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Erratum: Endnote 77 should read: Eckersley, *The Green State*, 227; Eckersley, 'Ecological Intervention.' See also Stern, 'The Case for Comprehensive Security,' 137-138.



Human Security: Key Drivers, Antecedents and Conceptualization

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The human race, though divided into no matter how many different peoples and nations, has for all that a certain unity, a unity not merely physical, but also in a sense political and moral. ... [E]ach of the states is also a member, in a certain sense, of the world, as far as the human race is concerned.

—Suarez¹

I. WHY RE-EXAMINE HUMAN SECURITY?

Over the last several months, earthquakes in Haiti and Chile, mudslides in Brazil, and the fallout from the fiscal crisis in Greece have highlighted the continued relevance of non-traditional threats to state and non-state security, and of human security as a lens through which to understand them better. In March this year, an ex-head of the Australian army, Professor Peter Leahy, criticized the Australian government's defence spending, in the process describing the world as a friend of human security would:

We've also seen the changing nature of threats, from territory and sovereignty to terrorism, transnational criminals, cyber-warfare. We've still yet to figure it out, but food, water and energy shortages, climate change, pandemics, mass migration, how do we live and deal with that sort of stuff?

We also have to deal with failed and failing states. We've intervened in a number of states in our region and there's an expectation that we should ...

We need to have a very close look at the most effective tools to use in this new security environment, and my view would be that one of those things is let's have a look at high-end equipment being procured for the least likely defence eventuality.²

This background paper is part of a larger research project exploring the theory and practice of human security, its meaning and utility for governments, international and regional organizations, the third sector and civil society. The project is funded by an Australian Research Council Linkage Learned Academies Special Projects grant with the support of Australian Academy of Social Sciences, the Institute for Human Security at La Trobe University, and other partners. It explores the meaning and utility of human security as a response to non-traditional threats to states and human beings—threats that have arisen, and become more visible to, scholars and policy-makers monitoring a globalizing and

interdependent world. The project draws upon the multidisciplinary expertise of its investigators and partners.

This paper relies primarily upon political science and International Relations (IR) literature to explore the main drivers, precursors and concepts of human security. It examines the tense 'dialectic' between national and human security,³ its connection with the responsibility to protect (R2P) principle and the ways in which it straddles thinking about peace, development, human rights and human well-being. It surveys some of the key criticisms of the concept of human security and provides a brief defence of the broad conception of it. Another paper will examine the institutionalization and operationalization of human security in the context of Australia's foreign policy, especially with regard to the Asia-Pacific region.

II. HUMAN SECURITY DISCOURSE AND DEFINITIONS

1. The increasing prominence of human security discourse

While human security, at least as a concept, has a long history, the term's first important mention was in United Nations (UN) Secretary-General Boutros-Boutros Ghali's *Agenda for Peace* (1992). In that report he urged 'an integrated approach to human security' that would deal with the fundamental political, economic and social causes of conflict. But it was in the Pakistani economist Mahbub Ul-Haq's Human Development Report (HDR) (UN Development Program (UNDP), 1994) that human security came to prominence. Subsequently, it was endorsed by then UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan in a number of UN reports and declarations (the 1999 Millennium Declaration; High-level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change (2004); *In Larger Freedom: Towards Development, Security and Human Rights for All* (2005)). Human security has been officially recognized in the Outcome Document of the UN's 2005 World Summit (Paragraph 143) and by the UN General Assembly in 2008 (Thematic Debate on Human Security). In 1999, the government of Japan and the UN Secretariat established the UN Trust Fund for Human Security to initiate and fund diverse projects. To facilitate these purposes, in 2004, under the direction of the recently established Advisory Board on Human Security (ABHS), a Human Security Unit (HSU) was created within the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA).⁴

In addition, human security has become an influential discourse in a range of multilateral organizations at the international and regional levels. Canada, having in the late 1990s made human security a major part of its foreign policy (under the guidance of the relevant minister Lloyd Axworthy) concluded the Lysoen Declaration with Norway to advance the cause. In 1999, again led by Canada, twelve 'like-minded' states became part of a new Human Security Network (HSN) to apply human security to a range of international problems, with a focus on landmines, international criminal and humanitarian law and the protection of civilians from violent threats. It should be noted, however, that Canada's current government is less enthusiastic about human security as a part of its foreign policy than earlier ones were.⁵ In addition to Canada, other important members of the HSN are Norway, Austria and Switzerland.⁶ In 2006, the Friends of Human Security (FHS) was created, 'a flexible and open-ended informal group of supporters of human security.' Most recently chaired by Japan, members of the FHS are UN states and various international organizations based at the New York headquarters of the

UN. As suggested, human security has become an explicit part of the foreign policy approaches of not only HSN members but Japan as well.⁷

Human security has also been taken up—with varying levels of commitment—by regional organizations, including the European Union (EU), the Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN), African Union, Organization of American States (OAS) and the League of Arab States (LAS).⁸

As significant as the 1994 UNDP HDR was the *Human Security Now* report released in 2003. It was the outcome of inquiries by an independent Commission on Human Security (CHS). The CHS was set up with Japanese backing in 2001 and chaired by Sadako Ogata, former UN High Commissioner for Refugees, and Nobel laureate economist Amartya Sen.⁹

In addition to many local, national and international NGOs and groups in civil society that were already in substance and practice taking a human security approach, since 1994 a number of other NGOs have begun to do so, including Amnesty International, Oxfam, and a wide range of environmental, development and health entities. Interestingly, a number of NGO initiatives have been funded and backed by HSN members.¹⁰

These NGOs have been joined by a growing number of human security programs at think tanks and institutes in, for example, Austria (International Summer Academy on Human Security), Jordan (Regional Human Security Centre), Canada (Canadian Consortium on Human Security; Human Security Report Project and Human Security Gateway at the School for International Studies, Simon Fraser University), Chile (Facultad Latino-americana de Ciencias Sociales), Switzerland (CHD; the Small Arms Survey; the Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining; and the Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces) and Norway (the International Peace Research Institute, Oslo (PRIO)). There are also research and teaching programs in human security at a number of universities, including the following: Tufts University (Institute for Human Security), Sciences Po (Centre for Peace and Human Security), Harvard University (Program on Humanitarian Policy and Conflict Research), University of Oxford (Centre for Research on Inequality, Human Security and Ethnicity), University of Pittsburgh (Ford Institute for Human Security), the United Nations University (Institute for the Environment and Human Security, also at the University of Bonn) and La Trobe University (Institute for Human Security). Naturally, there are many scholars, from a variety of disciplines and theoretical perspectives, who support the notion of human security at these institutions and elsewhere.¹¹

2. Definitions of human security

There are three especially important institutional definitions of human security that we must briefly consider: the UNDP's, the CHS's, and that of the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS).¹²

In the 1994 UNDP HDR, human security was defined as the security of people, their freedom from fear and want in the midst of threats in several domains: economic, food, health, environmental, personal, community and political. The UNDP's conception is centred on people more than nation-states, universalist (all people everywhere are entitled to security), reflects interdependence between human beings and between the security domains (for example, economic insecurity can affect access to adequate food), prioritizes prevention of threats over reaction to crises, and recognizes that the

ramifications of threats will often be transnational.¹³ As Taylor Owen has noted, there is thus a ‘temporal’ aspect to the UNDP definition: human security addresses ‘chronic’ and acute threats of broader (typically regarded as economic and social) and narrower (commonly understood as the freedom of individuals, and perhaps groups, from physical violence) kinds. The phrases ‘freedom from fear’ and ‘freedom from want,’ popularized by US President Franklin Delano Roosevelt (FDR), have become metonyms in the literature for the narrower and broader conceptions of human security.¹⁴ The UNDP, however, insists that both are essential and interdependent. The 1994 HDR, as well as a number of scholars, itemize various specific threats to the seven domains of human security. For example, Owen has identified poverty as a threat to economic security; ‘injury and disease’ to health security; ‘pollution, environmental degradation and resource depletion’ to environmental security; violence (including sexual violence) to personal security; ‘repression’ to political security; and ‘social unrest and instability’ to community security.¹⁵

Influenced by the capabilities approach of Amartya Sen—including its focus on the fundamental importance of freedom to human fulfilment, autonomy and the satisfaction of the full range of basic needs—the CHS, in its impressive report in 2003, defined human security in the following terms:

Human security is concerned with safeguarding and expanding people’s vital freedoms. It requires both shielding people from acute threats and empowering people to take charge of their own lives ... Human security complements state security, enhances human rights and strengthens human development ... It means protecting people from critical (severe) and pervasive (widespread) threats and institutions.¹⁶

The CHS synthesizes the freedom from fear and want and emphasizes that human security is ‘people-centred,’ and must respond to a wide range of ‘menaces’ by making use of many different actors beyond the nation-state. The CHS’s report is notable for distinguishing (the nevertheless overlapping) phenomena of human security and human development on the basis that the former is more concerned with ‘downturn with security’ while the latter involves ‘expansion with equity.’ This distinction accentuates that any effective human security strategy must protect individuals in crisis. The CHS takes a broad approach to human security, examining not only conflict prevention, the protection of civilians (and particularly women, children and those with disabilities) in wartime, disarmament, demobilization and post-conflict reconstruction, but also personal violence and other crime, economic and health security, the needs of refugees, the vulnerability of internally displaced persons and migrants, the importance of public welfare systems (‘social protection’) and the pivotal role of education. The CHS also begins to connect human security with the norms of R2P. This is evident in its exploration of what infrastructure, resources and governance states need in order to secure their citizens; that is, to be successful rather than ‘failed’ states. It is also reflected in the CHS’s endorsement of what has surely become a governing principle of the UN: the conditional nature of state sovereignty.¹⁷

The ICISS, which developed the R2P principle, defined human security broadly as ‘the security of people—their physical safety, their economic and social well-being, respect for their dignity and worth

as human beings, and the protection of their human rights and fundamental freedoms.’ According to the commission, human security requires attention to the security of ‘ordinary people’ in their everyday lives. In a tone reminiscent of FDR’s wartime speeches, the commission criticizes states that invest heavily in the military sector while letting their citizens suffer the ‘chronic insecurities of hunger, disease, inadequate shelter, crime, unemployment, social conflict and environmental hazard.’ The ICISS thus adopted a very broad understanding of human security despite its defence of state sovereignty and the common view in the literature that it was preoccupied with freedom from fear.¹⁸

In addition to the UNDP, CHS and ICISS definitions, there is a myriad of national (for example, Canada’s narrower approach and Japan’s and Thailand’s wider policies), regional, NGO and scholarly ones. In the literature, academics writing on human security have been divided over whether they support or reject the concept, whether they subscribe to a broad or narrow conception, whether it displaces or complements national security and whether there is a threshold that must be satisfied (for example, that a threat must endanger human life).¹⁹

III. THE KEY DRIVERS OF HUMAN SECURITY DISCOURSE

Among the key stimulants for the development of the concept of human security are the long-running processes of globalization and interdependence that have affected conceptions of the state, warfare and military defence (to put it crudely), economy and technology, the natural environment, culture and identity, and global and regional governance. While globalization was not born in the 1980s, when it became a popular term in IR theory—in other words, globalization has a history of several decades at the very least—over the last few decades the evidence of the uneven acceleration, magnification, dispersal and interaction of the effects of globalization on the security of states and human beings has undermined the plausibility of traditional realist notions of security. The combination of these empirical developments, together with new theoretical perceptions, provided the setting for the emergence of ideas of human security. For it was not only the *existence* of the phenomena of globalization and interdependence that mattered, but the capacity to *see* them, and to recognize them as significant, that was crucial. Realists have been blind to enduring threats to security that do not fit within its paradigm: for example, genocide and other human rights violations, poverty and food riots, authoritarianism, violence towards women and racial discrimination.²⁰

As Joseph Camilleri has argued,²¹ it is not only the armed attack of one nation-state upon another, using organized military forces, that can cause physical and psychological insecurity for human beings and undermine states. Proponents of human security argue that threats come from a diverse range of sources and actors, that there is a wide variety of possible responses by many different actors to those threats, and that the fundamental purpose of those responses is to secure human beings, not the state. The rationale for human security embodies a number of claims:

- Internal sources of insecurity for people and states are as important as external ones.
- The aspects of people’s and states’ security that can be threatened are complex and multidimensional: they can be objective (for example, environmental integrity, life and limb, nutrition and health), subjective (for example, emotional well-being, economic confidence, perceptions of government legitimacy) or a combination of the two.

- There is a wide variety of military and non-military threats to the security of human beings and states. These threatening forces involve diverse agents and causes, including non-state (or ‘transnational’²²) actors interacting with national, international, global, regional and local developments in, for example, economic, environmental, political, cultural and technological fields.
- Insecurities are dynamic and interactive (for example, political repression may increase the likelihood of famine; economic insecurity can undermine health; global warming can produce climate change refugees; population flows can contribute to economic insecurity, environmental degradation, violent conflict and disease).
- The state can not only enhance security (for example, by national defence, provision of public goods, legal regulation, opportunities for political participation) but also be a major threat to it (for instance, by killing, torturing and imprisoning people, by coercive programs of economic modernization, by provoking war with other states, and by corrupt administration).
- Even states with the best of intentions have limited capacities to provide security for their citizens, other human beings or even their state (for example, structural adjustment conditions might reduce the capacity of a state to provide for healthcare; a state might be unable to combat a regional or global financial crisis; a state will often be ill-equipped to deal with global, borderless, threats to its natural environment).

How do globalization and interdependence—evident in relation to the state, war and defence, economy, technology, environment, identity and culture, and global and regional governance—render realist claims empirically dubious and normatively undesirable? First, there is ambiguity about whether the term ‘state’ means the government, nation or nation-state.²³ Globalization has been joined by fragmentation as, for instance, ethno-nations trapped within the borders of a nation-state seek independence or at least autonomy. Second, the realist assumption of the state’s monopoly on the loyalty of its residents, and even citizens, based on a homogeneous nationalism is usually falsified by competing local, tribal, nationalist, multicultural, religious, cultural and transnational identities; and these alternative identities are facilitated by porous borders through (or outside of) which various cultural influences flow, aided by television, radio, the internet and YouTube. Third, the realist approach overestimates the ability of states to solve national, let alone global, problems. Finally, the realist approach neglects how states work with and have their sovereignty constrained (and sometimes enhanced) by various non-state agents such as International Governmental Organizations (IGOs), NGOs, International Non-governmental Organizations (INGOs), social movements and other individuals and collectivities.²⁴ Peter Willetts has pointed out that while there are around two hundred governments in the world, there are more than seventy thousand transnational corporations (TNCs), roughly ten thousand national NGOs and more than seven thousand INGOs. He concludes that these numbers suggest that policies and decisions are made by various transnational actors within ‘complex systems’ that are much richer than the interstate world that realists assume.²⁵ Likewise, Scholte, Camilleri and Slaughter have identified the constraints and opportunities that the bewildering range of global, supranational, transnational, international and regional organizations, institutions and regimes present to nation-states. These systems can positively or adversely affect and respond to the requirements of human security in all its complexity. They provide opportunities for advocacy, cooperation,

coordination, confidence-building, regulation, harmonization, and subsidiarity, the pooling of sovereignty and the adjudication and enforcement of sanctions.²⁶ In this 'complex multilateralism' (one augmented by emerging multipolar configurations: for example, the consolidation of the European Union, the rise of China and India) states become, in Slaughter's words, 'overlaid by non-state actors.'²⁷

In relation to two of the preoccupations of realism, military defence and warfare, it is clear that the security of human beings and states can be threatened by a state's preparation for war. A state's efforts to enhance its national security by preparing for war can undermine human security due to the distortion of the economy: what might be called a war deficit (spending on military hardware, for example) takes resources away from satisfying vital human needs like food, housing and health. The preparation for war often involves coercion, restriction of civil liberties, and economic adversity. Also, the security of states and human beings can be undermined as much by internal threats (for example, civil wars, ethnic cleansing, secessionist conflicts, riots, coups d'états, revolutions, and sectarian battles) as by external ones. These threats also demonstrate that there is no necessary correlation between a state's clear and well-defended external borders and societal security (Northern Ireland, Zimbabwe and South Africa are good examples). Security for a state or nation does not mean security for (all) its inhabitants: poverty, persecution, repression, and disease may remain endemic within it. But states have a reduced capacity even to defend their external borders given the proliferation of extremely destructive conventional arms, as well as nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction (WMD). The risks associated with these weapons are increased by the possibility that they will be used accidentally, without state authority, or cause harm while being transported, stored or dumped. Defensive territoriality and sovereignty are also eroded by the location of foreign military bases on state soil, as military autonomy is constrained through joint military exercises, shared intelligence, coordinated strategies and command structures. The enormous financial cost of maintaining and upgrading military force for any one state has led to what Camilleri calls the 'transnationalization of defence' in relation, for example, to the production of military hardware and the pursuit of research and development. Obviously, waging war causes loss of life, injury, anxiety and trauma to many people, often aggravated by national conscription schemes.²⁸

Michael Sheehan, drawing upon the work of Mary Kaldor and Lawrence Freedman, has identified aspects of 'new wars' that challenge the simplistic model of interstate, nationalistic, territorial battles between regular forces in defence of the national security. War increasingly involves many non-state actors (for example, mercenaries, advisers, media representatives, humanitarian NGOs and INGOS); campaigns fought in cyberspace and via worldwide media; weaker parties in asymmetrical wars trying to shock and demoralize their opponents' publics (the Mogadishu effect) rather than necessarily to seize state power, or even to 'win'; the outsourcing and privatization of military functions, including logistics, security, equipment and training; cultural motivations, such as fighting for a religious cause and/or to resist Western secularism; sub-state threats from, for instance, militias, paramilitaries, criminals, warlords, tribes, and security TNCs; and the decentralized funding of war through kidnappings, money laundering and the trafficking of drugs, arms, and people.²⁹

Consistent with these conclusions about new warfare, James Kiras's work has demonstrated that globalization, particularly the emergence of new technologies, has made terrorist actions and messages by non-state actors more efficient, mobile, simultaneous, instantaneous, widespread and destructive

than the first phase of international terrorism of the 1960s. Al Qaeda, for example, has been described as a global network of franchise operations that uses the media, internet, 'distance learning,' improved transport systems and personal electronics, local sympathizers and 'homegrown' terrorists to threaten and carry out simultaneous attacks in different parts of the world.³⁰

The globalization of the economy and associated technologies, including those affecting transportation and the carrying of goods, have also reduced the importance of territorial space and challenged the economic, social and political security and autonomy of nation-states. As Jan Art Scholte has argued, there has been, first, an increased volume of money, goods, people and investments crossing borders (internationalization). Second, national borders have become more open, partly in response to neoliberal pressures and prescriptions from the World Trade Organization (WTO) and other bodies (liberalization). Third, borders are often transcended in regard to trade and finance (the 'transborder economy'). These supraterritorial and 'transplanetary' tendencies, to use Scholte's labels, have rendered the notion of isolated national economies under the absolute direction of their governments fictitious.³¹

With regard to trade, we may note, for example, the following features:

- The prominence of 'transborder production': the global sourcing of components and labour, worldwide factories, trade *within* global TNCs, preferential economic zones such as the *maquiladora* region in Mexico–USA;³²
- The phenomenon of 'regulatory arbitration': global TNCs leveraging states by threatening to move their operations elsewhere;³³
- The challenges of extraterritoriality and the conflict of laws that reduce the relevance and impact of national jurisdiction and regulation;³⁴
- The rise of global, remote electronic commerce (for example, eBay, Amazon Books).

These developments can reduce the capacity of states to enforce human rights (for example, privacy and labour standards) and environmental standards, as well as their criminal laws (for example, regarding pedophilic pornography on the internet).

The impact of the globalization of finance was notoriously on display during the 1997 Asian financial crisis and with the onset and ramifications of the Global Financial Crisis (GFC) in 2008. Some important aspects of the globalization of finance include.³⁵

- The globalization of money and credit arrangements: the ubiquity of the now declining US dollar and 'dollarization,' the Euro, foreign exchange dealing, smart and credit cards;
- 'Transplanetary banking': transborder deposits and loans, global instantaneous electronic funds transfers between banks;
- Global securities and investment: 'transplanetary securities' such as euroequities, Eurobonds; global funds; 24-hour global, electronic trading of bonds, shares, derivatives, futures and options; the influence of investors on regulation.

Additionally, globalization is evident in the spread of human rights, in the rise of new transnational social movements, such as the peace movement, in the dramatic increase in the number of NGOs and in the ways that mass travel and almost instantaneous transborder communication foster these developments. Thus, so the argument goes, more of us might become empathic cosmopolitans and be more sensitive to the welfare of strangers in distant lands.³⁶

And yet Scholte is right to emphasize, in response to the ‘hyperglobalists,’ that economic ‘globalization has repositioned the (territorial) state’ rather than brought about its extinction. The state continues to be an important economic actor, participating in, rather than simply passively affected by, global processes. Economic globalization has been uneven, territorial space remains significant (for example, with regard to manufacturing, retail banking, locally-based corporations and national stock), and state decisions can affect the impact of globalization by regulating money flows, interest rates, TNCs, offshore finance and standards relating to human rights, labour and the environment.³⁷

Given the substantial discussion of environmental security later in this paper, here we need only note that global environmental problems can threaten state viability; undermine personal, economic, food, water, social and community security (destroying, for example, livelihoods and the sustainability of ways of life linked to the land); exceed state capacities for management; and cause loss of life, violent conflict and population flows within and between states.³⁸

IV. ANTECEDENTS OF HUMAN SECURITY

There is a long history of human security which I cannot trace here. This history includes developments in economic and social rights, efforts to satisfy basic needs through the welfare state (including the efforts of New Dealers in the USA), the strengthening of humanitarian intervention and international humanitarian law, various constraints upon state sovereignty, and the recognition of the individual as a subject of international law. Instead, in this section I examine other precursors to human security, alternative notions of security that have emerged over the last three decades or so.³⁹

The idea of common security was identified most clearly in the report of the same name produced by the Palme Commission in 1982. Chaired by the late Swedish Prime Minister Olaf Palme, and established in the midst of the Cold War, the commission challenged traditional conceptions of security in three main ways: by transforming the objectives of security, by urging new strategies to achieve peaceful interstate relations, and by recognizing the many dimensions of security (multidimensionality). First, the common security approach aims to eventually achieve peace and disarmament in the world, through cooperation rather than through an enduring deterrence based on ‘competitive power politics.’ David Capie and Paul Evans identify six principles of common security:

- Every state has a legitimate claim to security.
- The projection of military force (at least outside the collective security system of the UN) is not a legitimate way to resolve interstate disputes.
- States should be restrained in any expression of ‘national policy.’
- Security cannot be achieved via the attainment of ‘military superiority.’
- Qualitative (the type of arms) and quantitative arms control is necessary.
- States ought not link negotiations over arms with any political event as a form of leverage.⁴⁰

Second, the Palme Commission condemned zero-sum approaches to international relations in which states unilaterally and self-interestedly pursued their own security. Because a state’s defensive military preparations can be misread as offensive ones (the security dilemma), the commission urged states to take account of each other’s interests, to reassure each other and thus to move away from the heavy reliance on deterrence strategies. As the commission said, ‘states cannot achieve security at each

other's expense.' Instead, security can only be achieved in conjunction with so-called adversaries, using persuasive incentives and disincentives to constrain aggressors rather than the blunter instruments of coercion and punishment. For instance, states might participate in confidence-building measures (CBMs) (use of observers during military exercises, improved transparency, sharing of intelligence) to reduce the fear that they will be attacked.⁴¹

Third, and most importantly, the commission anticipated human security's emphasis on the multidimensional nature of security. It recognized connections between economic insecurities, Third World–First World distributional inequities and violent conflict. It also understood the overlap between domestic and international domains. Security, noted the commission, 'requires economic progress as well as freedom from fear,' themes earlier emphasized by FDR. The commission thus recognized a wide range of internal and external threats to human (and state) security, the ways in which they can interact and how they can contribute to violent conflict:

[P]ressures stemming from economic under-development and the maladministration of resources and wealth produce stresses and strains both within and between nations. Hunger, malnutrition, poverty and ill-health on a massive scale all work to spur political change, sometimes through violent means.⁴²

Australia and Canada advocated a form of common security for the Asia-Pacific region but went on to advocate 'cooperative security' which was seen by some as less European in origin and thus more likely to succeed in an area often sensitive to the risk of Eurocentrism.⁴³

There is very little difference between the concepts of common and cooperative security. Indeed, Joseph Camilleri seems to treat cooperative security approaches as means, either fairly modest or more ambitious, to achieve common security. The Canadian-backed North Pacific Cooperative Dialogue (NPCSD) paid attention to cooperative security in its projects between 1990 and 1993. Like the Palme Commission, it stressed the importance of multilateral and reassuring relations between states as a way of moving away from the sharp bipolarity, balancing of power and deterrence of the Cold War. While cooperative security is very similar to common security, it has taken on various shades depending upon its advocates (for example, Australia, Canada, and China) and its use in particular regions.⁴⁴ I cannot explore the nuances of cooperative security here, but I can identify the following essential features of it:

- Cooperative security is multidimensional: it endorses a broad conception of security that encompasses a range of potential threats involving state and non-state actors (for example, environmental problems, demographic concerns, economic underdevelopment and inequity, human rights abuses—especially under some Australian versions—and transnational crime).
- Cooperative security recognizes that many threats and problems cannot be solved by a state acting alone; rather, their resolution depends on cooperation between states ('inclusive multilateralism') and between various actors *within* states as well.
- According to cooperative security, the best approach to threats and challenges is an inclusive one in which diverse states and non-state actors (for example, NGOs, and TNCs) participate.

- The processes available to diverse actors to advance the goals of cooperative security include 'habits of dialogue,' CBMs, transparency, arms control and disarmament measures, exchanges between armed forces and the creation of formal institutions.⁴⁵

The sometimes unsteady course of cooperative security as it swings between traditional and alternative conceptions was captured well in a speech to the UN General Assembly in 1993 by then Australian Foreign Affairs Minister Gareth Evans:

[Cooperative security is] an approach which emphasizes reassurance rather than deterrence; it is inclusive rather than exclusive; favours multilateralism over unilateralism or bilateralism; does not rank military solutions over non-military ones; assumes that states are the principal actors in the security system but accepts that non-state actors have an important role to play; does not particularly emphasize the creation of formal security institutions, but does not reject them either; and which, above all, stresses the value of creating habits of dialogue.⁴⁶

Comprehensive security overlaps with common and cooperative security, but is perhaps closest to the notion of human security, at least as far as it is considered complementary to the security of the state. Comprehensive security takes a holistic approach, recognizing the existence of non-military threats (for example, economic and environmental crises), the interrelationships between those threats and the range of non-military (for example, preventive diplomacy) and military means that can be deployed to meet them. In the form most similar to the notion of human security, it is within the family of security understandings in which the interests of human beings are prioritized over those of states. More conservative interpretations accept a wide range of external and internal threats to security (for example, the trafficking of people and drugs, infectious diseases), but retain a traditional focus on the *state* as referent. Moreover, these interpretations, evident in Malaysia, Indonesia and Singapore, for example, give greatest attention to *internal* threats to the nation-state: to the menaces of civil unrest, economic underdevelopment, insurgency, fragmentation and moral degeneration.⁴⁷

Notions of non-traditional security again go beyond the realist's focus on external military threats by one state to another's territory and interests. Non-traditional security recognizes a wide range of threats to states. The state can be threatened by a variety of state and non-state actors and dangers. For example, the Chinese scholar Zhang Yunling has claimed that non-traditional security includes environmental, social, economic, cultural and political issues. Similarly, Wang Yizhou specifies water scarcity, threats to species, conflicts over fisheries, the challenges of delivering humanitarian relief, interruptions to communications technology and the weakening of cultural identities as within the ambit of non-traditional security. Indeed, he concludes 'that almost all issues can be included in the big basket of non-traditional security once they are, or are regarded as, serious enough.' Corroborating this view, ASEAN, the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) and China have in recent years endorsed versions of non-traditional security to meet threats originating in phenomena such as terrorism, drug and human trafficking, cybercrime, communicable diseases, organized crime, piracy, global economic crime, and environmental decline. However, while non-traditional security is similar to human security in its recognition of a diversity of threats, well beyond those of interstate war, it differs in its staunch defence

of traditional norms and laws relating to non-intervention and state sovereignty. Its principal focus remains on the nation-state as a potential victim, not on individuals, groups or civil society generally. Moreover, it assumes that the only actor that can respond with legitimacy and effectiveness to these new threats is the nation-state. In this sense, non-traditional security has not yet left the familiar comfort of national security to embrace the human in human security.⁴⁸

V. CONCEPTUAL DEBATES

[E]veryone is for it, but few people have a clear idea what it means.

—Roland Paris⁴⁹

Paris's complaint about human security is a common one. But human security can be defined and defended. As we have discussed, human security represents a move away from realist understandings of (balance of) power politics, anarchy, self-help, scepticism about morality, the neglect of internal conditions and the almost exclusive concentration on military threats to the nation-state. Security has objective (the degree to which we are actually threatened) and subjective (our perception of a threat) dimensions. Of course, the boundary between these dimensions is often blurred. A useful way to understand security is to ask who or what is the security referent (who or what is threatened), what the threats are, or which threats are recognizable or admissible within any conception, and what means are used and by whom to secure the referent against the threats. If using this typology, traditional realist theorists of security would, as we have suggested, answer: the nation-state, external military threats, and national military power (for example, as deterrence) and the use of force. In contrast, adherents to a human security approach would answer: human beings; a wide range of internal and external military and non-military threats; diverse military, non-military (for example, humanitarian relief) or hybrid responses (for example, humanitarian intervention, the prosecution of war crimes). For supporters of human security, a state's pursuit of its own security can undermine the security of those within its borders (for example, an aggressive foreign policy might lead to a war in which citizens are conscripted for life-threatening service), and of course agents of states can also intentionally kill, persecute and oppress inhabitants, as we have seen in numerous genocides. The term human security, though it has many precursors, emerged in the UN as a result of the encounter between the literature on security and on development: the extension of security to encompass non-military threats from economic and environmental domains; the critique of elite-directed, modernizing, growth-obsessed development, and advocacy for equitable, 'bottom-up', people-oriented or 'human development'; the reconfiguration of the state as instrumental for security but not its referent (as Thomas Pogge has put it, 'every human being', not the state, 'has a global stature as an ultimate unit of moral concern'); and feminist critiques of sexism, militarism, patriarchal exploitation, degradation and oppression by, within and between states and other agents. As was noted in the discussion of key drivers, the intensification and acceleration of certain global forces, combined with the end of the Cold War, also contributed to the emergence of human security as an alternative to national security, given the struggles of states under conditions of increasing interdependence to cope with transnational challenges—to deal with what Joseph Camilleri has evocatively called the 'globalization of insecurity'.⁵⁰

Canada has criticized the UNDP conception as too broad and unwieldy and, in its focus on underdevelopment, as neglecting the continuing salience of security against military and other violent threats to people's lives and limbs. But Canada's freedom from fear approach can be better regarded as a strategic decision about limiting the scope and ambition of its foreign policy on human security than as a persuasive conceptual critique. As Japan rebutted, the exclusion of threats to life, sustenance and dignity that, for example, have mainly economic causes (for instance, dying because of hunger) is not justifiable. A holistic approach to human security that includes freedom from want concerns is no murkier or less plausible than a narrower freedom from fear conception. Indeed, the claim that it is less plausible is reminiscent of the argument that the only real human rights are civil and political, not economic and social, ones. It excludes economic threats that cause the deaths of millions of people every year and cast others into circumstances of deprivation, declining health, insecurity and demoralization. Including freedom from want considerations also links human security to the key purposes of a humane state and, specifically, to early notions of social security. Further, if poverty, inequity and lack of opportunity contribute to conflict, neglecting these dimensions undermines the preventive objectives of human security.⁵¹

Some scholars concerned about the alleged 'woolliness' of human security have tried delimit it not by excluding threats according to their source (for example, whether they are military threats or economic threats) but according to their severity. This has been termed the threshold approach and prima facie it has more promise. How high the threshold bar should be set remains unresolved, however. Some have argued that only life-threatening menaces come within the concept of human security; so only genocidal killing, death by starvation and similar harms would qualify. But this sets the bar too high: any 'severe' or 'serious' threat to the 'vital interests' of a person is in my view sufficient. This is consistent with the leading conceptions of human security outlined by the UNDP and the CHS, and also with the norms of human development and human rights (for example, with those in the 1966 covenant on economic, social and cultural rights). It is not heterodox to insist that non-lethal harms to human beings matter. As the CHS said in relation to poverty:

When people's livelihoods are deeply compromised—when people are uncertain where the next meal will come from, when their life savings suddenly plummet in value, when their crops fail and they have no savings—human security contracts. People eat less and some starve. They pull their children out of school. They cannot afford clothing, heating or health care.⁵²

It is better to consider the severity of threat in terms of prioritization rather than as a trigger for excluding a threat from the realm of human security. Since both the UNDP and CHS conceptions of human security have emphasized prevention, it makes sense to try to stop the building and filling of powder kegs rather than just trying to extinguish their fuses later on. The UN's Human Development Index, for example, measures exactly those kinds of factors which can cumulatively produce crises of human insecurity.⁵³

Others argue that human security covers only harm that is the result of human intention and agency and/or that is readily preventable. On this view, natural disasters might, for example, be

excluded from the operation of human security. But again this underestimates the complex and diverse causes of, and human responsibility for, the magnitude of 'natural' disasters. For example, deforestation can contribute to desertification and unwise development and poor urban planning can increase the vulnerability of people to flooding, mudslides and cyclones. Development policies can reinforce inequalities, with the poorest most exposed to environmental hazards. Aggravating these circumstances, the poorest are least able to mitigate or escape the impact of these environmental hazards. Hurricane Katrina is a notorious example of what I have in mind here, with the convergence of unwise development, racism, poverty and governmental incompetence.⁵⁴

The securitization of international challenges has also been criticized. While securitization might be strategically useful in raising the profile of an issue, in attracting resources for the cause, and in gaining the attention of governments and mobilizing people in relation to it, some have argued that it risks militarized conceptions and responses to it. Such criticisms have been made of the securitization of environmental issues and public health (for example, its relation to HIV/AIDS). Some argue it risks the issue being controlled by elites and subsumed in the dangerous and secretive language and practice of national security, polarizing people around the world. The escalation of border control measures by some governments in response to the Ebola virus, Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS) and swine flu lend some plausibility to this view. On the other hand, it is ironic that the securitization of an issue as a matter of *human* security is criticized for worsening the vices of traditional national security approaches.⁵⁵ I take up these debates later in this section.

Another concern is whether the security referent is identified with sufficient precision. At various times proponents of human security speak of a human being, human beings, groups, peoples or communities as security referents. But the potential looseness of the terminology here is significant. It raises debates between liberalism and communitarianism, for example. In terms of the UNDP conception, conflict between community security and personal security is possible. While individuals can be threatened by states, they can also be threatened by groups, by ones they are members of or by other groups. These group-based threats to individual security raise sharply the issue of oppressions and persecutions that can, for example, be based on morality, culture, tradition and religion. Honour killings, genital mutilations and violence against people on the basis of their gender, sexual behaviour, sexual preferences and identities are examples of group-based threats to individuals. As in debates over human rights, the tensions between the individual and group are not easily overcome. Social, cultural and group rights are important and often compatible with individual claims. Ultimately, however, a human rights violation perpetrated against an individual will not be excused on the basis of a group or cultural claim.⁵⁶

Another point of contention is how novel human security is. Some scholars argue that it adds little to international relations, that what it requires can be handled perfectly well by existing international law structures, for example. While this claim is an exaggeration, it is important to appreciate the many precursors to human security in international law and politics. This appreciation will reduce the risk of the multiplication and superimposition of unnecessary norms, laws and institutions. It will mean that the operationalization of human security will be wiser and more efficient; it will be able to link to existing traditions, interpretations, incentives, laws, instruments, principles and organizations. Such an approach will allow greater specialization and differentiation in pursuing human security (for example, through human rights law and human development). It might also demonstrate to sceptical, realist defenders of

national security the orthodoxy and legitimacy of many principles underpinning human security: that it is not simply an invention of the mid-1990s with shallow and idiosyncratic roots.⁵⁷

One example of how an approach sensitive to the history of human security might be useful is in reconceptualizing (or remembering) the parameters of state sovereignty: that state sovereignty is conditional and purposive. States have the *privilege* of sovereignty and non-intervention when they exercise their responsibility to protect their populations. While the links with the recent formulation of 'the responsibility to protect' (R2P) are clear, so are its roots in older conceptions of the state (including Ciceronian, natural law and social contract versions) and of humanitarian intervention. Remembering these connections assists in the reconciliation of state sovereignty and the security of the people within the state. States have the primary responsibility to protect their own people, but if they fail to do so, I argue there is a cosmopolitan responsibility to secure the welfare of the people affected. R2P is commonly understood to be limited to threats of the freedom from fear kind (genocide, mass killings, ethnic cleansing), but it could be extended to at least serious forms of economic deprivation resulting in food or water insecurity or environmental calamity (consider, for example, the plight of refugees in famine conditions, exposed to the cold or heat and suffering from disease). Of course, the just cause threshold, authorization requirements, precautionary principles and operational prescriptions would apply. Additionally, the costs and benefits of inaction versus intervention for the security of the people concerned would have to be assessed. But we should also be much more imaginative regarding what intervention and cooperation might involve. Certainly most exercises of a socioeconomic R2P would not involve military intervention. Under human rights law, for example, the progressive realization of many economic and social rights requires international cooperation and assistance, assuming that a state will sometimes be incapable of protecting the vital interests of its own people. In this regard, we should also recall Article 28 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) that states that 'everyone is entitled to a social and international order in which the rights and freedoms set forth in this Declaration can be fully realized.' As Barbara Von Tigerstrom argues, states can also examine the degree to which their policies and actions have caused or worsened a crisis within another state, a crisis they now have the responsibility to alleviate. If a state finds they have made a contribution to such a crisis they should try to adjust their conduct. And the R2P should not be limited to states: where necessary, it can involve networks of international, regional, and local non-state organizations (for example, the OAS, EU, Oxfam and so forth).⁵⁸

It is useful to explore some of these issues in the context of debates over the securitization of environmental issues, the greening of the nation-state and the risks and promise of intervention to protect the environment against severe harm.⁵⁹ Following the 'doomsday' environmental and 'limits to growth' literature, and associated social movements of the 1960s and 1970s, together with the critiques by the World Order Movement Program (WOMP) and World System Theory in the 1970s and 1980s, a number of theorists began to challenge the realist security paradigm in terms of the security referent, the threats to security and the means to secure. Richard Ullman and Jessica Tuchman Mathews broadened national security to include threats from population growth, resource scarcities and environmental degradation. While the referent was still the nation-state, for Mathews a range of non-military responses was needed to achieve security for it, including the containment of population growth, the pursuit of more sustainable development and the encouragement of multilateralism.⁶⁰

This wider understanding of security was reinforced at the end of the Cold War. Various theorists, international organizations and commissions understood security as going beyond the interests of the nation-state, encompassing non-military threats and requiring the redirection of a peace dividend to civilian ends, sustainable development and peacebuilding.⁶¹ As Eckersley has noted, these developments placed a spotlight on 'neglected areas of vulnerability and marginalization,' on interdependence between the global natural environment and the global economy, and on the necessity for cooperation at the international level. The interactive relationships between peace, environment, development and economy as matters of security were successively recognized by the Brandt Commission (1980), Brundtland Commission (1987), the Rio Declaration (Principle 25) (1992), the UNDP HDR (1994) (as a component of human security), the CHS (1995), and the UN Security Council⁶² (April 2007). Eckersley has identified four main themes of a broader approach to security with regard to the environment since the end of the Cold War: the emergence of new understandings of 'ecological risks' as insecurity sources; a recognition of new security referents such as the biosphere and 'ecological communities'; creative responses to ecological threats based on cooperation and dialogue linked to various levels and kinds of governance; and identification of the prerequisites for 'long-term security,' such as ecological and communicative justice (drawing on critical, Habermasian and constructivist theories) and sustainable development.⁶³

Before briefly assessing some of the criticisms of the treatment of environmental degradation as a matter of national or global security, it is useful to examine how such degradation presents a threat to security. We can do so using the general rubrics of freedom from fear and freedom from want that have proved useful to the synthesis of human security discourse. Under the heading of freedom from fear, we may ask how environmental degradation and emergencies might cause or exacerbate interstate and intrastate war and other forms of conflict and turmoil. In relation to freedom from want, we can ask how environmental degradation might affect economic decline and poverty. Thomas Homer-Dixon is one of the leading researchers to have sought answers to these related questions.⁶⁴

As a preliminary matter, we must note that, as is the case with all threats to security, environmental harms have a differential impact: the threats affect different parts of the world (for example, the effect of rising sea levels on small island states) more or less, and different people more or less (for example, based on gender, age, race, class and geographical region). For instance, the consensus is that climate change will have the most destructive impacts in the South, a region that has historically contributed less to global warming. Moreover, due to poverty, lack of economic diversification, deficits in knowledge and information, unreliable governance and the lack of necessary technology, the worst affected tend to be least able to adapt to detrimental impacts.⁶⁵

Homer-Dixon has examined the impact of the scarcity of resources, with an emphasis on renewable resources such as arable land, water and forests. He concluded that scarcities in these areas when combined with population growth and inequality of access could produce population movements (including the 'ecological marginalization' of migrants and refugees), poverty, and violent intrastate, intergroup conflict. The violence produced by these scarcities will, according to Homer-Dixon, normally be 'subnational, persistent and diffuse,' although interstate conflict is also possible, particularly over water resources such as river systems, and non-renewable resources like oil and minerals which are vital to economic and military power. Conflict and poverty will be worse in poorer states that are heavily

dependent on natural resources.⁶⁶ Many of Homer-Dixon's conclusions are consistent with the perspectives of 'social justice ecologists' who emphasize the connections between environmental degradation and scarcity, war, violence, injustice, power and wealth inequalities and human rights violations (especially as they affect indigenous peoples, women, the poor and other marginalized and vulnerable populations).⁶⁷ Some similar concerns have been expressed by Critical Political Ecologists regarding 'innocent communities' having to bear the brunt of the 'unfair externalization' of environmental risks.⁶⁸

Realists have criticized a broad conception of security that includes environmental matters because it muddies the analytical waters and obscures the proper focus on 'the study of the threat, use and control of military force.'⁶⁹ Other traditionalist critics are concerned that if everything is an urgent matter of security then one loses the useful prioritization function of security studies. There have also been criticisms of the securitization of the environment from perhaps less familiar quarters.⁷⁰

For example, Daniel Deudney, while sympathetic to the basic thrust of the environmental movement, is critical of ecological issues being treated as matters of *national* security. In his view, matters of national security and environmental decline are too different from each other. First, while conceding that the preparation for and waging of war causes environmental harm, the nature, sources and agency of military threat differ from environmental degradation. In Deudney's view, environmental decline is not characteristically a national problem, interstate war and violence are rarely caused by it, and interstate resource wars are unlikely (states can now get what they need through world trade and it is too costly and difficult to get such resources through territorial conquest, even in asymmetrical battles). While he thinks there is greater plausibility to the scenario of wars being waged over water resources (for example, in the Middle East where drinkable water is scarce), he considers that transboundary water resources can also provide opportunities for interstate cooperation, as was the case in relation to cooperation between Argentina, Brazil and Paraguay over the use of the Parana River. As for the possibility of an upstream state using a river as a weapon of war by denying a downstream state adequate water supply, strangely Deudney claims that this possibility is implausible since a dam used by an upstream state for this purpose could always be attacked militarily (whereas to me, a military attack on a dam sounds like a war over water!). Deudney also argues that military attacks differ from environmental degradation in their timeframes (they are more immediate) and intention (they are usually intended).⁷¹ Similarly, Eckersley describes most 'military threats' as 'discrete, specific and deliberate' and motivated by a zero-sum, adversarial attitude, whereas 'environmental threats are usually diffuse, transboundary, unintended, operate over longer time scales ... implicate a wide range of actors,' and their resolution promises mutual benefits.⁷² While there is some truth to these claims, the contrast is perhaps overdrawn. Even classic interstate conflicts can be diffuse, are by definition transboundary, can have unintended consequences, persist over long periods, involve many actors and bring 'common benefits' upon their resolution. If, as I would argue, this was true of many Cold War tensions, proxy wars, civil wars, wars of national liberation (self-determination and secessionist conflicts)—including the 'Troubles' in Ireland, Basque separatism and enduring Middle East conflicts—it is truer still of many ethnic and religious conflicts, particularly intrastate ones, as well as terrorist actions, since the Cold War's end.

Second, Deudney argues against the securitization of the environment as a matter of national security. The values, norms and mentalities of the global environmental movement and national security are too different. The mission of the environmental movement will be sullied by association with the bloody, adversarial, zero-sum, jingoistic, secretive, hierarchical and centralized work of national security. The national security approach is unsuited to the long-term, multi-layered, behaviourally-oriented strategies needed to combat environmental decline. For Deudney, wars on social problems such as poverty, drugs and crime do not bode well for a war on environmental harm. Not only would such an approach lead to a focus on how other states threaten us with the irresponsible use of their environment (conveniently distracting us from the actions of our own states), but it risks unhelpful military responses to environmental problems.⁷³ Domestically it could result in a kind of green fascism that rides roughshod over the claims of indigenous peoples, internationally it could amount to what Nancy Peluso calls a 'coercive conservation' (and Deudney 'eco-totalitarianism') in which the discourse of environmentalism is a rationalization for dispossessing local populations of their resources to enrich elites and TNCs.⁷⁴ Simon Dalby, influenced by Marxist, critical, World System and WOMP theories, similarly criticizes the securitization of environmental problems. He argues that there is a high risk of Northern, geopolitical, neocolonialist adventures. Such adventures are more about powerful states' economic and strategic interests than they are about protecting the environment. These states manage, blame and exploit the Third World while leaving the fundamental causes of global injustice and poverty such as capitalism, US hegemony and Western overconsumption untouched. Dalby also argues that the securitization of the environment is connected with the vested interests of the military and security establishment (whose funding and justification depend on the discovery of new threats), and raises the possibility of military 'solutions' insensitive to local environmental problems. The new environmental interventionism will, in Dalby's view, be confined to developing states. Powerful states will be immune to the discipline, sanctions and military responses prescribed for other ones.⁷⁵ Eckersley has also argued that 'short-term, highly technical' military actions are only 'rarely able to tackle underlying causes of environmental problems.'⁷⁶ But this is true of military responses generally, which usually do not address the underlying causes of war. Also, as Eckersley recognizes in her discussion of ecological intervention, the military is better used in emergency situations where its resources, technical skill (especially regarding engineering, construction and logistics), training, command structures and discipline are virtues. The military (peacekeepers or 'National Guard'-style forces) has responded domestically and internationally to natural disasters like tsunamis, earthquakes, floods, fires and landslides.⁷⁷

In any event, treating environmental degradation as a matter of security need not involve thinking of it in military terms and responses. To continue to think in this way is to remain in the thrall of the realist national security mindset: the very mindset that the broadening of security to encompass environmental concerns is designed to challenge. In short, securitizing environmental concerns is only problematic when security is understood in traditional, realist terms. For instance, why couldn't ecologically responsible states cooperate with each other as part of their approach to security? After all, Deudney recognized this possibility in the context of the interstate management of river systems.⁷⁸ Moreover, as I have emphasized, security has a very long-established meaning in civil contexts, connected with economic and social security, human rights, welfare, human well-being, basic needs and social democracy. Thus, longer-term, non-military solutions to environmental problems of the kind

Deudney and Eckersley urge (for example, sustainable development, reformed trade and credit regimes, transfer of technology, disarmament, reduction of poverty, debt relief and ecologically sensitive modernization) and security are not mutually exclusive.⁷⁹

These considerations apply equally to radical theorists such as Ole Waever who have criticized the securitization of environmental issues on the basis that, like the war on terror, such an approach encourages a kind of ‘political triage’ where the ‘urgent’ displaces the more important (for example, body screening at airports rather than investigation of the underlying causes of terrorism), and where civil liberties disappear into the black hole of security state exceptionalism. While these cautions are important—as seen in the way governments can use wars, ‘states of emergency’ and security discourse generally to suspend human rights and the rule of law, to centralize power, suppress dissent and persecute minorities and the marginalized—they depend again on a traditional realist approach to security. The traditional connotations of the word ‘security’ are no doubt difficult to dispel, nevertheless broader, civil and humane conceptions of security do allow for the systemic, longer-run critiques of modernization and industrialism that radical critics (as well as Critical Political Ecologists) want to make.⁸⁰

Eric Stern’s idea of comprehensive security (somewhat different from the notion of comprehensive security that has been influential in the Asia-Pacific region) is compatible with the UNDP’s conception of human security and has a number of virtues. First, it recognizes the many dimensions of security: political, economic, social, environmental and military. Second, it acknowledges the multilevel nature of security, what Stern calls kinds of ‘social aggregation,’ including political parties, social movements, IGOs, NGOs and regions. Third, it sees the potential for nation-states to play a positive role in environmental protection as they cooperate with, guide and are directed by various levels of governance. As with Eckersley’s green state, and the brief account of a humane state in this paper, Stern’s comprehensive security anticipates and endorses a transformation of sovereignty, upward to the transnational level and downward to regional and sub-national communities, groups and individuals. As Stern says, the world is likely to see a ‘mixed system of governance characterized by an uneasy distribution of authority between autonomous subnational entities, national governments, and emergent supranational institutions, such as regional and global formal organizations, regimes, and a developing body of international law.’⁸¹ Fourth, Stern urges security policy-makers, and those who evaluate their decisions, to be explicit about the complex trade-offs between different values (for example, between economic and environmental security) and unforeseen externalities, thus hoping to make policy-making more transparent, accountable, responsible and democratic. Finally, Stern identifies possible candidates for overarching, core values, namely ‘survival, autonomy, and health,’ and then proceeds to list various threats to health, life-supporting ecological goods, ‘valued non-human ecosystems’ and biodiversity. All of these values come comfortably within the UNDP’s definition of human security.⁸²

Just as I have argued for a humane state exercising a conditional sovereignty for the benefit of people within its borders, Robyn Eckersley has urged the greening of the state so that it is ‘ecologically responsible.’ In Eckersley’s view, since states are likely to remain important actors on the global scene for the foreseeable future, it is crucial to ask how they might be reformed to exercise their powers and capacities to enhance the protection of the environment while maintaining a sustainable and socially

just economy and providing various public goods and infrastructure. The state can also regulate and reorient investment, production and consumption in pursuit of ecological sustainability. States, in conjunction with national and transnational civil communities and a wide range of other actors at the global, regional and local levels, have the potential to act as ecological stewards or trustees to combat the harsher aspects of (particularly neoliberal) capitalist economic globalization, to be good international citizens in a society of states, and to steer themselves and their citizens away from virulent, parochial forms of nation-statism.⁸³

Inventively, Eckersley seeks to transform what she terms the negative sovereignty of non-intervention so that states, especially those in the South, can invoke it to *protect* ecosystems. She does this by arguing that ecological protection could be linked to a state's protection of its territorial integrity (which includes ecosystems) and political independence, which includes the capacity and right to determine standards for, and to maintain, the quality of its natural environment in accordance with international law. Additionally, environmental hazards caused by other states and entering into the victim state—such as toxins, radiation, waste, acid rain—may be condemned and resisted on the basis of human rights norms (including the rights to life, health and to an adequate environment). Eckersley even maintains that some of these damaging environmental intrusions amount to attacks on the victim state and are thus prohibited under Article 2(4) of the UN Charter. However, Eckersley's interpretation of 'attack' is not yet part of international law, and the analogy between armed attack and environmental intrusions will sometimes be strained given the difference in intention between one state's armed attack and another state's recklessness or negligence causing environmental harm. But this will not always be the case: conceivably a state could intend to cause harm to the environment of another state. For example, states might cause such harm as part of a 'scorched earth' strategy of warfare, with or without the use of biological or chemical weapons (one thinks of Iraq's destruction of oil wells and the USA's use of Agent Orange and napalm in the Vietnam War).⁸⁴

By universalizing the principles reinforcing this sovereign 'green shield,' a state benefiting from the invocation of self-determination, sovereignty and non-intervention would itself be required not to use its territory in ways that harm the ecosystems and human and non-human species in other states. In particular, its economic activities would be duly restrained by this norm. Although Eckersley herself does not make the argument, one might extrapolate that just as the democratic peace thesis supposes that the best way to achieve global peace is for as many states as possible to democratize (since such states are thought not to wage war against each other), the more states employ the principle of non-intervention to protect their own environments—the greener they become—the more likely it is that environmental degradation will be prevented or at least retarded. Eckersley imagines that states might internalize a general norm of environmental stewardship as part of their very being, much as they now exercise proprietary, exploitative dominion over their territories. Indeed, according to Eckersley, stewardship should replace proprietorship as the ruling global value. One obstacle to the needed process of socialization, however, is that many states, especially in the South, will guard jealously their economic sovereignty, preferring it to any environmental benefit a green shield might bring. Difficult questions can also be raised about the framing of these issues in terms of ecosystems *within* states, given that ecosystems will sometimes straddle a number of state borders as some river systems do.⁸⁵

Political philosopher Henry Shue has also sought to reconcile a state's economic development, which he sees as a 'just cause,' with protection of the environment and humans in other states potentially affected by the development. In Shue's view, States must not pursue development by 'unjust means.' Specifically, a state is responsible for all people, not only citizens, that are affected by the state's development activities, when its policies have substantially harmed (especially when injuring 'physical integrity') victims in states that cannot prevent the harm, and where benign means of development are available that the perpetrator state has not used.⁸⁶

Eckersley has recently developed her views on 'ecological intervention' ('the threat or use of force by a state or coalition of states within the territory of another state *and without the consent of that state* in order to prevent grave environmental damage') and 'ecological defense' (the 'preventive use of force in response to the threat of serious and immediate environmental harm into the territory of a "victim" state'). Eckersley defines intervention as a military or paramilitary response by a state or states under the authority of the UN Security Council (or, given its inaction, as an exercise of self-defence under Article 51 of the UN Charter) to an ecological emergency. She argues that the idea of legal, moral, legitimate and proportionate responses of this kind in peacetime is not implausible given the recognition in international law of environmental war crimes, as well as the prospects for 'green helmet' peacekeeping. Eckersley's prescriptions for intervention usefully build on human rights and humanitarian intervention norms (including those concerning crimes against humanity and genocide) as well as R2P.⁸⁷

Like the ICISS, which developed the R2P principle, Eckersley is aware of the perils of intervening militarily, let alone using military force to protect the environment. These perils include the following: the possible double standards (powerful states will intervene in smaller states in the South but will be immune to intervention themselves); the existence of ulterior motives for intervention; uncertainty in threat assessment; unintended consequences of intervention (including civilian casualties); and the risk of failed interventions. She thus cautions that military intervention must be used only as a last resort, after thorough cost-benefit analysis of the alternatives of inaction or non-military responses.⁸⁸ But we need more information than Eckersley provides regarding exactly *how* military action (and specifically what *kinds* of actions?) will prevent the contemplated environmental harms (and exactly *which* environmental harms can be prevented in this way). In some cases, it will no doubt be possible to prevent harm by arresting potential individual perpetrators, but often the causes and agents of the harm will be harder to identify, to constrain and to hold to account (in this regard, the difficulty of war crime prosecutions and the frequent impunity of corporations, domestically and internationally, is instructive).

VI. CONCLUSION

This paper has argued for a holistic conception of human security: conceptual lopsidedness should be avoided. As Marlies Glasius has argued effectively, human security is distorted when there is a lopsided emphasis on either freedom from fear or freedom from want.⁸⁹ Both are necessary. Moreover, one must attend to the interactions and interdependencies between these approaches. The analogy between these requirements and the UN's description of human rights as universal, interdependent and

indivisible is helpful in this regard. Indeed, the UN advocates precisely this holistic approach to human security.⁹⁰ In contrast, as Glasius notes, a narrow operationalization of human security, by Canada and the Human Security Network (HSN) for example, has neglected the challenges of poverty and is more in tune with the way states already operate.⁹¹ But Japan and other states in the Asia Pacific have also at times taken human security in a distorted direction, one that overemphasizes the role of the state as the object of security and prioritizes internal order, sovereignty and non-intervention, national unity, economic development, and poverty reduction over regionally sensitive issues of democracy, civil and political human rights and humanitarian intervention. A positive approach to freedom from want human security is no defence to state repression, killings and other gross human rights violations of the kind that Canada and the HSN have been most concerned about. Again, these kinds of debates were played out in the strategic distortions of Eastern and Western rhetoric during the Cold War over whether civil and political or economic and social rights were the real human rights.⁹²

In addition to the question of lopsidedness, there is also the challenge of working out where human security fits in with the existing human rights, human development, peace and (national) security sectors. Glasius's description of human security as 'a paradigm shifting and bridging concept' is an illuminating one.⁹³ It reminds us that while there are important new emphases that human security brings, there are also essential continuities with past values, norms and laws associated with human rights, human development, and peace and security. This is not surprising given that human security emerged from the fusion of various humanitarian approaches to security, development and human rights. Human security is best regarded as a change of perspective, an overarching norm and a coordinating principle for the security, development and human rights sectors. It complements the role of the state in relation to what I would call its R2P3 responsibility: the prima facie responsibility of the state to protect human beings from death and violence, to provide economic and social welfare and security, and to preserve the environment.

The final challenge to human security considered here concerns how in myriad contexts the various actors and sectors responding to human insecurities can be coordinated. This challenge is not confined to human security of course; it applies to more traditional approaches as well. With regard to humanitarian and development operations, for example, the challenge of coordinating and integrating the UN, other international organizations, regional institutions, and state and non-state actors is well known. It has been evident in recent humanitarian responses to the Haiti earthquake. But the advantage of a human security approach is its frankness about these concerns and its development, in bodies such as the UN's Human Security Unit, of strategies to address them.⁹⁴

Glasius's solution to the coordination challenge is in effect to remove it by training people as human security all-rounders, what I would call super-operatives who can do it all:

The human security worker would be a highly trained professional, graduated from a human security academy. She would need to have training in military and police skills, such as disarming combatants, making arrests and containing angry crowds; in how to understand development concepts and practices, such as participation and gender awareness; and in multi-purpose skills, such as logistical and legal knowledge. When not deployed she would be constantly training and exercising. Before any deployment,

however urgent, some learning sessions should always be devoted to the political and cultural context of the location. Apart from the general curriculum, each human security worker could be specialized in one 'hard' and one 'soft' area of expertise. These could be unrelated—say, making arrests and information provision—but better still these might be related skills, so the same person would be specialized in disarmament and in reintegration of former combatants in civilian society, or in mine clearance and land-rights disputes.⁹⁵

This is too ambitious and not the best approach. It is like asking an anaesthetist to become an occupational therapist, physiotherapist, radiologist, nurse and surgeon. The better approach is to persist with efforts to improve the integration and coordination of, and communication between, the various sectors and actors involved in securing human beings. There is no need for proponents of human security to anxiously demonstrate how human security is not like human rights, human development or peacebuilding, how it makes a unique and completely novel contribution. The great strength of human security is how it can draw upon, make sense of and enhance a whole range of existing values, norms and regulations in the human rights, development and security sectors. So, to extend my metaphor, human security is like the objective of good health in medicine. A medical team coherently uses the full range of its expertise and experience to prevent illness, to intervene more intrusively when necessary, to assist patients post-operatively and to help them sustain good health through new ways of living—all with the active participation of the patient. So, also, human security draws upon expertise and experience from the human rights, security and development sectors, among others, to prevent insecurities, intervene appropriately, manage post-conflict situations and to transform the conditions and practices of individuals and communities to sustain any gains. Just this kind of thinking is reflected in the UN Human Security Unit's view that human security requires

the development of an interconnected network of diverse stakeholders drawing from the expertise and resources of a wide range of actors across the UN ... private and public sectors at the local, national, regional and international levels ... [and] synergies and partnerships that capitalize on the comparative advantage of each implementing organization and help empower individuals and communities to act on their own behalf.⁹⁶

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Notes

¹ Quoted in S. Neil MacFarlane and Yuen Foong Khong, *Human Security and the UN: A Critical History* (Bloomington and Indianapolis, IN: Indiana University Press, 2006), 35. In this paper, at times I draw upon other papers I completed during 2009–2010, viz.: Stephen James, 'The Precursors of Human Security'; 'Two Themes: Freedom from Fear and Freedom from Want'; and 'The Institutionalization of Human Security' (unpublished, 2009–2010).

² Dan Oakes, 'Defence Spending Questioned,' *The Age* (Melbourne), 10 March 2010, 2.

³ Pauline Kerr, *The Evolving Dialectic Between State-centric and Human-centric Security*, Working Paper 2003/2, Department of International Relations, Australian National University, Canberra, September 2003.

⁴ Human Security Unit, Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, United Nations, *Human Security in Theory and Practice: Application of the Human Security Concept and the United Nations Trust Fund for Human Security* (New York: Human Security Unit, 2009), 55–57.

⁵ Mary Martin and Taylor Owen, 'The Second Generation of Human Security: Lessons from the UN and EU Experience,' *International Affairs* 86, no. 2 (2010): 211–224, at 211.

⁶ Marlies Glasius, 'Human Security from a Paradigm Shift to Operationalization: Job Description for a Human Security Worker,' *Security Dialogue* 39, no. 1 (2008): 31–54; Mark Neufeld, 'Pitfalls of Emancipation and Discourses of Security: Reflections on Canada's "Security with a Human Face,"' *International Relations* 18, no 1 (2004): 109–123; Keith Krause, 'Building the Agenda of Human Security: Policy and Practice within the Human Security Network,' in Moufida Goucha and John Crowley (eds), *Rethinking Human Security* (Oxford: Blackwell, 2008), 65–79; Human Security Unit, *Human Security in Theory and Practice*, 55–57.

⁷ Human Security Unit, *Human Security in Theory and Practice*, 55–56.

⁸ *Ibid.*, 58.

⁹ *Ibid.*, 55–58.

¹⁰ Krause, 'Building the Agenda of Human Security,' 77, and generally; Glasius, 'Human Security from Paradigm Shift to Operationalization'; Sarah Michael, 'The Role of NGOs in Human Security,' The Hauser Center for Nonprofit Organizations and The Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University, November 2002, Working Paper No. 12; Marianne Elliott, et al., 'Human Security Discussion Paper,' Oxfam, c.2009.

¹¹ Krause, 'Building the Agenda of Human Security,' 76–77. See also the selection of articles in the special section on human security in *Security Dialogue* 35, no. 3 (September 2004).

¹² For detailed accounts of UN and other institutional definitions of human security, see Taylor Owen, 'The Uncertain Future of Human Security in the UN,' in *Rethinking Human Security*, 113–127; Sabina Alkire, *A Conceptual Framework for Human Security*, Working Paper 2, Centre for Research on Inequality, Human Security and Ethnicity (CRISE), Queen Elizabeth House, University of Oxford, 2003, 48–49; Human Security Unit, *Human Security in Theory and Practice*, 55–58.

¹³ Barbara Von Tigerstrom, *Human Security and International Law: Prospects and Problems* (Oxford; Portland, OR: Hart, 2007), 1–19, 28–29; UNDP, *Human Development Report 1994: New Dimensions of Human Security* (New York: United Nations Development Program, 1994), 3, 13–21, 90–101; Pauline Ewan, 'Deepening the Human Security Debate: Beyond the Politics of Conceptual Clarification,' *Politics* 27, no. 3 (2007): 182–189, at 184.

¹⁴ Taylor Owen, 'Challenges and Opportunities for Defining and Measuring Human Security,' *Disarmament Forum* 3 (2004): 15–24, at 18; Mary Martin and Taylor Owen, 'The Second Generation of Human Security,' 211–224, at 213; Taylor Owen, 'The Uncertain Future of Human Security in the UN,' in *Rethinking Human Security*, 113–127, at 115; Human Security Unit, *Human Security in Theory and Practice*, 55–56.

¹⁵ Taylor Owen, 'Challenges and Opportunities,' 18. For similar inventories, see: Pauline Kerr, *The Evolving Dialectic*, 9; Kanti Bajpai, *Human Security: Concept and Measurement: Kroc Institute Occasional Paper, no. 19: OP: 1* (August 2000), University of Notre Dame (USA), 15; Shahrbanou Tadjbakhsh and Anuradha M. Chenoy, *Human Security: Concepts and Implications* (London and New York: Routledge, 2007), 15–17. See also: Sara Edson, *Human Security: An Extended and Annotated Bibliography*, Common Security Forum, Centre for History and Economics, King's College, University of Cambridge, 1 June 2001; Caroline Thomas, 'Global Governance, Development and Human Security: Exploring the Links,' *Third World Quarterly* 22, no. 2 (2001): 159–175, at 162; Gary King and Christopher J.L. Murray, 'Rethinking Human Security,' *Political Science Quarterly* 116, no. 4 (2001–2002): 585–610, at 589; Sabina Alkire, *A Conceptual Framework for Human Security*.

¹⁶ Commission on Human Security, *Human Security Now* (New York: Commission on Human Security, 2003), iv, 2, 4.

¹⁷ *Ibid.*, 6, 9, 12, and *passim*.

¹⁸ International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty, *The Responsibility to Protect* (Ottawa, Canada: International Development Research Centre, 2001), 15. See also Gareth Evans, *The Responsibility to Protect: Ending Mass Atrocity Crimes Once and for All* (Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution, 2008), 34–35.

¹⁹ See, for example, Neufeld, 'Pitfalls of Emancipation and Discourses of Security'; Sorpong Peou (ed.), *Human Security in East Asia: Challenges for Collaborative Action* (London and New York: Routledge, 2009); David Capie and Paul Evans, *The Asia-Pacific Security Lexicon* 2nd edn (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2007); *The Role of NGOs in Human Security*. For a very useful collection of short conceptual articles on human security by a range of academics, see the special issue of *Security Dialogue* 35, no. 3 (September 2004). See also: David Chandler, 'Human Security: The Dog that Didn't Bark,' *Security Dialogue* 39, no. 4 (August 2008): 427–438; Taylor Owen, 'The Critique that Doesn't Bite: A Response to David Chandler's "Human Security: The Dog that Didn't Bark,"' *Security Dialogue* 39, no. 4 (August 2008): 445–453; Caroline Thomas, 'Global Governance, Development and Human Security: Exploring the Links,' *Third World Quarterly* 22, no. 2 (2001): 159–175; P.H. Liotta, 'Boomerang Effect: The Convergence of National and International Security,' *Security Dialogue* 33, no. 4 (December 2002): 473–488; Gary King and Christopher J.L. Murray, 'Rethinking Human Security'; Pauline Ewan, 'Deepening the Human Security Debate'; Yuen Foong Khong, 'Human Security: A Shotgun Approach to Alleviating Human Misery?', *Global Governance* 7 (2001): 231–236; Ken Booth, 'Realities of Security: Editor's Introduction,' *International Relations* 18, no. 1 (2004): 5–8; Roland Paris, 'Human Security: Paradigm Shift or Hot Air?', *International Security* 26, no. 2 (Fall 2001): 87–101; Astri Suhrke, 'Human Security and the Interests of States,' *Security Dialogue* 30, no. 3 (September 1999): 265–276; Annick T.R. Wibben, 'Human Security: Toward an Opening,' *Security Dialogue* 39, no. 4 (August 2008): 455–462; David Roberts, 'The Intellectual Perils of Broad Human Security: Deepening the Critique of International Relations,' *Politics* 28, no. 2 (2008): 124–127; Tadjbakhsh and Chenoy, *Human Security: Concepts and Implications*.

²⁰ See Mike Sheehan, 'The Changing Character of War,' John Baylis, 'International and Global Security,' Ngaire Woods, 'International Political Economy in an Age of Globalization,' Richard Little, 'International Regimes,' Peter Willetts, 'Transnational Actors and International Organizations in Global Politics,' John Vogler, 'Environmental Issues,' James T. Kiras, 'Terrorism and Globalization,' Edward Best and Thomas Christiansen, 'Regionalism in International Affairs,' Jan Aart Scholte, 'Global Trade and Finance,' Caroline Thomas, 'Poverty, Development, and Hunger,' and Ian Clark, 'Globalization and the Post-Cold War Order,' in John Baylis, Steve Smith and Patricia Owens (eds), *The Globalization of World Politics: An Introduction to International Relations* 4th edn (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), Chs 12, 13, 14, 17, 19, 20, 21, 25, 26, 27, 32; Joseph A. Camilleri, 'Security: Old Dilemmas

and New Challenges in the Post—Cold War Environment,' *Geojournal* 34, no. 2 (October 1994): 134–145; Joseph A. Camilleri and Jim Falk, *The End of Sovereignty? The Politics of a Shrinking and Fragmenting World* (Aldershot, Hants: Edward Elgar, 1992); Steven Slaughter, 'Globalisation and its Critics,' in Richard Devetak, et al. (eds), *An Introduction to International Relations: Australian Perspectives* (Melbourne: Cambridge University Press), Ch 25.

²¹ I thank Joseph Camilleri for the structure employed here to examine the drivers of the development of the human security concept.

²² Willetts, 'Transnational Actors,' 332.

²³ *Ibid.*, 332–334.

²⁴ Camilleri, 'Security,' 139–143, and generally Camilleri and Falk, *The End of Sovereignty?*; Willetts, 'Transnational Actors.'

²⁵ Willetts, 'Transnational Actors,' 331–332.

²⁶ Scholte, 'Global Trade and Finance'; Camilleri, 'Security'; Slaughter, 'Globalisation.'

²⁷ Slaughter, 'Globalisation,' 303; Camilleri, 'Security,' 139–144; Scholte, 'Global Finance and Trade,' 452; Best and Christiansen, 'Regionalism'; Willetts, 'Transnational Actors.'

²⁸ Camilleri, 'Security,' 136–138.

²⁹ Sheehan, 'The Changing Character of War'; Willetts, 'Transnational Actors,' 337.

³⁰ Kiras, 'Terrorism'; Willetts, 'Transnational Actors,' 338.

³¹ Scholte, 'Global Trade and Finance,' 453–461; Camilleri, 'Security,' 140–141; Woods, 'International Political Economy'; Willetts, 'Transnational Actors,' 335.

³² Scholte, 'Global Trade and Finance,' 457–458.

³³ Willetts, 'Transnational Actors,' 335; Woods, 'International Political Economy,' 253.

³⁴ *Ibid.*, 336.

³⁵ In what follows, I rely on Scholte, 'Global Trade and Finance,' 459–462.

³⁶ I thank Robyn Eckersley for drawing attention to these concerns.

³⁷ *Ibid.*, 453, 462, 466; Slaughter, 'Globalisation,' 295–296 (on hyperglobalism).

³⁸ Camilleri, 'Security,' 141; Jon Barnett and W. Neil Adger, 'Climate Change, Human Security and Violent Conflict,' *Political Geography* 26 (2007): 639–655; Josef Schmidhuber and Francesco N. Tubiello, 'Global Food Security Under Climate Change,' *Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America* 104, no. 50 (11 December 2007): 19703–19708.

³⁹ Stephen James, 'The Precursors of Human Security,' unpublished ms, December 2009; Camilleri, 'Security,' 140–141; Capie and Evans, *The Asia-Pacific Security Lexicon*, 59–63; Baylis, 'International and Global Security,' 230. See also MacFarlane and Khong, *Human Security and the UN*; Mark Nucleous, 'From Social to National Security: On the Fabrication of Economic Order,' *Security Dialogue* 37, no. 3 (September 2006): 353–384.

⁴⁰ Capie and Evans, *The Asia-Pacific Security Lexicon*, 59.

⁴¹ Quotations from *ibid.*, 60; Camilleri, 'Security,' 140–141.

⁴² Quoted in Capie and Evans, *The Asia-Pacific Security Lexicon*, 62

⁴³ Capie and Evans, *The Asia-Pacific Security Lexicon*, 61–62 (see also China's 'new security approach,' discussed 169–172).

⁴⁴ Camilleri, 'Security,' 141; Capie and Evans, *The Asia-Pacific Security Lexicon*, 106.

⁴⁵ Camilleri, 'Security,' 141; Capie and Evans, *The Asia-Pacific Security Lexicon*, 106–108.

⁴⁶ Quoted in Capie and Evans, *The Asia-Pacific Security Lexicon*, 107.

⁴⁷ Camilleri, 'Security,' 141; Capie and Evans, *The Asia-Pacific Lexicon*, 65–75 (and 173–178, on non-traditional security); Eric K. Stern, 'The Case for Comprehensive Security,' in Daniel H. Deudney and Richard A. Matthew (eds), *Contested Grounds: Security and Conflict in the New Environmental Politics* (Albany, NY: State University of New York Press, 1999), 1–22.

⁴⁸ For this account of non-traditional security I rely on Capie and Evans, *The Asia-Pacific Security Lexicon*, 173–178.

⁴⁹ Paris, 'Human Security: Paradigm Shift or Hot Air?', 88; Von Tigerstrom, *Human Security and International Law*, 27.

⁵⁰ Von Tigerstrom, *Human Security and International Law*, 1–15, 57. Camilleri's phrase can be found in his *Regionalism in the New Asia-Pacific Order: The Political Economy of the Asia-Pacific Region Volume II* (Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar, 2003), 306. See also Camilleri, 'Security,' 135–145 and 'The Security Dilemma Revisited'; James's papers, above, n 1. On feminist critiques, see, for example, V. Spike Peterson and Laura Parisi, 'Are Women Human? It's Not an Academic Question,' in Tony Evans (ed.), *Human Rights Fifty Years On: A Reappraisal* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1998), 132–160; J. Ann Tickner, 'Re-visioning Security,' in Ken Booth and Steve Smith (eds), *International Relations Theory Today* (Cambridge: Polity, 1995), 175–197; Alison Brysk, 'Now We Are All Globalists?' and V. Spike Peterson, 'Contending Imaginaries,' *Global Change, Peace & Security* 22, no. 1 (February 2010): 17–20, 9–15.

⁵¹ Von Tigerstrom, *Human Security and International Law*, 28–29, 30–32. See also James's papers, above, n 1.

⁵² Commission on Human Security, *Human Security Now*, 73. See also Taylor Owen, 'Human Security—Conflict, Critique and Consensus: Colloquium Remarks and a Proposal for a Threshold-based Definition,' *Security Dialogue* 35, no. 3 (September 2004): 373–387; Taylor Owen, 'Challenges and Opportunities for Defining and Measuring Human Security'; Mary Martin and Taylor Owen, 'The Second Generation of Human Security'; Taylor Owen, 'The Uncertain Future of Human Security in the UN'; King and Murray, 'Rethinking Human Security,' 585 ('we propose a simple, rigorous, and measurable definition of human security: the number of years of future life spent outside a state of "generalized poverty." Generalized poverty occurs when an individual falls below the threshold of any key domain of human well-being.'). Generalized poverty occurs when an individual falls below the threshold of any key domain of human well-being.'). Roberts, 'The Intellectual Perils of Broad Human Security'; Ramesh Thakur, 'A Political Worldview,' *Security Dialogue* 35, no. 3 (September 2004): 347–348, at 347 ('One possible solution to the definitional dilemma is to focus on security policy in relation to crisis, short of which it is more accurate to assess welfare gains and losses through the development agenda.'). Consider, also, the United Nations University's definition of human security: 'the protection of people from critical and life-threatening dangers, regardless of whether the threats are rooted in anthropogenic activities or natural events, whether they lie within or outside states, and whether they are direct or structural': quoted in Thakur, 'A Political Worldview,' 348.

⁵³ Ibid., 32–33. See also UNDP, *Human Development Report 1994*; Commission on Human Security, *Human Security Now*.

⁵⁴ Ibid., 33–34; Jon Barnett, 'Security and Climate Change,' *Global Environmental Change* 13, no. 1 (April 2003): 7–17; Barnett and Adger, 'Climate Change, Human Security and Violent Conflict,' 639–655; Dennis Altman, 'AIDS and Security,' *International Relations* 17, no. 4 (2003): 417–427.

⁵⁵ Von Tigerstrom, *Human Security and International Law*, 43–45; Altman, 'AIDS and Security'; Sandra J. Maclean, 'Microbes, Mad Cows and Militaries: Exploring the Links Between Health and Security,' *Security Dialogue* 39, no. 5: 475–494.

⁵⁶ Von Tigerstrom, *Human Security and International Law*, 39–43, 52–54.

⁵⁷ Ibid., 38–43. See also James's papers, cited above, n 1; MacFarlane and Khong, *Human Security and the UN*; Commission on Human Security, *Human Security Now*; International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty, *The Responsibility to Protect*; Bellamy and Wheeler, 'Humanitarian Intervention in World Politics,' in Baylis, *The Globalization of World Politics*, 522–539.

⁵⁸ Ibid., 23, 49–58, Ch 2 (*passim*), Conclusion (*passim*). See also James's papers, *ibid.*; International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty, *The Responsibility to Protect*, especially at viii, 5, 15, 32, 49, 71; MacFarlane and Khong, *Human Security and the UN*; Martin Loughlin, *The Idea of Public Law* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004), Chs 1 and 2 (especially at 5–12) (on Cicero); Stephen James, *Universal Human Rights: Origins and Development* (New York: L.F.B. Scholarly Publishing, 2007), especially 13–16; Bellamy and Wheeler, 'Humanitarian Intervention in World Politics.'

⁵⁹ See Robyn Eckersley, *Environmentalism and Political Theory: Toward an Ecocentric Approach* (Albany, NY: State University of New York Press, 1992); Robyn Eckersley, *The Green State: Rethinking Democracy and Sovereignty* (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2004); Robyn Eckersley, 'Communitarianism,' in Andrew Dobson and Robyn Eckersley (eds), *Political Theory and Ecological Challenge* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006), 91–108; Robyn Eckersley, 'Environmental Security, Climate Change, and Globalizing Terrorism,' in Damian Grenfell and Paul James (eds), *Rethinking Insecurity, War and Violence: Beyond Savage Globalization?* (London and New York: Routledge, 2009), 85–97; Robyn Eckersley, 'Ecological Intervention: Prospects and Limits,' *Ethics and International Affairs* 21, no. 3 (Fall 2007): 293–316; Peter Christoff and Robyn Eckersley, 'The Kyoto Protocol and the Asia Pacific Partnership on Clean Development and Climate,' in Tim Bonyhardy and Peter Christoff (eds), *Climate Law in Australia* (Annandale, New South Wales: Federation Press, 2007), 32–45; Andrew Linklater, 'Cosmopolitanism,' in Dobson and Eckersley, *Political Theory and the Ecological Challenge*, 109–127; Daniel H. Deudney, 'Environmental Security: A Critique,' in Deudney and Matthew, *Contested Grounds*, 187–219; Richard A. Matthew, 'Introduction: Mapping Contested Grounds,' in Deudney and Matthew, *Contested Grounds*, 1–22; Daniel H. Deudney, 'Bringing Nature Back In: Geopolitical Theory from the Greeks to the Global Era,' in Deudney and Matthew, *Contested Grounds*, 25–57; Thomas F. Homer-Dixon, 'Thresholds of Turmoil: Environmental Scarcities and Violent Conflict,' in Deudney and Matthew, *Contested Grounds*, 69–90; Michel Fr  d  rick, 'A Realist's Conceptual Definition of Environmental Security,' in Deudney and Matthew, *Contested Grounds*, 91–108; Eric K. Stern, 'The Case for Comprehensive Security,' in Deudney and Matthew, *Contested Grounds*, 127–154; Simon Dalby, 'Threats from the South? Geopolitics, Equity, and Environmental Security,' in Deudney and Matthew, *Contested Grounds*, 155–185; Richard A. Matthew, 'Conclusion: Settling Contested Grounds,' in *Contested Grounds*, 291–301.

⁶⁰ Matthew, 'Introduction,' 10; Eckersley, *Environmentalism and Political Theory*, Ch 1. See also Macfarlane and Khong, *Human Security and the UN*.

⁶¹ Eckersley, 'Environmental Security,' 87.

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- ⁶² Ibid., 87–88; Stern, ‘The Case for Comprehensive Security,’ 133.
- ⁶³ Eckersley, ‘Environmental Security,’ 89–91.
- ⁶⁴ Homer-Dixon, ‘Thresholds of Turmoil.’
- ⁶⁵ Eckersley, ‘Environmental Security,’ 91; Homer-Dixon, ‘Thresholds of Turmoil’; Matthew, ‘Introduction,’ 7–8, 12–13; Schmidhuber and Tubiello, ‘Global Food Security Under Climate Change’; Barnett and Adger, ‘Climate Change, Human Security and Violent Conflict.’
- ⁶⁶ Homer-Dixon, ‘Thresholds of Turmoil,’ 62–65.
- ⁶⁷ Matthew, ‘Introduction,’ 7–8.
- ⁶⁸ Eckersley, ‘Environmental Security,’ 91.
- ⁶⁹ Stephen Walt quoted in Stern, ‘The Case for Comprehensive Security,’ 134–135.
- ⁷⁰ Eckersley, ‘Environmental Security,’ 89; Deudney, ‘Environmental Security’; Dalby, ‘Threats from the South?’
- ⁷¹ Deudney, ‘Environmental Security: A Critique’; Matthew, ‘Introduction,’ 18.
- ⁷² Eckersley, *The Green State*, 225
- ⁷³ Deudney, ‘Environmental Security.’
- ⁷⁴ Ibid., 197–198.
- ⁷⁵ Dalby, ‘Threats from the South?’
- ⁷⁶ Eckersley, *The Green State*, 225
- ⁷⁷ See also Stern, ‘The Case for Comprehensive Security,’ 137–138.
- ⁷⁸ Deudney, ‘Environmental Security,’ 207. See also Eckersley, ‘Environmental Security,’ 88.
- ⁷⁹ Eckersley, *The Green State*, 225–227.
- ⁸⁰ Eckersley, ‘Environmental Security,’ 89.
- ⁸¹ Stern, ‘The Case for Comprehensive Security,’ 131, 140
- ⁸² Stern 142–146, 148; Eckersley, ‘Environmental Security,’ 90.
- ⁸³ Eckersley, *The Green State*, 1–13, 243; Eckersley, ‘Environmental Security.’
- ⁸⁴ Eckersley, *The Green State*, 227–232.
- ⁸⁵ Ibid., 232–238. I am aware, of course, that the democratic peace thesis has hardly been proved.
- ⁸⁶ Eckersley, *The Green State*, 236–237.
- ⁸⁷ Eckersley, ‘Ecological Intervention,’ 293–297.

⁸⁸ Ibid., 302, 312. See also International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty, *The Responsibility to Protect*.

⁸⁹ Glasius, 'Human Security from a Paradigm Shift to Operationalization.'

⁹⁰ See Human Security Unit, *Human Security in Theory and Practice*.

⁹¹ Glasius, 'Human Security from a Paradigm Shift to Operationalization,' 39; Krause, 'Building the Agenda of Human Security,' 65, 69, 71–72; Neufeld, 'Pitfalls of Emancipation and Discourses of Security,' 114. For an example of an avowedly narrow approach to human security, see Human Security Report Project, *Human Security Brief 2007* (Human Security Report Project, Simon Fraser University: Vancouver, BC, 2007).

⁹² Glasius, 'Human Security from a Paradigm Shift to Operationalization'; Peou, *Human Security in East Asia*.

⁹³ Glasius, 'Human Security from a Paradigm Shift to Operationalization,' 31.

⁹⁴ See also *ibid.*; Michael G. Smith and Jacqueline Whelan, 'Advancing Human Security: New Strategic Thinking for Australia,' *Security Challenges* 4, no. 2 (Winter 2008): 1–22; Human Security Unit, *Human Security in Theory and Practice*, 11.

⁹⁵ Glasius, 'Human Security from a Paradigm Shift to Operationalization,' 50.

⁹⁶ Human Security Unit, *Human Security in Theory and Practice*, 11.