such broad scope and wide ranging implications, it is unsurprising that there are numerous challenges and impediments to the comprehensive implementation of UNSCR 1325. Perhaps the most daunting obstacle to successfully implementing UNSCR 1325 is the lack of political will to do so, given that implementation would 'fundamentally shift the gendered distribution of power' in peace processes.⁴³ The history of the women's movement and the development of the international legal regime around women's rights illustrate all too well the fact that states are often willing to pay lip-service to ideas of women's rights, gender equality, gender mainstreaming and protection, but are loath to commit the financial, human and logistical resources necessary to addressing them. As Stephen Lewis argues, '[t]he paucity of progress following global meetings ... has little to do with the women; it has everything to do with the monolithic walls of male authority, and how indescribably tough it is to bring those walls down.'⁴⁴ As indicated earlier, this lack of political will is not unique to the implementation of UNSCR 1325, but a common challenge facing the implementation of many 'soft security' normative principles including R2P and human security more broadly. Further, weak political will is compounded by the absence of enforcement or monitoring mechanisms. It is a false hope to assume that a resolution alone is enough to achieve behavioural changes as broad as those implied by UNSCR 1325, highlighting the need for relevant policy changes and implementation systems at national level to systematise compliance with adopted norms. This may not be possible in the case of many 'soft security' norms such as human security, which require deeper shifts in states' international policy and engagement. However, given that UNSCR 1325 has some very specific implications for how states engage in peace process, there is clear scope for the operationalisation of those principles through the development of overarching policy frameworks. An added benefit of National Action Plans (NAPs) is that it is possible to influence other states' action and compel compliance through norm

⁴³ Carol Cohn, "Feminist peacemaking," *The Women's Review of Books*, Vol. XXI, No. 5, Feb 2004p. 8.

⁴⁴ Stephen Lewis, *Race Against Time: Searching for Hope in AIDS-Ravaged Africa*, Melbourne, The Text Publishing Company, 2005 p. 115.

consolidation, and so the more states develop NAPs, the harder it is for other nations to act outside the norms created without being held to account, or at least subject to some normative pressure. Unfortunately, the limited understanding of the importance of gender perspectives in establishing sustainable peace and security, and the gender dimensions of complex humanitarian emergencies, means that fostering this groundswell of implementation pressure for UNSCR 1325 will remain a challenge.⁴⁵

Another major challenge to the implementation of UNSCR 1325 is poverty, and particularly the feminization of poverty. Sirleaf argues that '[a]s conflict escalates, the patterns of discrimination against women tend to become exacerbated. Consequently, women become more susceptible to the marginalisation and sufferings that are engendered by armed conflict.'⁴⁶ This increases the socio-economic inequities between genders, which is described as the feminization of poverty. To achieve sustainable peace and security, it is therefore necessary to address the social structures that institutionalise asymmetries between men and women. This necessitates an international move to transform structures and conditions resultant of a history of male domination, and feeds into much broader human security, social justice and development agendas. While it is important to recognise that UNSCR 1325 is couched in these much broader arenas of action, it is also necessary to recognise the distinct importance of pursuing the implementation of the Resolution's provisions even in the absence of broader action, given the immediate effects it can have on women's empowerment in peace processes and the sustainability of those processes in the longer term.

Another challenge to the implementation of UNSCR 1325 in its mandate for the protection of women and girls in conflict zones from SGBV by peacekeeping personnel lies in the contradictory legal standards to which different military and police personnel are subject. If, for example, prostitution is legal in a soldier's home country, or SGBV is relatively un-stigmatised, it will be difficult to convince that soldier (and potentially his

⁴⁵ For a more detailed discussion of this, see NGO Working Group on Women, Peace and Security, "Accountability for Implementing Security Council Resolution 1325," p. 2.

⁴⁶ Sirleaf, "United Nations Security Council Resolution 1325: What are the Challenges", pp. 4-5.

superiors) of its unacceptability in a peacekeeping mission. There may also be differing standards among Troop Contributing Countries (TCCs) within the same mission. It is important to note here the overlap with other international legal standards and structures to which parties to armed conflict are subject, particularly the Geneva Conventions and the International Criminal Court (ICC). In the Rome Statute, war crimes include 'committing rape, sexual slavery, enforced prostitution, forced pregnancy ... enforced sterilization, or any other form of sexual violence also constituting a grave breach of the Geneva Conventions.'⁴⁷ Situating UNSCR 1325 and women's protection and rights within this broader framework may give it more weight in the minds of those responsible for implementing its provisions on the ground in peace operations.

Although UNSCR 1325 is a powerful and important addition to the international normative and legal frameworks around human security, it is problematic that many actors remain unaware of its existence.⁴⁸ Surprisingly, in the mainstream literature around humanitarian intervention and peacekeeping, UNSCR 1325 is rarely mentioned. Its advocates are, understandably, concentrated in the international women's movement, but it is imperative that they disseminate information to the wider population and the range civil society and social justice groups, and increase awareness of the importance and implications of the resolution. The tendency of the security sphere is to focus on traditional 'hard' security matters and concerns, and while it is clear that these will remain the dominant concerns in the security sector, there is a growing awareness of the interaction of 'soft' and 'hard' security concerns, which may create more space for issues like women, peace and security to be mainstreamed. Attracting the commitment of a wider range of actors will be key to securing the implementation of UNSCR 1325 at national level, and it is especially vital that men are involved in the advocacy for and implementation of UNSCR 1325. As Margaret Owen argues, the resolution is 'important for all aspects of conflict prevention, peace-building

⁴⁷ *Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court*, (1998), Article 8.

⁴⁸ Elisabeth Porter, *Peacebuilding: Women in International Perspective*, p. 19.

and post-conflict reconstruction, and men in the judiciary, policy making and the armed forces must be convinced of its relevance to their work.⁴⁹

The responsibility for the implementation of UNSCR 1325 lies with a collection of actors, but it is at the level of states that policy change must be achieved in order to systematise the implementation of UNSCR 1325, and it is to these actions that I now turn my attention.

PART 2: National Action Plans

As UNSCR 1325 is a binding but non-enforceable resolution, national governments can play an important role in ensuring adherence to the resolution by developing National Action Plans. However, where governments have not yet developed such plans, UNSCR 1325 provides civil society and other actors with a platform from which they can demand government accountability to the norms and responsibilities set out in UNSCR 1325, and lobby for the development of an NAP.

Friends of 1325 is a voluntary, ad hoc group of UN Member States that has been instrumental in advocating for the implementation of UNSCR 1325 at government level, and most of the initial states that developed NAPs (barring Spain, Iceland and Norway) belonged to the group. Australia is a member of this group, although, almost 11 years after the adoption of the resolution it has not yet committed to developing an NAP. Since Denmark's adoption of an NAP in June 2005, 24 states have developed and adopted NAPs on 1325. These are: Norway, Sweden, Cote d'Ivoire, Switzerland, Austria, Spain, the Netherlands, Iceland, Finland, Uganda, Liberia, Belgium, Portugal, Chile, Sierra Leone, the Philippines, Rwanda, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Nepal, Canada, Estonia, France and the United Kingdom. (It is important to note here that some countries are using alternative strategies to implement UNSCR

⁴⁹ Margaret Owen, "Chair's Introduction" (paper presented at the GAPS: Involving Men in the Implementation of UN Security Council Resolution 1325 on Women, Peace and Security, London, March 13, 2007) p. 7.

1325 at national level. For example, in place of developing an NAP on 1325, Fiji has opted to integrate the resolution's provisions into a broader gendered framework.⁵⁰⁾

A brief survey of existing NAPs indicates a number of trends in the processes by which they were developed and adopted. These were: (i) conducting gender audits to determine both the internal and external contexts of women, peace and security issues, and identify priority areas; (ii) establishing broad-based working groups or taskforces to guide and oversee the development of an NAP; (iii) establishing monitoring and accountability mechanisms, with defined goals and indicators; and (iv) the allocation of appropriate resources to facilitate the implementation of the plan.⁵¹ These processes benefit from the use of bottom-up strategies and integrated approaches, as the participation of all stakeholders is thereby ensured, thus increasing ownership and commitment to the achievement of the goals set out in the plan.⁵² Despite such trends, and the similarities between the plans themselves, it is important to recognise that an NAP's effectiveness is contingent on it being tailored to fit its specific country context.

NAPs on UNSCR 1325 vary greatly, in terms of development processes and content, but particularly in terms of monitoring and coordination frameworks. The scope of this paper is such that it would not be useful (or possible) to provide a detailed analysis of the variety and scope of the 25 NAPs on UNSCR 1325, but I will instead provide a more general discussion of the benefits and challenges of systematising the implementation of UNSCR 1325 through National Action Plans.

NAPs offer numerous benefits in terms of the implementation of UNSCR 1325, including increased comprehensiveness, coordination, policy coherence and consistency,

⁵⁰ For a detailed discussion of this, see NGO Working Group on Women Peace and Security, "From Global to Local: Making Peace Work for Women," New York, 2005, pp. 70-72.

⁵¹ For a detailed study of these trends, see NGO Working Group on Women Peace and Security, "From Local to Global," p. 51-52, and UN-INSTRAW, "Securing Equality, Engendering Peace: A Guide to Policy and Planning on Women, Peace and Security (UNSCR 1325)," Santo Domingo, 2006, pp. 28-51.

⁵² Camilla Sugden, "SCR 1325: National Implementation in Action" (paper presented at the Panel Discussion: Inclusive Security, Sustainable Peace: Tools for Action, Brussels, November 29, 2005), pp. 2-3.

awareness-raising, ownership, accountability, and monitoring and evaluation.⁵³ The major transformational element of an NAP is that it necessitates a complete gender rethink in relation to foreign and domestic policy. Critically, UNSCR 1325 and any related NAP are not simply 'add-ons' to policies addressing women, peace and security, but are themselves policies that require an overhaul of other policy and processes so as to integrate a gender analysis into them. This involves making gender considerations a priority in security policy. Denmark's experience illustrates this 'rethink', in that its NAP called for a study to be undertaken to examine Ministry of Defence documents and policies such as codes of conduct, rules of engagement, mandates, education and training frameworks, and gender-related tools, to determine the extent to which they promote gender balance in staff recruitment, the protection of women and girls in conflict contexts, and the participation and representation of women in peace building and reconstruction processes, and to promote gender mainstreaming. Based on that study, policies were revised to bring them in line with obligations under UNSCR 1325, and this process of mainstreaming UNSCR 1325 in military planning and policy processes was re-committed to in the revised NAP covering 2008-13.⁵⁴

Although action plans on women, peace and security can mainstream the implementation of UNSCR 1325, they do entail challenges of their own which, if not addressed, can undermine an NAP's effectiveness. Perhaps the most prominent challenge is that of monitoring the implementation of an NAP, an endeavour made even more difficult by the absence of measurable goals, benchmarks, and defined timeframes in a number of NAPs, including those of Finland, Iceland, Norway, Spain, Sweden, and Switzerland. Interestingly, while Denmark's initial 2005 NAP did not include any indicators or monitoring provisions, the revised policy released in 2008 explicitly acknowledged that the 2005 NAP 'was not monitored comprehensively', and concluded

⁵³ For a fuller discussion of some of these benefits, see UN-INSTRRAW, "Securing Equality, Engendering Peace," pp. 5-7.

⁵⁴ Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Denmark and the Ministry of Defence, "Denmark's Action Plan on implementation of Security Council Resolution 1325 on Women and Peace and Security," September 2005, p. 4 and Ministry of Foreign Affairs et al., "Denmark's National Action Plan for implementation of UN Security Council Resolution 1325 on Women, Peace and Security 2008-2013," 2008, pp. 14-15.

that systematic monitoring of NAP implementation through an inter-Ministerial working group would be a valuable component of the updated plan.⁵⁵ Similarly, while the UK's initial 'high level' NAP was only skeletal and did not include specific details of actions to be taken, responsible actors and monitoring mechanisms (although a non-public monitoring and accountability in UK was 'said to exist' for the plan⁵⁶), the revised NAP launched in November 2010 recognised the shortfalls of this approach and included detailed information about objectives, specific tasks to be undertaken, measuring mechanisms, and actors responsible.⁵⁷ Some states, including Austria, Cote d'Ivoire, Liberia, and the Netherlands, took a more comprehensive approach to their NAPs from the outset, including detailed information on specific activities, lines of responsibilities, baseline status, benchmarks, indicators and timelines. In fact, the Cote d'Ivoire NAP took it a step further than most, including a budget for its implementation for the period 2008-2012.⁵⁸

Where NAPs lack details of specific tasks and responsible actors, the implementation may be undermined by the broader challenge inherent in gender mainstreaming, which is that gender risks becoming everyone's issue, but no one's responsibility. By specifying actions and lines of responsibility within NAPs, this can be avoided. Similarly, where action plans fail to specify funding streams which will support their implementation, there is the possibility that actors will not voluntarily assume responsibility for funding the tasks mandated in the plan, thus undermining implementation.

The lack of political will to ensure the implementation of UNSCR 1325 compounds the challenges to the realisation of its mandates. This operates on two levels

⁵⁵ Ministry of Foreign Affairs et al., "Denmark's National Action Plan for implementation of UN Security Council Resolution 1325 on Women, Peace and Security 2008-2013," p. 11.

⁵⁶ A. Sherriff and K. Barnes, "Enhancing the EU response to women and armed conflict with particular reference to Development Policy," in *ECDPM Discussion Paper 84*, Maastricht, ECDPM, 2008, pp. 109-111.

⁵⁷ Foreign and Commonwealth Office, "UK Government National Action Plan on UNSCR 1325 Women, Peace & Security," 2010.

⁵⁸ Women and Social Affairs Ministry of the Family, "Cote d'Ivoire National Action Plan for the Implementation of Resolution 1325 of the Security Council (2008-2012)," 2007.

– firstly, the national level, where states must convert their rhetorical support for women, peace and security principles at the UN level, into concrete actions and policies at the national level, including through developing a comprehensive NAP. That, in the ten years following the adoption of UNSCR 1325, only 25 states have developed NAPs to systematise its implementation indicates this challenge of converting rhetorical commitment to normative principles into actual policy and action, which goes beyond the challenges around developing appropriately detailed NAPs. Australia is a good example of this reticence to systematically implement normative commitments, given that it has not yet developed an NAP on UNSCR 1325, despite supporting numerous civil society initiatives related to the resolution, highlighting its commitment to the protection of women and the principles of UNSCR 1325 in its current bid for a seat on the UNSC,⁵⁹ and despite being a member of *Friends of 1325*. Australia has been vocal in its support of the resolution and the need for states to take practical steps to ensure its implementation: every year on the October 31 anniversary of the adoption of the resolution, Australia has made a statement reiterating its support for the principles enshrined in the resolution, most recently at the 10th anniversary, where Australia stated that

while we recognise improvements in our united efforts to respond to the needs of women, and promote the role and voice of women, in post-conflict societies, further determined efforts are required. As we approach the tenth anniversary of resolution 1325, Australia recommits to this compelling objective.⁶⁰

⁵⁹ "Australia: Candidate for the United Nations Security Council 2013-14," Canberra, Commonwealth of Australia, 2010, pp. 19-20.

⁶⁰ Ambassador and Permanent Representative of Australia to the United Nations H.E. Mr. Gary Quinlan, "Statement to the UNSC Open Debate on Women, Peace and Security," 5 October 2009. For other examples, see: Ambassador and Permanent Representative of Australia to the United Nations H.E. Mr. John Dauth LVO, "UNSC Open Debate: Resolution 1325: "Women, Peace and Security"," 29 October 2003, Ambassador and Permanent Representative of Australia to the United Nations H.E. The Hon Robert Hill, "Statement to the UNSC Open Debate on Women, Peace and Security," 29 October 2008, and Deputy Permanent Representative of Australia to the United Nations H.E. Ms Frances Lisson, "Statement to the UNSC Open Debate on Women, Peace and Security," 23 October 2007.

Similar statements have been made at various other international forums, including the Commission on the Status of Women in 2004.⁶¹ However, the lack of an overarching policy framework to ensure the compliance of all relevant government actors and bodies to the principles of UNSCR 1325 means that the implementation of the resolutions mandates in practice has been haphazard – this will be demonstrated below through a discussion of Australia’s involvement in RAMSI. Further, while many positive steps have been taken, including through gender training programs for the Australian military and through increasing women’s participation in Australian contributions to peacekeeping and policing operations, the focus has not been put broadly on increasing women’s participation in decision making and peace processes, which is at the core of UNSCR 1325.⁶² In fact, there have been clear cases where women’s participation was actively prevented, such as in the Solomon Islands where RAMSI personnel prevented representatives from the National Council of Women from entering Parliament to participate in discussions there.⁶³

Secondly, once an NAP has been adopted, actors (such as particular ministries or defence forces) may lack the will to comprehensively implement it as it relates to them – a problem compounded when defined goals and monitoring mechanisms are absent. This challenge is linked to the fact that there is a resistance to the importance of gender perspectives in relation to traditionally ‘realist’ policy arenas, such as security policy. Military actors may not understand the gender dimensions of complex conflicts and humanitarian emergencies, and in such situations, effective implementation of principles such as those enshrined in UNSCR 1325 often comes down to the discretion and commitment of individual military commanders. This presents a particular challenge in relation to women, peace and security principles, as gender training material often presents a more emotional than intellectual challenge to stakeholders. As

⁶¹ Kerry Flanagan, "Statement of Australia to the 48th Session of the Commission on the Status of Women," 4 March 2004.

⁶² For a discussion of these issues, see WILPF Australia, "Statement by the Australian Section of WILPF as input for the WomenSpeak consortium in preparation for CSW 2008," 2008, pp. 1-2.

⁶³ femTALK, "Special femTALK 1325 Report on the Solomon Islands Situation," femLINK Pacific, 23 April 2006, p. 1.

Mackay argues, gender training 'strikes at the core of everyone's being, male or female, because it is about beliefs, values, practices, expectations and attitudes... [and] long-held assumptions are likely to be challenged.'⁶⁴ That effective implementation is dependent on individual actors' commitment to the ideals behind UNSCR 1325 is a challenge not confined to the defence forces. It is pertinent that the UK's Department for International Development's (DFID) Draft Conflict Policy Paper of November 2006, which was developed after the adoption of the first UK NAP on UNSCR 1325, only referred to gender or UNSCR 1325 after the inclusion of such statements was strongly advocated for by Women's International League for Peace and Freedom, despite the fact that DFID played a significant role in the development of the NAP and was required by the plan to incorporate gender perspectives into policy and decision making.⁶⁵ This disjunct between high-level commitment to principles and their 'on the ground' implementation again highlights the importance of getting relevant bodies and actors to recognise the relevance of NAPs, which can be fostered by participatory, bottom-up processes that engage all stakeholders and foster ownership of the plans, rather than impose them from above.⁶⁶ The development of the UK NAP happened in the absence of broad stakeholder consultations due to resourcing constraints, and analysts predicted from the start that this would undermine implementation and ownership of the plan in the short- to medium-terms.⁶⁷ Further, there was also criticism that the process of cross-departmental communication during the NAP's development, particularly between the Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO), DFID and the Ministry of Defence, lacked

⁶⁴ Angela Mackay, "Training the uniforms: gender and peacekeeping operations," *Development in Practice*, Vol. 13, No. 2/3, May 2003, p. 220.

⁶⁵ WILPF UK, *WILPF's Response to DFID's Draft Conflict Policy Paper, November 2006* (November 2006 [cited 6 June 2008]); available from http://www.peacewomen.org/national/WILPF_DFID_06.pdf.

⁶⁶ See Di Zetlin, "Discussion Paper: Developing a National Action Plan on United Nations Security Council Resolution 1325," Canberra, Women's International League for Peace and Freedom (Australian Section), 2009, p. 26; and Kristin Valasek, "Securing Equality, Engendering Peace: A guide to policy and planning on women, peace and security (UNSCR 1325)," Santo Domingo, UN-INSTRAW, 2006.

⁶⁷ Amy Barrow, "Overview and Analysis of the UK Government's Action Plan for the Implementation of UN Security Council Resolution 1325" (paper presented at the Roadmap to 1325 Conference, Berlin, May 2007), p. 2.

transparency, which is another factor that undermined the NAPs effectiveness.⁶⁸ Interestingly, many of these weaknesses in the UK model were recognised and addressed in the revision of the NAP in 2010, which was a more comprehensive cross-government policy aimed at '[integrating UNSCR 1325] into wider defence, diplomacy and development measures adopted in armed conflict and post-conflict situations.'⁶⁹

This raises the related issue of coordination between different government actors to ensure policy and programmatic coherence across departments. For example, although the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA) is mandated to be guided by gender awareness in its development programming, it does not require its contractors to have codes of conduct that address gender-based violence.⁷⁰ This is linked to the issue discussed earlier of UNSCR 1325 and related NAPs being considered 'add-ons' to existing policies and processes, and further highlights the importance of situating an NAP within a broader strategy around poverty reduction, human rights, and economic and social sustainability.

One significant concern in the discourse around the effectiveness of NAPs is that such plans may be seen as tools of developed countries, which hold little meaning for developing or conflict-affected states.⁷¹ There were concerns that this North/South divide may create friction between actors lobbying for the implementation of UNSCR 1325 by national governments. However, that more than one third of the states with NAPs are conflict-affected states would suggest that this has not been the case, and that there is an understanding of the different benefits NAPs can offer to states in the post-conflict peace consolidation phase. Given the very different contexts of conflict and non-

⁶⁸ Amy Barrow, "Paying Lip Service? The Application of Gender-Mainstreaming Policies in a Peace and Security Context" (paper presented at the ISA's 49th Annual Convention: Bridging Multiple Divides, San Francisco March 2008), p. 25.

⁶⁹ Foreign and Commonwealth Office, "UK Government National Action Plan on UNSCR 1325 Women, Peace & Security," p. 7.

⁷⁰ Jackie Kirk and Suzanne Taylor, "Ending Violence Against Women and Girls in Conflict Contexts: Canadian Efforts and Experiences," *Canadian Women's Studies*, Vol. 25, No. 1/2, Winter/Spring 2006, p. 144.

⁷¹ For a fuller discussion of this, see Barrow, "Paying Lip Service? The Application of Gender-Mainstreaming Policies in a Peace and Security Context" pp. 22-23; and Barrow, "Overview and Analysis of the UK Government's Action Plan for the Implementation of UN Security Council Resolution 1325"

conflict states, it is unsurprising that a brief survey of the NAPs of conflict affected countries (Nepal, DRC, Rwanda, Bosnia-Herzegovina, the Philippines, Sierra Leone, Liberia, Uganda and the Cote d'Ivoire) shows that their emphasis is on the promotion of women's participation in political and post-conflict recovery processes, and the protection of women and girls from SGBV during and after armed violence. In contrast, the emphasis of developed countries tends to be more on the inclusion of gender perspectives and increasing women's participation in peacekeeping and policing operations.

This overview of national-level efforts to implement UNSCR 1325 suggests that there exist a range of opportunities and challenges presented by the adoption of an NAP. However, while the existence of an NAP can facilitate the comprehensive and coordinated implementation of UNSCR 1325, there is scope for governments to engage in activities that implement the resolution in the absence of an NAP. For instance, before developing an NAP, Canada provided funding to the ICC to ensure that a gender component is included in training judicial officers, and, in partnership with the UK, developed a set of gender-training materials for military and civilian police personnel deployed in peace operations.⁷² In Denmark, the Defence Command has a standing policy of issuing individual gender-based directives for each international military operation. For example, the rules of engagement for the Danish army in Iraq made it obligatory for soldiers to use force 'when confronted with grave criminal acts such as rape and human trafficking.'⁷³ Australia is also engaged in activities to implement UNSCR 1325, despite not yet having developed an NAP on the resolution. According to statements made to the open debates on Women, Peace and Security at the UNSC, Australian government has, to date, deployed female soldiers to peace operations and engaged women in truce monitoring missions. It has also incorporated a gender-training module into the pre-deployment training for peacekeepers, and has supported

⁷² Kirk and Taylor, "Ending Violence Against Women and Girls in Conflict Contexts: Canadian Efforts and Experiences," Vol., , p. 4; and Mackay, "Training the uniforms: gender and peacekeeping operations," Vol., , pp. 217-18.

⁷³ NGO Working Group on Women Peace and Security, "From Local to Global," p. 61.

women's organizations in the Asia-Pacific region. This has included an AusAID funded program in the Solomon Islands, PNG and Fiji, which was designed to 'train key civil and governmental representatives on the importance of UNSCR 1325, and translate UNSCR 1325 into local languages.'⁷⁴ However, while this is a promising start for Australia's implementation of UNSCR 1325 both within Australia and in terms of Australia's engagements in the international arena, it is problematic that actions are focused primarily on military engagement, and do not address inequitable gender relations on the ground in conflict and peace-building contexts. Further, until an Australian NAP is created to explicitly mandate and guide relevant actors to implement UNSCR 1325 in their every-day activities, the implementation of the resolution will continue on an ad hoc and uncoordinated basis. This is not consistent with Australia's various public statements of support for the resolution's comprehensive implementation, which emphasize the 'need to focus on practical steps to give effect to Resolution 1325', and reaffirm that 'Australia stands ready to do its part' in relation to such steps.⁷⁵

⁷⁴ *Statement by H.E. Mr. Robert G. Aisi, Ambassador/Permanent Representative, Permanent Mission of Papua New Guinea to the United Nations at the Security Council, on Behalf of the Pacific Islands Forum Group on Women Peace and Security*, (October 26, 2006 [cited 7/7/2008]; available from <http://www.forumsec.org.fj/pages.cfm/newsroom/speeches/speeches-2006/pif-statement-united-nations-on-women-peace-security.html>.)

⁷⁵ *Statement by H.E. Mr John Dauth LVO, Ambassador and Permanent Representative of Australia to the United Nations Security Council Open Debate on Women, Peace and Security*, (October 29, 2003 [cited 7/7/2008]; available from <http://www.peacewomen.org/un/SCOpenDebate2003/Australia2003.pdf>.)

PART 3: The RAMSI intervention in the Solomon Islands and Australia's adherence to UNSCR 1325

Australia's engagement in peacekeeping, particularly in the RAMSI intervention highlights some of these shortcomings. Before looking specifically at the case of RAMSI, which does not fall under the auspices of the UN, it is useful to look briefly at the ways in which UNSCR 1325 implementation is being implemented more broadly in UN peace operations.

As discussed earlier, and in terms of actions to be taken by the UN specifically as related to UN peacekeeping operations, the establishment of gender advisors and gender focal points within peacekeeping forces has been a key element of the UN's implementation of UNSCR 1325. The UN Transitional Administration in East Timor (UNTAET) was the first UN peacekeeping mission to establish a Gender Affairs Unit (GAU), which focused on mainstreaming gender perspectives into policies, programmes and legislation in the Transitional Administration.⁷⁶ It was also the first time that the UNSC called for the inclusion of personnel with 'appropriate training in international humanitarian, human rights and refugee law, including child and gender related provisions' in a mission mandate.⁷⁷ However, although there was some success in mainstreaming gender during UNTAET, some commentators question the extent to which it can be attributed to the GAU's efforts. For instance, Hilary Charlesworth and Mary Woods suggest that 'UNTAET's achievements relating to gender appear to be largely the products of uncoordinated pressures', and that its 'goals and achievements relating to sexual equality do not derive from an overall master plan.'⁷⁸ It is also problematic that, although 33 percent of UNTAET's civilian personnel were women, women accounted for only 11 percent of East Timorese staff, 4 percent of the civilian

⁷⁶ UNTAET, "Fact Sheet 11: Gender Equality Promotion," Dili, UNTAET Press Office, April 2002, p. 1.

⁷⁷ *Security Council Resolution 1272 on the Situation in East Timor*, (1999), Article 15. See also Hilary Charlesworth and Mary Wood, "Women and Human Rights in the Rebuilding of East Timor," *Nordic Journal of International Law*, Vol., No. 71, 2002, p. 329.

⁷⁸ Charlesworth and Wood, "Women and Human Rights in the Rebuilding of East Timor," p. 342,

police, and 2.4 percent of military peacekeeping personnel.⁷⁹ This shows that the presence of units dedicated to addressing gender issues does not guarantee effective gender mainstreaming, and highlights the importance of maintaining advocacy around gender issues even within UN missions.

The training of all peacekeeping personnel on gender issues is also a major way in which the UN implements UNSCR 1325. However, although training materials exist, such as the training pack *Gender and Peace Support Operations*, developed by Canada and the UK, it remains the prerogative of each TCC to decide whether their troops receive gender training. The issue of uneven training standards across country contingents has undermined the effectiveness of numerous peacekeeping missions, and consequently, there have been calls for 'lead nations' in missions to establish a set of minimum training requirements for incoming contingents, of which gender training could be one component.⁸⁰ This said, there has been some progress in training personnel on gender issues in peacekeeping operations, and the Office of the Gender Advisor (OGA) or a similar actor generally coordinates this. For instance, the OGA in the UN Mission in Liberia (UNMIL) developed a strategy for the implementation of UNSCR 1325, at the request of the Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO). This strategy encompassed the training and capacity building of all UNMIL personnel, monitoring and evaluating the implementation of UNSCR 1325, achieving a gender balance among personnel and beneficiaries, ensuring gender sensitive budgeting, and developing a UN Country Team 1325 Strategy.⁸¹ Strategies such as this will be essential in facilitating the implementation of UNSCR 1325 as it relates to the UN's peacekeeping function. The *Aide Memoire For the Consideration of Issues Pertaining to the Protection of Civilians* is an additional resource that the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) developed to guide relevant UN actors to ensure that the protection needs and

⁷⁹ Charlesworth and Wood, "Women and Human Rights in the Rebuilding of East Timor," p. 344.

⁸⁰ A number of senior Australian officers in UNTAET suggested this. See Mackay, "Training the uniforms: gender and peacekeeping operations," p. 220.

⁸¹ Office of Gender Advisor (UNMIL), *Strategy for the implementation of UNSCR 1325* ([cited 18 August 2008]); available from unmil.org/documents/Strategy_for_Implementation_of_SCR_1325.pdf

rights of civilians are addressed in resolutions, peacekeeping mandates, and peacekeeping operations.⁸² UNSCR 1325 is heavily referenced in this diagnostic tool.

These questions of how to ensure compliance with UNSCR 1325's mandates apply equally to Australia, and the case of the Australian-led Regional Assistance Mission to the Solomon Islands (RAMSI), discussed below, clearly shows that verbal commitments alone are not enough to ensure policy compliance with Australia's international obligations under UNSCR 1325, especially in missions that bring together a range of actors with differentiated but inter-linked responsibilities, including the military, police forces, and civilian units. Although Australian actions as part of RAMSI and the bilateral aid program have sometimes addressed gender, they have fallen short of the resolution's mandates around ensuring women's participation in decision-making and peace processes, incorporating gender perspectives and training in peace processes, and the protection of women.

One of the major problems has been that there is no overarching policy framework to systematise the implementation of the resolution. Thus, while some actors such as AusAID have individually recognised the importance of women's engagement in conflict resolution and peace building,⁸³ this has not translated into their meaningful engagement during the conflict resolution and peace building process in the Solomon Islands. In fact, women were excluded entirely from the negotiations in Townsville that brought peace to the Solomon Islands, remained excluded from decision-making processes after the conflict, and, their long-term experience in peace making in the Solomons was not drawn on by RAMSI at all.⁸⁴ This is despite the fact that women and women's groups played a very central role in peace-making in the lead up to the RAMSI

⁸² OCHA, "Aide Memoire For the Consideration of Issues Pertaining to the Protection of Civilians," New York, Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, Policy Development Studies Branch, 2004.

⁸³ AusAID, "Gender Equality: Annual thematic performance report 2006-07," Canberra, 2007, p. 24 and AusAID, "AusAID Peace, Conflict and Development Policy," ed. DFAT, Canberra, June 2002, pp. 9 & 12.

⁸⁴ Hilary Charlesworth, "Are women peaceful? Reflections on the roles of women in peacebuilding," *Feminist Legal Studies*, Vol. 16, No. 3, December 2008, and H Leslie, "Gendering conflict and conflict management in the Solomon Islands," *Development Bulletin*, No. 60, 2002, p. 13.

intervention, ranging from local peace-building initiatives within their communities, to more coordinated action through the Women for Peace Group, which interposed itself between the militia groups in a bid to stop the violence, and worked with both the militias and the government to resolve the conflict in 2000.⁸⁵ The incident mentioned earlier, in which women from the National Council of Women (NCW) were prevented by Australian RAMSI personnel from entering Parliament to participate in discussions about how to end the armed violence further demonstrates the fact that despite rhetoric to the contrary, Australia did not in fact actively support women's participation in the peace process in the Solomon Islands. This marginalisation has been compounded by the fact that women have not been elected to the Parliament since the conflict, despite the efforts of programs such as RAMSI's Machinery of Government Program, which has attempted to advance the status of women in government. This is not to suggest that the poor representation of women in government in the Solomon Islands is Australia's fault – rather it is due to a wide range of cultural and social pressures that motivate voters to elect men to positions of power⁸⁶ - but it is important to note the contradiction between Australia's promotion through AusAID programming of women's participation in government, while Australia, through RAMSI, actively excluded women from other arenas of the peace process. In fact, a March 2004 Report by a visiting Australian Parliamentary delegation to the Solomon Islands found that Australian funded support of peace building and reconstruction did not demonstrate the critical role AusAID had pledged to give women in such activities.⁸⁷

In terms of mainstreaming gender perspectives in RAMSI's actions, a gender advisor role within RAMSI was first established in 2009, six years after the Townsville

⁸⁵ See: Evelyn Thugea, "Rebuilding the Solomon Islands: A Woman's Perspective," Vol. , , p. 2; Elsinia Wainwright, "Women are the Peacemakers," *Focus*, Vol. 19, No. 2, September 2004, p. 31; and Carol Nelson, "Women and Disarmament: What can be learnt from conflicts in Solomon Islands, Bougainville and PNG?," in *In the Right Hands Seminar*, 2006, p. 2.

⁸⁶ For evidence of these, see ANU Enterprise, "People's Survey 2008," Honiara, Regional Assistance Mission to the Solomon Islands, August 2008, p. 17.

⁸⁷ Defence and Trade Joint Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs, "Report of the Parliamentary Delegation to the Solomon Islands," Canberra, The Parliament of the Commonwealth of Australia, March 2004, p. 14

Agreement of July 2003 established RAMSI. Although this is obviously a good step forward, the fact that it took so long to establish this position in a context where gender and SGBV were such central issues in the conflict, highlights the low priority gender has in 'hard' security oriented operations such as RAMSI. In terms of the NGO rollout of development assistance post-conflict, AusAID established a gender working group to ensure a 'gender-proactive environment among AusAID and RAMSI-supported initiatives.'⁸⁸ However an Amnesty International study from late 2004 concluded that 'many measures [of donor funded assistance to rehabilitate the Solomon Islands] pay little more than lip-service to the specific human rights protection needs of women and girls, favouring men's economic opportunities.'⁸⁹ That these specific needs were not given adequate attention in the immediate post-conflict years may undermine longer-term peace consolidation and indicates again the gap between rhetoric and action around women's protection and rights. More recently, research by Jennifer Corrin suggested that 'in spite of the fact that most aid donors and relief organisations have policies on women, there is evidence of a failure to consult them and to accommodate their needs in the post-conflict rebuilding process.'⁹⁰ Oxfam research on RAMSI's engagement with and consultation of women's groups corroborates this conclusion, revealing that while there were some informal interactions between RAMSI personnel and the communities, and one of the women police officers deployed early in RAMSI made an effort to seek out and speak to the Provincial Council of Women, when focus groups were asked how RAMSI had engaged with women's knowledge and experience of conflict resolution, used their networks to reach women, or addressed women's issues in the Solomon Islands, they responded 'they haven't.'⁹¹ This is a significant breach of the responsibilities under UNSCR 1325 to include women at all levels of decision-making and peace processes, and highlights the need to bind actors to engaging women

⁸⁸ Defence and Trade Senate Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs, "Inquiry into Australia's involvement in Peacekeeping," Canberra, 24 August 2007, p. 4.

⁸⁹ "Solomon Islands: Women Confronting Violence," London, Amnesty International 2004, p. 5.

⁹⁰ Jennifer Corrin, "Ples Bilong Mere: Law, Gender and Peace-Building in Solomon Islands," *Feminist Legal Studies*, Vol. 16, No. 2, August 2008

⁹¹ Nic Maclellan et al., "Bridging the gap between state and society: New directions for the Solomon Islands," Melbourne, Oxfam Australia, 2006, p. 24.

through overarching policies. In the absence of such policies, as well as monitoring mechanisms, it is likely that the issue of women's participation falls through the gaps of a table crowded with a complex set of tasks, activities and actors in a peace operation.

In terms of the protection of women during the RAMSI intervention, the record is also mixed. The deliberate use of SGBV as a weapon of war during the Solomon Islands conflict is well documented,⁹² and under UNSCR 1325 those who committed SGBV should have been held accountable during the peace process, and issues of women's protection from ongoing violence should have been central to RAMSI's actions. However, perpetrators of SGBV were not systematically held to account after the war, and although rape is now the second most serious crime under Solomon Islands law, with a maximum sentence of life imprisonment, there is little evidence of the systematic prosecution of violence against women. In fact, there is anecdotal evidence that there was a significant rise in the incidence of domestic violence against women during and after the violent conflict, with the Secretary General of the NCW as recently as 2009 claiming that the prevalence of domestic violence was still rising.⁹³ Compounding this situation of insecurity for women in the Solomon Islands, there is some evidence that RAMSI personnel have engaged in the exploitation of women and girls. Moore reported in 2007 that 'a few RAMSI personnel continue to transgress local cultural codes by involvement with prostitutes and local women,'⁹⁴ while a UNIFEM Gendered Early Warning Report of 2005 found prostitution to be a medium risk in Honiara, with indications of prostitution emerging in rural areas, and anecdotal suggestions that the rise was linked in some instances to the presence of RAMSI.⁹⁵ Particularly concerning are the anecdotal accounts of the prostitution of young girls being prostituted in parks

⁹² See for instance "Solomon Islands: Women Confronting Violence," , pp. 24-25.

⁹³ "Solomons domestic violence increasing," *Radio Australia* 19 January 2009. See also Annalise Moser, "Monitoring peace and conflict in the Solomon Islands: Gendered Early Warning Report No. 2," Honiara, UNIFEM, 2005, p. 11 and "Solomon Islands: Women Confronting Violence," p. 14.

⁹⁴ Clive Moore, "Helpen Fren: The Solomon Islands 2003-07," *Journal of Pacific History*, Vol. 42, No. 2, September 2007, p. 147.

⁹⁵ Moser, "Monitoring peace and conflict in the Solomon Islands: Gendered Early Warning Report No. 2," p. 9.

by RAMSI personnel in parks near RAMSI headquarters. According to Karlyn Tekulu, a local researcher, 'It's just common knowledge with the RAMSI officers – stories that keep popping up about RAMSI officers and prostitution.'⁹⁶ While RAMSI Special Coordinator Tim George rejected allegations that prostitutions was occurring at RAMSI's base,⁹⁷ a UNICEF report from 2004 that was not publicly released but seen by *Time* also documented the engagement of military, police and civilian RAMSI personnel in underage prostitution, with one RAMSI contractor paying a family \$2000AUD for a girl to serve as his mistress while he built police housing on an outlying island.⁹⁸ Given that RAMSI personnel are drawn from 15 states, including Australia, it is not possible to hold Australia completely accountable for these breaches in the protection of women and girls in the Solomon Islands, even though it is the lead state in the operation. However, *Time* also reported two cases involving allegations of sexual abuse against Australian RAMSI personnel, including one Army corporal who was discreetly sent back to Australia to face charges in a Brisbane military court after demanding sex from young Solomon Islander women in October 2003, and an AFP protective services officer who was charged with having sex with a person under 16 outside Australia.⁹⁹ The RAMSI mission's code of conduct includes an offence against fraternisation. However it remains a serious problem that the very people sent to the Solomon Islands to protect the civilian population are the same people involved in the exploitation of women and girls, highlighting the need for greater attention to be given to their protection in Australian peace missions, as well as the need to ensure that all military staff understand that such actions constitute exploitation and are unacceptable. This emphasises the importance of ensuring that all levels of military personnel receive comprehensive training in gender issues, as mentioned earlier, in order to ensure that

⁹⁶ Steve Sharp, "Aussie immunity snags PNG, Solomons initiatives," *Pacific Islands Report* 10 June 2005, p. 5. See also Gordon Leua Nanau, "Intervention and Nation-Building in Solomon Islands: Local Responses," in Greg Fry and Tarcisius Tara Kabutaulaka (ed.), *Intervention and State-Building in the Pacific*, Manchester, Manchester University Press, 2008, p. 264.

⁹⁷ RAMSI, "RAMSI Respects Solomon Islands Law," Press Release, 15 November 2006.

⁹⁸ Rory Callinan, "Generation Exploited," *Time* 19 March 2006, p. 4.

⁹⁹ Callinan, "Generation Exploited," p. 4.

more than just higher-ranking officers are aware of national commitments to international norms and standards.

This brief discussion of some of the weaknesses of Australia's implementation of UNSCR 1325 in its involvement in RAMSI suggests that the current system of rhetorical commitment to the resolution's principles and their ad hoc systematisation in individual agencies' policies is not enough to ensure the adherence of Australian actors to their international obligations around women, peace and security as set out in UNSCR 1325. This may be due to a wide range of reasons, including the lack of resources to fully and effectively implement the policies in place, given they may necessitate a major rethink around how a department/unit functions and addresses gender issues, and require an injection of resources including technical expertise into planning and programming. It may also be because those responsible for translating policy and rhetoric-level commitment to the principles enshrined in UNSCR 1325 are unconvinced of the importance of such a major rethink, and are hostile to its implications. These issues must be addressed if Australia is to step into line with its international obligations, particularly in terms of ensuring women's involvement in decision-making and peace processes, and the protection of women in post-conflict environments in which Australia is involved through peace operations.

Conclusion: Moving from rhetoric to action

Ten years after the adoption of the landmark UN Security Council Resolution 1325 on women, peace and security, much has been done to implement the resolutions mandates, and yet a number of significant challenges to its full implementation remain. These revolve around the difficulties in translating the rhetoric of support for women, peace and security norms into meaningful action globally, both through the actions of the UN and its Member States. As the discussion above demonstrated, it would be complacent to assume that a UN resolution alone is enough to precipitate the behavioural changes as broad as those implied by UNSCR 1325. As with almost all

normative issues in the international arena, the responsibility to ensure adherence to the norms enshrined in the resolution falls primarily to states, which can systematise compliance and the resolution's implementation through the development of national level policies. These generally take the form of National Action Plans on UNSCR 1325, although some states have pursued other options for implementing the resolution. NAPs can increase comprehensiveness, coordination, policy coherence and consistency, awareness raising, ownership and accountability for the implementation of UNSCR 1325's mandates. However they, of course, entail challenges of their own, particularly around how to ensure multi-level commitment to their full implementation, accountability for their implementation and establishing monitoring frameworks. These issues are of particular relevance for Australia, given that it has not yet developed an NAP on UNSCR 1325, and given that experiences in the RAMSI intervention indicate that, despite regular international statements to the contrary, it is not living up to its international commitment to ensure Australian actors comply with UNSCR 1325's mandates.

The development of an NAP on UNSCR 1325 would help translate rhetoric into meaningful action and improve Australia's implementation of the resolutions mandates in line with its public statements calling for practical steps to be taken that give effect to the resolution. The benefits of this would be twofold. Firstly, it would facilitate the comprehensive implementation of UNSCR 1325 by relevant Australian actors, and secondly, it would contribute to the development of an international normative framework around women, peace and security principles. Such a framework can potentially influence action and compel compliance by making it harder for nations acting outside the norms created to avoid being held to account.

These process-related recommendations aside, it is possible to identify a number of key components that must be included in an Australian NAP in order to ensure effectiveness and the proper implementation of UNSCR 1325's mandates. Whether the NAP is organised thematically (as in the UK), or by national-, regional- and

international-level actions (as in Sweden), is of little importance so long as it covers the key issues around which UNSCR 1325 organises its mandates on states' actions. These are the participation of women in decision-making and peace processes, the incorporation of gender perspectives and training in peacekeeping, and the protection of women. Key issues in UNSCR 1820 and subsequent women, peace and security resolutions with implications for Australian actors should also be included in the NAP, falling under the three categories listed above. It will be important to ensure that the NAP does not concentrate on Australia's engagement in peacekeeping operations, while neglecting the issues of incorporating local women actors into official peace processes and increasing women's access to decision-making processes in post conflict situations. However, if this does occur, there is scope for the UN and civil society organisations to step in and fill the gap, by implementing development projects that empower women and improve their access to decision-making structures both within communities and at national level. The NAP should also consider how UNSCR 1325 might be used to address domestic and community-level conflicts, both within Australia and internationally. The relationship and cooperation between Australian actors and international bodies and initiatives, such as the International Criminal Court and Peacebuilding Commission should therefore also be considered.

Learning from the experience of states like Denmark and the UK which released revised NAPs with much more detailed information about actions to be taken, responsible actors, and coordination and monitoring mechanisms, Australia's NAP should similarly establish measurable goals, benchmarks and timeframes, and establish monitoring and evaluation mechanisms. It should also identify funding streams, and allocate appropriate resources to the implementation of the NAP. Including these components may subvert the perennial challenge in gender-mainstreaming of gender issues becoming everyone's issue but no one's responsibility, which is important if the NAP is to effectively and comprehensively implement UNSCR 1325.

Lastly, provisions for review processes should be included in the Australian NAP. The NAP should be considered a 'living document,' which can be revised as necessary respond to changing contexts and improve effectiveness. As in Sweden's NAP, the scope and timeframes for such a process should be clearly established in the NAP. Any review processes should adhere to the same principles of inclusiveness and transparency that should guide the original development process.

Finally, it is important that the adoption of an Australian NAP is understood to entail a major gender rethink in domestic and international policy and processes. An NAP on UNSCR 1325 is not simply an 'add-on' to existing policies on women, peace and security issues, but is itself a policy that requires an overhaul of other policies and processes so as to properly integrate a gender analysis into them. For this re-think to be successful, it is essential that all stakeholders be meaningfully engaged in the development of an NAP.

The development of a comprehensive Australian NAP on UNSCR 1325 will greatly improve the implementation of the resolution by Australian actors, hopefully avoiding such weaknesses as occurred during the RAMSI intervention in the Solomon Islands. Nevertheless, the perennial challenge of getting state actors to commit to meaningful action around 'soft' security issues such as gender, or human security more broadly, will likely continue to undermine the full implementation of UNSCR 1325, and so it will be important that Australia complements the development and adoption of an NAP with continued efforts to support the development of international legal and normative frameworks on women, peace and security issues, and to pushing for adherence to them globally.

References

- "Accountability for Implementing Security Council Resolution 1325." In *NGO Working Group on Women, Peace and Security Issue Brief*, New York, NGO Working Group on Women, Peace and Security, October 2007
- AusAID. "AusAID Peace, Conflict and Development Policy," edited by DFAT, Canberra, June 2002
- — —. "Gender Equality: Annual thematic performance report 2006-07," Canberra, 2007
- "Australia: Candidate for the United Nations Security Council 2013-14." Canberra, Commonwealth of Australia, 2010
- Barrow, Amy, "Overview and Analysis of the UK Government's Action Plan for the Implementation of UN Security Council Resolution 1325", Paper presented at the Roadmap to 1325 Conference, Berlin May 2007
- — —, "Paying Lip Service? The Application of Gender-Mainstreaming Policies in a Peace and Security Context", Paper presented at the ISA's 49th Annual Convention: Bridging Multiple Divides, San Francisco March 2008
- — —, "UN Security Council Resolutions 1325 and 1820: constructing gender in armed conflict and international humanitarian law," *International Review of the Red Cross*, Vol. 92, No. 877, March 2010, pp. 221-34
- Butler, Maria, et al. "Women, Peace, and Security Handbook: Compilation and Analysis of United Nations Security Council Resolution Language 2000-2010," New York, The PeaceWomen Project of Women's International League for Peace and Freedom, October 2010
- Calandruccio, Giuseppe, "Protection in practice: concepts, strategies and dilemmas", Paper presented at the Roundtable on Protection in Practice hosted by the HPG, Geneva January 2007
- Callinan, Rory, "Generation Exploited", *Time* 19 March 2006, p. 4
- Charlesworth, Hilary, "Are women peaceful? Reflections on the roles of women in peacebuilding," *Feminist Legal Studies*, Vol. 16, No. 3, December 2008, pp. 347-61
- Charlesworth, Hilary, and Wood, Mary, "Women and Human Rights in the Rebuilding of East Timor," *Nordic Journal of International Law*, Vol., No. 71, 2002, pp. 325-48
- Cohn, Carol, "Feminist peacemaking," *The Women's Review of Books*, Vol. XXI, No. 5, Feb 2004, pp. 8-9
- Cook, Sam, "Security Council Resolution 1820: A Move to End Sexual Violence in Conflict," *1325 PeaceWomen E-News*, Vol., No. 102, June 2008, pp.

Corrin, Jennifer, "Ples Bilong Mere: Law, Gender and Peace-Building in Solomon Islands," *Feminist Legal Studies*, Vol. 16, No. 2, August 2008, pp. 169-94

Defence, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Denmark and the Ministry of. "Denmark's Action Plan on implementation of Security Council Resolution 1325 on Women and Peace and Security," September 2005

Diken, Buelent, and Laustsen, Carsten Bagge, "Becoming Abject: Rape as a Weapon of War," *Body & Society*, Vol. 11, No. 1, 2005, pp. 111-28

Enterprise, ANU. "People's Survey 2008," Honiara, Regional Assistance Mission to the Solomon Islands, August 2008

"Fact Sheet 11: Gender Equality Promotion." Dili, UNTAET Press Office, April 2002

femTALK. "Special femTALK 1325 Report on the Solomon Islands Situation," femLINK Pacific, 23 April 2006

Flanagan, Kerry. "Statement of Australia to the 48th Session of the Commission on the Status of Women," 4 March 2004

Foreign and Commonwealth Office. "UK Government National Action Plan on UNSCR 1325 Women, Peace & Security," 2010

"General Debate of the 63rd Session of the General Assembly." September 2008

Global Centre for the Responsibility to Protect. "Implementing the Responsibility to Protect The 2009 General Assembly Debate: An Assessment," New York, Ralph Bunche Institute for International Studies, The CUNY Graduate Center August 2009

Global Network of Women Peacebuilders. "UNSCR 1960 and the need for focus on full implementation of UNSCR 1325: Open letter to Member States of the Security Council Re: Res. 1960," 7 January 2011

H.E. Mr. Gary Quinlan, Ambassador and Permanent Representative of Australia to the United Nations. "Statement to the UNSC Open Debate on Women, Peace and Security," 5 October 2009

H.E. Mr. John Dauth LVO, Ambassador and Permanent Representative of Australia to the United Nations. "UNSC Open Debate: Resolution 1325: "Women, Peace and Security"," 29 October 2003

H.E. Ms Frances Lisson, Deputy Permanent Representative of Australia to the United Nations. "Statement to the UNSC Open Debate on Women, Peace and Security," 23 October 2007

H.E. The Hon Robert Hill, Ambassador and Permanent Representative of Australia to the United Nations. "Statement to the UNSC Open Debate on Women, Peace and Security," 29 October 2008

IANWGE Taskforce on Women, Peace and Security, "From the Charter to the SCR 1325", <http://www.un.org/womenwatch/ianwge/taskforces/wps/history.html>. (accessed 17/3/2008)

- International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty, *The Responsibility to Protect : Report of the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty*, Ottawa, International Development Research Centre, 2001
- Joint Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade. "Report of the Parliamentary Delegation to the Solomon Islands," Canberra, The Parliament of the Commonwealth of Australia, March 2004
- Kirk, Jackie, and Taylor, Suzanne, "Ending Violence Against Women and Girls in Conflict Contexts: Canadian Efforts and Experiences," *Canadian Women's Studies*, Vol. 25, No. 1/2, Winter/Spring 2006, pp. 139-45
- Leslie, H, "Gendering conflict and conflict management in the Solomon Islands," *Development Bulletin*, Vol., No. 60, 2002, pp. 13-16
- Lewis, Stephen, *Race Against Time: Searching for Hope in AIDS-Ravaged Africa*, Melbourne, The Text Publishing Company, 2005
- Mackay, Angela, "Training the uniforms: gender and peacekeeping operations," *Development in Practice*, Vol. 13, No. 2/3, May 2003, pp. 217-22
- Maclellan, Nic, et al. "Bridging the gap between state and society: New directions for the Solomon Islands," Melbourne, Oxfam Australia, 2006
- Ministry of Foreign Affairs, et al. "Denmark's National Action Plan for implementation of UN Security Council Resolution 1325 on Women, Peace and Security 2008-2013," 2008
- Ministry of the Family, Women and Social Affairs. "Cote d'Ivoire National Action Plan for the Implementation of Resolution 1325 of the Security Council (2008-2012)," 2007
- Moore, Clive, "Helpen Fren: The Solomon Islands 2003-07," *Journal of Pacific History*, Vol. 42, No. 2, September 2007, pp. 141-64
- Moser, Annalise. "Monitoring peace and conflict in the Solomon Islands: Gendered Early Warning Report No. 2," Honiara, UNIFEM, 2005
- Nanau, Gordon Leua, "Intervention and Nation-Building in Solomon Islands: Local Responses", in Greg Fry and Tarcisius Tara Kabutaulaka (ed.), *Intervention and State-Building in the Pacific*, Manchester, Manchester University Press, 2008, pp. 250-71
- Naraghi-Anderlini, Sanam B., *Women, Peace and Security: A Policy Audit*, International Alert, June 2001
- Nelson, Carol. "Women and Disarmament: What can be learnt from conflicts in Solomon Islands, Bougainville and PNG?," In *In the Right Hands Seminar*, 2006
- Neuwirth, Jessica, "Women and Peace and Security: The Implementation of U.N Security Council Resolution 1325 " *Duke Journal of Gender Law & Policy*, Vol. 9, Summer 2002, pp. 253-61

- NGO Working Group on Women Peace and Security. "From Global to Local: Making Peace Work for Women," New York, 2005
- O'Callaghan, Sorcha, and Pantuliano, Sara. "Protective action: Incorporating civilian protection into humanitarian response," London, Overseas Development Institute, December 2007
- OCHA. "Aide Memoire For the Consideration of Issues Pertaining to the Protection of Civilians," New York, Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, Policy Development Studies Branch, 2004
- Office of Gender Advisor (UNMIL), "Strategy for the implementation of UNSCR 1325 ",
 unmil.org/documents/Strategy_for_Implementation_of_SCR_1325.pdf.
 (accessed 18 August, 2008)
- Owen, Margaret, "Chair's Introduction", Paper presented at the GAPS: Involving Men in the Implementation of UN Security Council Resolution 1325 on Women, Peace and Security, London March 13, 2007
- Pampell Conaway, Camille, and Shoemaker, Jolynn. "Women in United Nations Peace Operations: Increasing the Leadership Opportunities," Washington D.C., Women in International Security, Georgetown University, July 2008
- Porter, Elisabeth, *Peacebuilding: Women in International Perspective*
 — — —, September 2005, "Women and security: 'You cannot dance if you cannot stand'", *Women and Security*, OpenDemocracy,
http://www.opendemocracy.net/democracy-resolution_1325/dance_2937.jsp.
 (accessed 19/5/2008,
- RAMSI. "RAMSI Respects Solomon Islands Law," Press Release, 15 November 2006
- Rehn, Elisabeth, and Johnson Sirleaf, Ellen. "Women, War, Peace: The Independent Experts' Assessment on the Impact of Armed Conflict on Women and Women's Role in Peace-Building (Progress of the World's Women 2002, Vol.1, Executive Summary)," New York, United Nations Development Fund for Women, 2002
- "Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations, A/55/305, S/2000/809", August 2000, www.un.org/peace/reports/peace_operations/. (accessed 15 March, 2006)
- Robertson QC, Geoffrey, *Crimes Against Humanity: The Struggle for Global Justice*. 3rd ed, London, Penguin Books, 2006
- Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court*, 1998
- "S/RES/1325 (2000)." 31 October 2000
- "S/RES/1820 (2008)." 19 June 2008
- "S/RES/1888 (2008)." edited by UNSC, 30 September 2009
- "S/RES/1889 (2009)." edited by UNSC, 5 October 2009

Secretary-General's Bulletin on Special Measures for Protection from Sexual Exploitation and Sexual Abuse, ST/SGB/2003/13,
Security Council Resolution 1272 on the Situation in East Timor,
 Senate Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade. "Inquiry into Australia's involvement in Peacekeeping," Canberra, 24 August 2007
 Sharp, Steve, "Aussie immunity snags PNG, Solomons initiatives", *Pacific Islands Report* 10 June 2005, p.
 Sherriff, A., and Barnes, K. "Enhancing the EU response to women and armed conflict with particular reference to Development Policy," In *ECDPM Discussion Paper 84*, Maastricht, ECDPM, 2008
 Sirleaf, Ellen Johnson, "United Nations Security Council Resolution 1325: What are the Challenges", Paper presented at the Wilton Park Conference, London May 30, 2006
 Smith, Dan, "Why SCR 1325 and gender matter", Paper presented at the GAPS Conference: Involving Men in the Implementation of UN Security Council Resolution 1325 on Women, Peace and Security, London March 13, 2007
 "Solomon Islands: Women Confronting Violence." London, Amnesty International 2004
 "Solomons domestic violence increasing", *Radio Australia* 19 January 2009, p.
 "Statement by H.E. Mr John Dauth LVO, Ambassador and Permanent Representative of Australia to the United Nations Security Council Open Debate on Women, Peace and Security", October 29, 2003, <http://www.peacewomen.org/un/SCOpenDebate2003/Australia2003.pdf>. (accessed 7/7/2008,
 "Statement by H.E. Mr. Robert G. Aisi, Ambassador/Permanent Representative, Permanent Mission of Papua New Guinea to the United Nations at the Security Council, on Behalf of the Pacific Islands Forum Group on Women Peace and Security", October 26, 2006, <http://www.forumsec.org.fj/pages.cfm/newsroom/speeches/speeches-2006/pif-statement-united-nations-on-women-peace-security.html>. (accessed 7/7/2008,
 Sugden, Camilla, "SCR 1325: National Implementation in Action", Paper presented at the Panel Discussion: Inclusive Security, Sustainable Peace: Tools for Action, Brussels November 29, 2005
 Thugea, Evelyn, "Rebuilding the Solomon Islands: A Woman's Perspective," Vol., pp.
 UN. "Resolution Adopted by the General Assembly, 2005 World Summit Outcome," In *A/RES/60/1*, 24 October 2005

- UN-INSTRAW. "Securing Equality, Engendering Peace: A Guide to Policy and Planning on Women, Peace and Security (UNSCR 1325)," Santo Domingo, 2006
- UNIFEM. "Progress of the World's Women 2008/08: Who Answers to Women? Gender and Accountability," New York, UNIFEM, 2008
- United Nations. "Facts and Figures on Women, Peace and Security," New York, United Nations Department of Public Information, 2005
- United Nations Secretary General, *Women, Peace and Security: Study submitted by the Secretary-General pursuant to Security Council resolution 1325 (2000)*, New York, United Nations, 2002
- United Nations Secretary-General. "'Report of the Secretary-General on Women, Peace and Security', S/2002/1154," New York, October 2002
- Valasek, Kristin. "Securing Equality, Engendering Peace: A guide to policy and planning on women, peace and security (UNSCR 1325)," Santo Domingo, UN-INSTRAW, 2006
- Wainwright, Elaina, "Women are the Peacemakers," *Focus*, Vol. 19, No. 2, September 2004, pp. 31
- WILPF Australia. "Statement by the Australian Section of WILPF as input for the WomenSpeak consortium in preparation for CSW 2008," 2008
- WILPF UK, November 2006, "WILPF's Response to DFID's Draft Conflict Policy Paper, November 2006",
http://www.peacewomen.org/national/WILPF_DFID_06.pdf. (accessed 6 June, 2008)
- Zetlin, Di. "Discussion Paper: Developing a National Action Plan on United Nations Security Council Resolution 1325," Canberra, Women's International League for Peace and Freedom (Australian Section), 2009